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iSummary
As Information Security (IS) standards do not always effectively cater for
Social Engineering (SE) attacks, the expected results of an Information
Security Management System (ISMS), based on such standards, can be
seriously undermined by uncontrolled SE vulnerabilities.
ISO/IEC 17799:2005 is the subject of the current analysis as it is the type of
standard not restricted to technical controls, while encompassing proposals
from other standards and generally-accepted sets of recommendations in the
field.
Following an analysis of key characteristics of SE and based on the study of
Psychological and Social aspects of SE and IS, a detailed examination of
ISO/IEC 17799:2005 is presented and an assessment of the efficiency of its
controls with respect to SE is provided. Furthermore, enhancements to
existing controls and inclusion of new controls aimed at strengthening the
defense against Social Engineering are suggested.
Measurement and quantification issues of IS with respect to SE are also dealt
with. A novel way of assessing the level of Information Assurance in a system
is proposed and sets the basis for future work on this subject.
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1. The problem of Social Engineering in Information Security.
Social Engineering (SE) is neither new nor strictly related with Information
Technology (IT) systems. SE methods are best applied against individuals
who can be convinced, against their better judgement, to do or believe things
that they shouldn't. If these facts are combined with the inherent complexity
and intricacies of present-day IT systems that can not be fully understood by
the systems' users, the unavoidable result is that Information Security (IS) can
certainly be compromised by SE methods of attack. Current IS standards do
provide a framework for improved Information Security. However, as it is
shown by this work, even in an environment governed by standards, there is
always room for a Social Engineer to mount an attack. The very nature of SE
methods makes it difficult to design controls for SE-related vulnerabilities.
Hopefully, this work will shed some light in the direction of devising schemes
for better protection against Social Engineering.
1.1 Problem Area, background
A trend has been under way for quite a while; that of the digitisation of the
modern world. We are presently moving away from the analog models of the
sovereign state and closed (or "finite") communities that governed the
development of the current legal system and hence our notion of "security".
With the evolution of the modern e-world, borders, in the traditional sense of
the word, have already been abolished. In fact, the digitisation of our world
which is bringing people closer and giving them the ability to interact, is
actively demolishing the traditional social structures, replacing them with new
types thereof. Such a transition has already taken place in the past when
mankind passed from the society of the village communities of yesteryear that
was governed by ethics, to the national, and progressively international,
society which was made possible through the existence of a complex legal
system. This legal system is now being proven incapable of dealing with the
effects of societal changes that are already under way. It can thus be deduced
with reasonable certainty that the emerging e-society requires a new form of
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governance. The very nature of e-society actually aggravates the problem of
ensuring the legality of its members' actions in general, as it is now possible -
or even easy- to physically be in one part of the world and commit a crime in
another.
In this transitional day and age, one can take advantage of the shortcomings
of the existing legal system that is not yet adequately equipped to deal with
the arising situations, and offenders can slip from the grasp of the proverbial -
but no longer truly so- "long arm of the law".
As IT systems form the pillars on which e-society is being built, the security of
the information handled by those systems becomes of paramount importance.
Many examples corroborating this statement can be identified:
• Computer systems are increasingly relied upon for monetary transactions,
e-money being just a small part of the bigger picture of the new digital
economy.
• The advantages of e-government (such as the simplification of the
bureaucratic procedures) are made possible only through the
implementation of complex systems that do away with the outdated
bureaucratic models of the past that are still in use around the world.
• In the war against crime and terrorism, national law-enforcement agencies
rely on distributed computer systems to securely identify individuals and
collaborate with corresponding organisations at an international level.
• Personal data is being handled by computer systems for medical,
insurance, financial and other purposes.
• Communications are governed by computer systems. "Least Cost
Routing" ensures that people can communicate efficiently and as cheaply
as possible. When a call is placed from one side of the Atlantic to the
other, the subscriber has neither control nor interest over the type of the
voice channel used, the bandwidth allocated for the conversation, the
physical medium etc., as long as the communication is of acceptable
quality and cost.
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All of these applications and many more play a major role in everyday life. The
extent to which the operation of these computer systems affects modern
society can be indirectly deduced by considering whether there exists a way
that these systems can be abolished altogether, perhaps by reverting to older
techniques, and how society would react to such a change. If the credit card
system were to stop functioning, there is a good chance that people would
feel trapped as their freedom to finance purchases or easily carry out
transactions and conduct business outside geographical confines would be
curtailed. Add to this an abrupt failure of ATM machines and permanent
interruption of Internet banking services at a global scale, and economy would
probably come to a grinding halt. Eventually, alternative methods to conduct
business would probably emerge, but the blow to the economy could be
crucial and hard -if not impossible- to recover from. Similarly, global loss of the
computer systems handling telecommunications, would almost definitely result
in chaos.
1.2 The problems of measurement and comparison
All of the above stress the need for Information Security (IS). Two simple
questions immediately arise: the first one is "how can an Information System
be made secure?" and the second is "how secure is secure?". The notion of
security in general, is neither one that can be readily defined and achieved
nor can it easily be quantified. When it comes to the issue of the security of
Information, the problem becomes even more complicated and difficult to
measure, as the object to be protected is an immaterial one.
In an effort to provide streamlined methods of securing Information Systems,
several Information Security standards and recommended practices have
emerged over the past decade. These security standards and practices,
although they all deal with the general notion of IS, have different mentalities
and tend to approach the issue of IS in different ways. Their focal points are
also different but in many cases, these standards and sets of practices prove
to be complementary to each other in the common effort to ensure security. A
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comparative study of some representative security standards and
recommended best practices is presented by Frangopoulos & Eloff (2004).
It can be argued that the measurement of security is not necessary and that
any system should be made "as secure as possible" (non-availability
notwithstanding). The problem is that no isolated information system really
exists nowadays. Thus, when information is transferred between systems, the
issue of the level of confidentiality immediately comes into play. It is
absolutely unacceptable to pass information from one system to another
without first ensuring that the level of security is comparable between the two
systems. For the notion of comparison to even exist, a common measure
must be devised against which both systems are compared for a useful
deduction to be made. To this end, security standards for information systems
already exist and the degree of conformity of similar systems to the same
standards is currently used as a ruling factor on whether the systems are
compatible with each other with respect to their level of security.
Furthermore, as e-society is being developed, various types of pressure
towards the measurement of IS are emerging. Such an example is the
growing concern voiced by insurance companies that need to base their risk
assessments on solid metrics. Another example is the need of top
management to first establish a baseline and then exactly identify the return
on its investment on security in terms of improvement in overall IS.  An
organisation also needs to know its security standing with respect to its peers
to assess its relative position and not over- or under-budget for security.
Thus, the measurement of the level of security as this applies to the
information handled within the scope of operation of an organisation, is
becoming one of the principal questions pertaining to IS. To address this
issue, the establishment of a holistic risk-management framework that is
based on quantification and metrics, is necessary. The quantification of IS is
an indispensable component of the objective assessment of the current or
projected security status of any information-processing system. Clearly, the
scope of such a quantification can neither be limited to the computer system
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in operation, nor can the security of the computer system handling the
information be judged irrespectively of other information handling systems and
procedures active within the organisation.
To this end, the current mentality of security planning, lies on principles that
cover a very broad base of security measures and controls as these are
applied to all of the organisation's operations and procedures.
1.3 The application of standards
A mentality such as the one described above is displayed by the ISO/IEC
17799:2005 standard (ISO/IEC, 2005a). This standard evolved directly from
the British Standard BS7799 of 1995 (British Standards, 1995) as ISO/IEC
17799:2000 (ISO/IEC, 2000a) and was further revised in 2005, leading into its
present status. This standard can be viewed as a collection of sound practices
that govern all aspects of IS within the bounds of an organisation. As
described by Ted Humphreys (the ISO/IEC JTC1/SC27 WG1 Convenor) in
(Humphreys, 2005), in the 2005 revision of ISO/IEC 17799:2005 steps have
been taken in order to update the standard with new or updated controls, to
delete obsolete controls, to include new developments, to clarify the
standard's text in an international context, to improve the user friendliness of
the control text and to include a detailed section on IS incident management.
In an effort to streamline the creation and maintenance of an Information
Security Management System (or ISMS) based on the original ISO/IEC
17799:2000 / BS 7799:95 standard, BS 7799-part 2 was created in February
of 1998 (British Standards,1998). This British Standard has been the de facto
universal standard in recent years for the creation and maintenance of an
ISMS. BS7799-part 2 has undergone a number of revisions, the most recent
of which was in late 2005 when the standard was presented by ISO/IEC as
the first in the new 27000 series of IS-related ISO/IEC standards, in its current
form as ISO/IEC 27001:2005 (ISO/IEC, 2005b).
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It must be noted that the ISO/IEC 17799:2005 standard will also take its place
in the new 27000 series. According to Humphries (2006) ISO/IEC 17799:2005
will be renamed into ISO/IEC 27002:2007 and will be introduced to the 27000
set in April of 2007. It is expected that the renaming of the standard will not
include a revision. Hence the content of the new 27000-series standard will
not be different from that of the current ISO/IEC 17799:2005 standard. If this
holds true, any discussions relevant to ISO/IEC 17799:2005 that are
presented in this work will be directly applicable to the new ISO/IEC
27002:2007 standard.
ISO 27001 is still based around the Plan-Do-Check-Act (PDCA) model as part
of an iterative management system approach that leads to the development,
implementation, and continual improvement of the effectiveness of an
organization’s IS management system. This, latest, revision includes changes
to the areas of risk assessment, contractual obligations, scope, management
decisions as well as measuring the effectiveness of selected controls.
ISO/IEC 27001:2005 currently requires a) the measurement of the
effectiveness of selected controls and consequently b) an assessment of their
effectiveness (as described in the standard's sections 4.2.2d & 4.2.3c) in a
way that it produces "comparable and reproducible results". However it
neither describes how to achieve this, nor requires that the assessment be
based on a fully quantified evaluation. Instead, the degree of effectiveness of
the ISMS can be deduced in conjunction to audits, security incidents, changes
in external factors such as legislation, etc. This approach is indicative of the
difficulty of the quantification of IS which, thus, remains a rather elusive
system quality.
It is also true that most methods of assessing the need for the introduction of
security in information systems are based on Risk Analysis. As it is discussed
by Kokolakis et al (2000), this Risk Analysis is founded on a rather simplistic
model of information systems that consists of assets, i.e. data, hardware and
software, that are vulnerable to a range of threats. As a result, such a risk
analysis does not take into consideration the organisational environment in
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which the information systems in question, operate. Kokolakis et al (2000) go
further in discussing the view that "a comprehensive methodology for
information systems security analysis and design should incorporate both risk
analysis and organisational analysis that is based on Business Process
Modeling (BPM)".
For the sake of argument it can be assumed that whether based on BPM or
otherwise, a quantification scheme for an IS structure that is based on
generally accepted IS standards, may indeed be possible. From such a
scheme, a measure for applied IS can be extracted and consequently, IS
methodologies that are applied to information systems can be made more
efficient. Thus, quantification should lead to improvement. However, this
deduction can be placed in jeopardy as there exist other, very important
factors stemming from human behaviour that, to the knowledge of this author,
have not been sufficiently addressed in the context of IS standards. The effect
of these factors can seriously destabilise both the expected results of the
application of IS standards on Information Security as well as the
quantification construct related to IS. Although generally acceptable IS
standards and best practices are very useful in streamlining the design and
implementation of security controls against a large variety of threats, they do
not seem to sufficiently address the obscure area of vulnerabilities stemming
directly from the exploitation of the human factor of Information Systems.
There are many reasons that justify the "weaknesses" of the human factor in
this respect, a crucial one being that due to the speed of the onset of the
"digital age", e-society ethics' development is definitely lagging.
1.4 The introduction of  e-ethics and their relation to Social
Engineering
The ability that humans have to distinguish between "good and bad" evolved
through millenia of human existence. It has thus become our second nature to
assess any potential decision or action and make a conscious decision on
whether to follow it or not, based on our ethics and the existence of the legal
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system. However, all is not so clear when it comes to e-crime. Apart from
blatant examples such as someone breaking into a bank's computer system
and adding trailing zeros to an account, most people today do not have a
concise notion of what is legal and what is not so when it comes to potentially
criminal acts that pertain to information miss-handling. Thus, people can be
fairly easily convinced to seriously underestimate the repercussions of their
actions and the potential destructive consequences that these may have in
the context of IS. Such persuasion methods are the standard tools in SE
attacks that are directed towards the one element that ISMSs (or any other
security level assessment procedure) so far, do not efficiently cater for - that
of the human psyche and its shortcomings when dealing with IS.
If the wide proliferation of IT systems is further considered under the light of
their resulting inter-dependencies and the reliance of so many aspects of
modern life on them, it can be easily understood that the isolation and study of
particular IT subsystems in terms of their individual merits and elementary
qualities is virtually impossible. Hence, accurate assessment of the necessary
security level of IT systems is very hard to achieve. Adding to this conclusion
the increased complexity induced by the effects of SE vulnerabilities, the
problem becomes daunting, at best. The only way to address this problem is
by breaking it down to its individual components and dealing with each of
those in a manner appropriate to each one.
1.5 Research Questions, hypothesis
All of the above lead to the conclusion that the inherent difficulty in effectively
applying IS, stems from the fact that the task of enforcing such security should
be an interdisciplinary one. The increasing level of reliance upon sociological
and psychological issues in order to achieve IS, causes divergence from the
trodden path of simply applying technical countermeasures against well-
specified vulnerabilities.
As a result, it is becoming increasingly complex to form the technical, legal
and social framework through which IS can, primarily, be enforced and,
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furthermore, measured. In true reverse causality, it can even be argued that
the need for successful IS enforcement (and measurement) could even lead
to the establishment of a complex enough framework that is necessary to
have IS applied (or a least have it strengthened through accurate and
quantifiable feedback on its efficiency).
Modern IT systems are much more than "number-crunching" machines or
extended repositories of useful data. Such IT systems provide an extremely
powerful means of communicating ideas -sometimes even at a transcendental
level- a very potent decision-making aid, and, to a large extent, their design
and inherent limitations even dictate the structure of an organisation. To be
optimally efficient, it is common practice for organisations to be set-up from
zero or get re-organised around the capabilities of their IT backbones, with
executives and administrative personnel tapping into those backbones in
order to perform their duties. The sociological effects are obvious as many
organisations promote remote working (from the employee's home or in the
field), desk space sharing on co-location-optimised premises, de-centralised
corporate structures etc. Furthermore, as all of the technology necessary to
realise such schemes can not be assumed to be grasped by all employees,
even the slightest degree of computer illiteracy can be frowned upon and
result in professional and social isolation -hopefully, only in the most extreme
of cases.
It is, thus, the demanding nature of this proliferation of Information Systems
that causes a certain degree of insecurity to the non-expert users and makes
them vulnerable to the indirect nature of SE attacks.
The security standards (and recommended best practices) that have been
developed in relatively recent years, all have the common goal of minimising -
and ideally, nullifying- the effects of attempted security breaches. However,
their provisions do little in the field of counteracting the effects of SE attacks,
as most such standards are centered on the technical issues involved in
designing, specifying, building and administrating Information Systems.
Examples of this mentality are the 5-part ISO/IEC 13335 standard (ISO/IEC,
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1997; 1998; 2000b; 2001; 2004) and the 3-part ISO/IEC 15408 (ISO/IEC,
2005c; 2005d; 2005e). ISO/IEC 17779:2005 (ISO/IEC, 2005a) deviates from
the above standards in providing for IS at all levels of the structure of an
organisation, but still does not directly cater for the SE factor.
It would thus be interesting to investigate the effect that attacks of the
SE type could have on the existing provisions of IS standards and
practices.
The above statement effectively forms the primary research question that is
addressed in this work. It will be attempted to study each group of controls
presented in ISO/IEC 17799:2005 (ISO/IEC, 2005a) and identify its weak
points with respect to SE.
It will be shown in subsequent chapters of this work that a significant number
of the stipulations in the ISO/IEC 17799:2005 IS standard, can be severely
undermined or even rendered useless by a clever attacker using SE methods.
Furthermore, it will be made obvious that although the research carried out
involved only the current version of the ISO/IEC 17799:2005 standard (soon-
to-be ISO/IEC 27002:2007), the results obtained can easily be extended to
other IS standards and recommended practices.
Hence, extra controls must be devised for inclusion into standards and
practices in order to guard efficiently against SE attacks.
The above statement forms the secondary research question addressed in
this work. An attempt will thus be made to present additional or alternative
controls that offer better resistance to SE attacks.
The optimised process of evaluating the effect of SE attacks on existing
standards and practices in an effort to provide enhanced controls for such
attacks, can be summarised in figure 1.1:
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IS Standard
Directives
Active ISMS
PDCA
cycle
Extracted
Metrics Result
IS Standard
Directives
Active ISMS
PDCA
cycle
Extracted Metrics
Result
(taking into account the
effects of SE methods)
Comparison
of Metrics
Results
Space of
Uncontrolled SE
Vulnerabilities
If the two results are
not equivalent,
implement new
controls to reduce SE
vulnerabilities
Figure 1.1: Identification of the effect of SE vulnerabilities
In the hypothetical process presented in figure 1.1, above, two distinct paths
of evaluation are followed and their results compared.
First, it is assumed that an ISMS based on the applied IS standard is in place
and that a metrics result can be made available from that ISMS. This result
does not take into account the effect of SE attacks as SE vulnerabilities are
not particularly catered for in the IS standard and the resulting ISMS.
Next, each control or group of controls described in the adopted IS standard
(as well as the resulting ISMS) will be examined under the light of a possible
attack that falls under the methods of operation of Social Engineers. In order
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to quantify the effects of possible SE attacks, new measurement methods will
have to evolve from the above examination. If metrics that are particular to the
effects of SE methods are added to the original set of metrics, the effect of SE
attacks will be reflected in the new result. By comparing the original result to
the "SE-adjusted" result, it is reasonable to expect that the effect of SE
attacks will definitely be non-trivial, and will show a significant reduction of the
level of security of the Information System under examination.
Thus, SE vulnerabilities will have to be identified and SE controls be devised
and implemented in order to ideally eliminate the risks stemming from Social
Engineering (i.e. to make the direct and SE-adjusted metrics' results as close
to being equal as possible).
1.6 Value of research in context
The present work attempts to identify the shortcomings of standards and
practices pertaining to IS, with respect to the security risk stemming from SE
methods of operation. Given the inherent complexity of the Social Engineering
problem, it was decided to address the problem of Social Engineering from a
variety of angles. In this context, an approach from a Social Sciences
perspective was even attempted. The main effort was to address as many
issues pertaining to SE attacks as possible in real-life situations and study
their effect on the controls and directives described in IS standards and best
practices. This analysis resulted in the definition of controls that can be
considered as "add-in" modules for IS standards and practices geared
towards countering SE attacks. This could lead to the creation of broader, SE-
encompassing, versions of the said standards and practices.
Current IS standards and practices are of a predominantly technical nature.
According to these standards, technical controls are provided against
technical vulnerabilities. That is to say, technical countermeasures are
created and adopted against the loopholes created by technical shortcomings
of the system that can be exploited by potential intruders.
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For example, in the above sense, as a security "undocumented feature" (or
"bug") in a firewall hardware or software is discovered after being sufficiently
exploited by attackers, a new technical countermeasure in the form of a
"patch" is applied. Or, to guard against the possibility of information leakage,
fundamentally technical measures against an overlooked technical capability
of the system, such as removing floppy disk drives and locking USB ports of
physically secured computers, are employed.
In the case of SE attacks, the vulnerabilities that are being exploited could not
be any further removed from being technical. It is the mind and psyche of
perfectly legitimate and fully authorised users that the Social Engineers target
and through whom the attack against the system is mounted.
Building controls for non-technical vulnerabilities should both be a technical
and a non-technical issue. Technical controls could be those that make the
realisation of SE attacks unfeasible by altering the situation and conditions
under which the Social Engineer operates. For example, in controlled office
entrances where employees must present a personal ID token to be allowed
entry, "tailgating" or "piggy-backing" may be possible and an unauthorised
person can follow an authorised person in. To control such a vulnerability, an
ordinary triple-bar access-control turnstile could be used, one 120 degree turn
of which should be allowed per ID token presentation.  As a result, even if the
person being manipulated into allowing the attacker to follow through an open
door were prone to do so, the system in place would simply not allow it. This
way, the psychological tendency to be polite to one's assumed co-worker, can
not be taken advantage of by a Social Engineer. Hence, a technical control
can be used to eliminate a non-technical vulnerability.
On the other hand, non-technical controls such as security-related education,
the promotion of ethical standards in the workplace, the redefinition of the
notion of responsibility within the working environment etc, clearly form non-
technical controls that are essential in maintaining a state of raised awareness
against security breaches.
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Furthermore, the fact that many, if not all, technical controls described in the
current IS standards and practices can be proven inadequate when examined
through the prism of a SE attack, necessitates the protection of Information
Systems in an indirect way. If IS is viewed in such a lateral way, it could be
proven that the whole arsenal of IS standards and practices as these currently
stand, could be brought down if an effective layer of protection against non-
technical attacks is not incorporated in them.
For the above to be effected, two issues that rather deviate from the usual
approaches to IS must be examined. The first of these issues is how
psychological principles actually apply to the notion of SE, while the second
has to do with the analysis of the social aspects of IS. The results of this study
can then be put to good use in the assessment and further development of
the controls of IS standards which are the prime objectives of this work.
Ideally, the outcome of this work will be used to strengthen the structure and
provisions of IS standards and practices against SE vulnerabilities. It can also
lead to the creation of a "yardstick" against which (in the context of an ISMS)
the effectiveness of any given Information Security System will be assessed.
Such a yardstick would be based on a scheme according to which, SE
vulnerabilities and their respective controls are defined and transformed into
security-wise-quantifiable entities. This could form the basis for the creation of
a metrics-based standard tool, with obvious added value for SE-related risk
analysis.
Given that this assessment / measurement scheme will have to be
dynamically self-adjusting, continually permitting new factors to be taken into
account as new SE-related circumstances arise, allowances will have to be
made for temporally-spaced results obtained during the course of life of the
evolving system to be comparable to one-another. This comparison will
provide the feedback necessary for the effectiveness of the self-adjusting
system. Hence, the proposed system will allow for the continual re-
assessment and adjustment of the measurement procedure itself, in an effort
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to extract objective results of higher accuracy with respect to the Information
System under examination.
Hence, this research contributes in the following areas:
• Provision of better understanding of the mechanisms involved in Social
Engineering methodology
• Study of the psychological considerations in SE
• Analysis of the social aspects of Information Security
• Evaluation of existing controls in IS standards and practices with respect
to SE
• Proposals on additional technical and non-technical controls for the
mitigation of SE-related risk
• Foundation of an assessment scheme for SE-related controls based on
metrics.
1.7 Limitations and delimitations, scope
The method presented in figure 1.1 takes for granted that a result based on
metrics can be obtained with and without factoring in the effect of SE attacks.
This, as it was realised during the course of this research, was definitely not
an easy task to accomplish. Although security metrics schemes that are used
to assess the effectiveness of security policies and controls do exist,
measuring the possible effect of SE vulnerabilities is not as straightforward.
Hence, if exact results are required, it will be necessary to first devise metrics
geared towards SE issues and only then attempt to make the comparison
described in figure 1.1.
It can be argued though, that exact metrics are not necessary for assessing
the effect that SE attacks have on the controls described in IS standards and
practices. For this work to advance, it was assumed that as long as a control
is shown to be susceptible to an SE attack, if it can somehow be strengthened
to resist the attack, or complementary controls be devised to aid in this
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direction, the prime objective is reached. This still holds true even though an
exact metric for the procedure can not be obtained.
The proposed research is, de facto, limited to standards and practices that are
geared towards creating practices for IS and that do not solely address the
technical aspect of IS. It was considered most appropriate to examine the
ISO/IEC 17799:2005 standard (ISO/IEC, 2005a) because of its nature that
covers the whole spectrum of IS and not just the technical part of it. A
stronger case for this choice is presented in the relevant chapter containing
the detailed examination of the Standard. The standard was examined from
the perspective of possible SE vulnerabilities, the existing loopholes were
identified and appropriate controls were proposed.
What this research attempts to prove, is that compliance to standards and
recommended practices (as they currently stand), does not -on its own-
suffice for either fully securing an information system or determining the level
of applied security. This is so because other factors that are not technical
come into play. These factors originate from the methods used by Social
Engineers who take advantage of the vulnerabilities in human behaviour to
mount a successful attack.
The indirect attacks targeted against the human element of security which fall
under the general category of "Social Engineering" can prove detrimental to
IS. Social Engineers base their method of operation on well-proven applied
psychology and persuasion techniques that are being adapted to suit the
needs of e-criminals. To a large extent, countermeasures to control risks of a
psychological nature must be based on psychology themselves. Furthermore,
as the general title "Social Engineering" suggests, such attacks take
advantage of certain aspects of social interaction in order to be successful.
Hence, returning to the issue of metrics, it may well be that quantification of
SE issues can not be made possible unless a significant contribution can be
made from a social sciences standpoint.
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On the other hand, it is not only psychological countermeasures that can be
established in order to control SE attacks. Technical controls such as state-of
the-art identification tokens can -and should- also be applied to counter SE
attacks. The application of technical countermeasures to control non-
technical, SE threats should be seen under a different light from technical
controls applied against technical threats and a separate quantification
method be employed.
Hopefully, the reader will be convinced that, as is the firm belief of the author,
SE attacks that are mostly unaccounted for in IS standards (and, hence,
ISMSs), can seriously undermine the effectiveness of a policy based on the
said standards and cripple the usefulness of ISMSs. Hence, it is imperative
that a) the effects of SE issues are identified and catered for in the design of
IS standards and b) that the outcome of this study is also applied to the
ISMSs resulting from such standards.
1.8 Research methodology
1.8.1 Solution approach
First, an attempt was made to identify the problem of Social Engineering and
discuss as many of its aspects as possible. The better the understanding of
the nature of the problem and its roots, the more efficient the defenses
against it.
Armed with a solid understanding of the SE problem, the analysis of the
ISO/IEC 17799:2005 standard (ISO/IEC, 2005a) took place by reviewing the
existing security controls under the light of a possible SE threat. For each of
the resulting SE vulnerabilities, an attempt was made to create an appropriate
control that diminishes the effect of that vulnerability.
The applied methodology was rather straightforward in the sense that the
individual controls were re-assessed in the context of SE threats.
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From this analysis an obvious categorisation of existing controls resulted
according to whether a) the controls are not affected by SE threats, b) the
controls could be affected indirectly by SE threats or c) the controls could be
affected directly by SE threats. Obviously, for case (a) above, little -if anything
at all- was necessary to be added in order to achieve the desired "SE
enhancement" of the standard. When controls falling under category (b)
above, were identified, existing controls were improved or new ones proposed
to act as countermeasures for the hysteresis involved. Furthermore, the
controls of group (b) were found to benefit from the set of general measures
against SE (such as training and promoting awareness) that effectively cater
for the indirect effects of SE. The controls of group (c) above, were the ones
that definitely required the creation of further controls particular to SE in order
to withstand scrutiny under the light of SE threats. The SE controls resulting
from the study of controls falling under category (c) above, in most cases, also
have an indirect positive effect on the existing controls of group (b).
It was made clear in the course of this research, that it is not sufficient to
"provide extra padding" to a standard by adding controls against SE threats,
but that some existing controls or even groups thereof should
undergo a complete re-design.
1.8.2 Research outcomes
The first outcome of this research was the systematic study of Social
Engineering that resulted in the fundamental principles behind SE
methodology being identified. The basic forms of SE attacks were discussed,
backed by a presentation of the most important Persuasion tactics and
Influence techniques as modern psychology accepts them. It was further
deduced that to defend against SE an organisation must invest upon its
human resources through security awareness and psychological training
programs. The objective of these programs should be a controlled exposure
of employees to SE methods that sets the foundation for effective defense
against SE attacks.
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The second outcome was obtained through the study of the social aspects of
Information Security. This study provides the means to identify "socially-
induced" vulnerabilities (i.e. vulnerabilities stemming from the social relations
and interactions of people) and establish controls for them. It is thus shown
that the social construct underlying the IS hierarchy severely affects the
design, functionality and efficiency of the security policy. As soon as the
security policy is in place, it affects and transforms the dynamic relationships
within the social construct of the IS hierarchy. Care should thus be taken for
this feedback mechanism to ultimately lead to an equilibrium point of
maximised security efficiency rather than an explosive and uncontrolled
situation.
As was anticipated, the third outcome of this research was an assessment of
the degree in which the security clauses and individual controls specified in
ISO/IEC 17799:2005 may be affected by SE threats. It was found that
although the set of controls presented in ISO/IEC 17799:2005 is very
comprehensive and effective, it was not written with SE in mind.
As a fourth outcome and directly stemming from the third result, the general
effectiveness of the ISO/IEC 17799:2005 standard was assessed under the
light of SE threats. Although the sets of controls present in ISO/IEC
17799:2005 do have the indirect effect of raising the level of security with
respect to SE threats, there is still room for improvement and "tuning" of the
standard with respect to SE.
The fifth outcome was that through the discussion of ISO 17799 controls
insofar their susceptibility to SE threats is concerned, the weaker areas of the
standard, in this respect, were identified. This provides the necessary
information by which individual controls, control groups or whole sections of
the standard may need to be re-designed. The weaker areas of the standard
with respect to SE were:
a) physical security where more technical controls need to be introduced to
counterbalance the psychological hysteresis which is interwoven with human
nature,
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b) security against SE attacks over the telephone which remains largely
untouched in the current version of the standard,
c) security against SE attacks over the Internet and email that needs to be
strengthened under the light of emerging SE attacks and
d) the need for education related to SE and IS awareness building (especially
where SE is concerned).
As a sixth outcome, new controls were devised or "tuning" of existing controls
was proposed in the detailed discussion of ISO/IEC 17799:2005, specifically
addressing the SE issue.
Seventh, this analysis, by providing adequate SE-related data can be further
used for the assessment of ISMSs that are based on ISO/IEC 17799:2005.
Such an assessment though lies well outside the scope of this Dissertation.
Eighth, this work could be of assistance to all involved with designing IS
based on the ISO/IEC 17799:2005 standard by providing enough insight on
how vulnerable systems may be from SE threats. The residual risk even after
the application of the controls defined in the said standard may be quite
higher than expected if SE vulnerabilities are taken into consideration.
Hopefully, this work will result in raising the level of alertness and diminishing
the false sense of security that the application of the particular standard may
have instilled.
Ninth, although far from having fully exploited the concept, the chapter on SE-
related metrics, does provide firm ground on which to build for subsequent
work on the quantification of SE issues.
Lastly, this work could provide the basis of a future revision of ISO/IEC
17799:2005 (and even of ISO/IEC 27001:2005) with emphasis on the aspect
of SE.
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1.9 Structure of the dissertation
This dissertation is structured in a way that eases the reader into the reality of
Social Engineering within the context of Information Security. Hopefully, by
the time the reader reaches the final chapter, the notion of Social Engineering
and the degree to which it is being addressed by the current state of the
ISO/IEC17799:2005 will be clear enough to be of further use.
Figure 1.2 graphically depicts the overall structure of this dissertation and the
relations between the individual chapters.
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Figure 1.2: Structure of the dissertation and role of chapter 1.
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The current, first chapter defines the problem of Social Engineering as a
serious source of threat to Information Security and presents background
information, the research question, the methodology that was followed, and a
layout of the dissertation's structure.
This is followed by the second chapter where the current situation of SE
with respect to IS is presented, along with and a literature survey.
A discussion of the principles behind Social Engineering follows in the form of
the third chapter. This discussion is essential as it defines the multi-faceted
nature of SE and provides enough insight for identification and efficient
mitigation of the SE-related threats.
The fourth chapter focuses on the psychological aspect of Social
Engineering. By identifying the psychological component of SE, the first step
is taken towards building effective defenses against it.
The fifth chapter attempts an approach of IS from a social sciences’
standpoint. Although in the mind of the author, upholding Information
Security is to a very large extent a problem with sociological roots that reach
deeply into the very foundation of any organization, there is very little work
being done in this area. This chapter sets a starting point by providing a
different than usual perspective.
In the sixth chapter an attempt is made to devise defenses against SE
methods, based on the combined background of chapters 3,4 and 5. This
sets the basis for the review of ISO/IEC 17799:2005.
The detailed study of the ISO/IEC 17799:2005 standard from a Social
Engineering perspective follows in the seventh chapter and new SE
controls are also proposed.
The eighth chapter on the quantification of SE issues attempts to create a
starting point from which further work can be done. By accepting the multi-
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faceted nature of the SE problem and the complicated matter of devising
defenses against it, a novel approach is adopted to yield measurement
results.
A final, ninth, chapter reviews the work carried out, presents the conclusions
of the research and proposes directions for further development.
A list of bibliographical references follows and appendices are included
comprising the terminology and abbreviations used throughout the
dissertation (Appendices A and B respectively) and the details of the ISO/IEC
17799:2005 examination with respect to SE (Appendix C).
2. Social Engineering and Information Security:
The status quo.
2.1 Introduction
Having identified the problem of Social Engineering (SE) in the context of
Information Security (IS) in the previous chapter, an attempt is made in this
chapter to establish the current state of IS and indicate why IS is threatened
by Social Engineers. The basics of IS defence are also discussed in an effort
to set the stage for the analysis that will follow in subsequent chapters.
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Figure 2.1: Chapter 2 within the context of the overall dissertation structure
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The literature survey presented in the third section of this chapter also aims
towards the same objective. Many of the ideas present in the literature survey
were either used directly in the discussions that follow, or helped define the
direction in which this research progressed.
The relative role of the current chapter in the context of this dissertation is
graphically depicted in figure 2.1.
2.2 Information securit y
The idea that Information is an asset worthy of serious protective measures,
has never been more justified. During the past three decades the object of
security schemes has shifted from ontological units such as money, valuable
objects and paper documents, to the more abstract concept of Information in
all forms. Apart from the traditionally highly-valued -and worthy of protection-
forms of Information (such as those pertaining to issues of corporate, strategic
or national defense nature), at this time and age, the notion of the value of
information has risen to dizzying heights, mainly because of the way
information is stored and handled (Pfleeger, 1997, p. 2). The ability of
databases to hold millions of records with every type of information, enables
us to keep searchable records of anything and anyone in an organised and
highly efficient manner.  Access to even seemingly unimportant, catalogued
information may prove to be a very powerful tool against individual people or
groups and as such, in the wrong hands, may cause serious damage.
One example that may help illustrate the validity of the above point is that of
the everyday need for exchange of information for authentication purposes,
e.g. for banking transactions over the phone. Only fifteen, or so, years ago, in
order to authorise a banking transaction, one would either have to be
physically present in one of the bank's branches and sign the relevant
documents, or send in a signed letter (usually via a registered postal service)
requesting that a transaction be made. Twenty years ago, in most countries
around the world, credit card charges could not be made unless the owner of
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the card was physically present during the transaction and, furthermore, was
able to prove his or her identity by producing two different forms of ID.
Obviously, the reason that these practices were in place was that they were
considered necessary to avoid fraud at the expense of the legitimate owner of
the bank account or credit card. In our time and age such measures are seen
as more of a hindrance that does not allow us to transact swiftly and from a
distance -even from across national borders. If this attitude is examined from
a slightly removed point of view, it definitely seems highly unreasonable as it
is more-or-less devoid of most of the security controls that would be
considered essential for monetary transactions of any sort. However, every
time someone tries to pay by credit card for an item won at an online auction
that took place halfway around the globe from that individual's physical
location, all reservations are magically removed. A prime example for such
behaviour is none other than the world's best-known trading place on the
Internet, "eBay" (eBay, 2006). On a less personal basis, one of the reasons
international commerce is evolving is the ability of traders to conduct business
(including banking transactions) from a distance -usually a very long one- and
with "reasonable" security. The problem, though, is that nothing could be
more difficult to define than the level of "reason", for security to be
"reasonable". A highly subjective quality by definition, "reasonable security"
can not really be measured. On the contrary, it is infinitely variable. A person's
perception of the degree of security varies not only between different people,
but also depends on the nature of the transaction, the amount of money
involved in the transaction and the general psychological situation of that
person at the time. In the end, in most cases, this highly subjective degree of
security involved in a transaction, will be set in the mind of a person based on
his/her notion of the extent to which he/she can trust the other party. Thus,
the notion of trust between humans through social interaction comes
into play. (Castelfranchi & Falcone, 2001). In common life this trust is built
gradually over the course of a conversational transaction, usually based on
the exchange of information between the two parties. As an example,
consider an everyday procedure in a banking transaction. Suppose that a
transfer of money (neither an unusually high nor an insignificant one) is
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required from one bank account to another. The person requesting the
transfer can call his/her branch on the phone and ask for the clerk usually
dealing with his/her accounts. After a brief conversation, the clerk agrees to
move ahead with the transfer, provided that an authorising letter is sent by fax
to the bank to that effect. The fax is sent, the transfer is carried out without the
physical presence of the account holder and, furthermore, without an original
signed document authorising the transaction in the Bank's possession.
Normally, such a transfer is never challenged. Thus, it is "business as usual"
at the bank. In the event, however, that the transfer is challenged, there is
very little that the bank can do to prove that their actions were legitimate.
Although there is definitely no section of the security policy of any bank that
endorses such a procedure, it is a well-known fact that these things happen in
the course of an ordinary day. The reason that this is so, lies in the trust
relationship that has been built between the clients and the bank personnel
over time, and in the desire of the bank personnel to keep the clients satisfied.
If they don't, maybe the personnel of another bank will. Recognising the
potential source of problems that can arise this way, many banks around the
world choose to follow one of two routes. The first route is that of explicitly
denying to process any order that arrives via fax and require the client to
either perform the transaction in person at the bank premises or send a
signed order to the bank by registered mail or go through the phone-banking
authentication procedure. The other route is that many such institutions
choose to delegate the full risk associated with faxed transaction order to the
clients by having them sign "fax indemnity" statements that practically relieve
the bank of any responsibility stemming from following a counterfeit faxed
order (FBN Bank, 2006; Fletcher Kennedy Limited, 2007). It has to be taken
into consideration though that still, from the author's personal experience,
many banks in various countries around the world have not activated such
procedures and still rely on trust and the rapport between the staff and clients
for ordinary, everyday transactions.
One may argue that such rapport can only occur between the bank's clients
and personnel after a long trusting relationship has been built. But what would
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the situation be if an imposter plays the role of the well-known and trusted
customer? This is not an easy scheme to bring to fruition, but nevertheless it
can be achieved over the telephone, after some investigation and after an
appropriate authorisation document bearing a "cut-and-paste", non-original,
signature is faxed to the bank to tie loose ends.
Although this is a definite possibility for fraud, the bank personnel will most
probably not challenge the validity of such a document. Such an action (or,
actually, the absence thereof) is based on the bank personnel's subjective
assessment of the risk associated with the transaction. In practice, the clerk
carrying out the transaction, based almost solely on the recognition of the
voice of a familiar client over the phone, vouches for the sincerity of the client
whom he/she has a long-established direct and interpersonal relation with.
Clearly, the clerk's decision is hardly based on solid facts and as such is most
definitely unsafe.
If on the other hand, an unknown client calls a phone-banking clerk, then this
contact is devoid of any personal element of recognition or trust. In this case
the clerk has to go through an authentication process with the client, in order
to subsequently accept the client's requests and demands. Such
authentication is usually based on personal information being passed from the
client to the bank clerk. Even today, this information, though, does not
necessarily comprise a special password or PIN that the client is assigned for
phone banking. If a phone banking service has been correctly structured and
is correctly operated, then a PIN will have been assigned to the customer
(Barclays, 2006). On the other hand, most banks will be happy to process the
requests of a client provided the client gives some bits of personal information
such as mother's maiden name or home telephone number. Sometimes, a
social security or national ID card number may also be requested. Once this
information is presented to the phone-banking clerk, the client is assumed to
be authenticated and his/her requests are dully processed ("Right Sir, how
may I help you today?").
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Thus, in actual terms, these bits of information take on a monetary value
that equals (or exceeds) the sum of the balances of one's bank
accounts. In a similar fashion, orders for all types of goods and services can
be placed over the phone and charged on credit cards. Fifteen years ago, a
policy used to be enforced, according to which orders would be shipped only
to the address registered with the credit card company through which the
payment was made. At some point, sellers began to accept requests for
shipment of charged goods to alternative addresses provided they had the
client's registered address on file. Nowadays, from the author's personal
experience, nobody seems to care where they ship goods paid for by credit
card, as long as they have the credit card details as they appear on the card
and request no further information. Furthermore, when the sale has to do with
a service or a downloadable good (such as software, books, music etc), in
practice, the address of the credit card holder is not involved in the
transaction. It is thus of little wonder that credit card fraud flourishes these
days.
Although the examples discussed so far have to do with a specific type of
personal information that if compromised can financially hurt someone, all
forms of personal information have to be protected. For example, it can not be
overlooked that in most countries of the world -even western ones- it is very
easy to call up a microbiology laboratory and get your blood test results over
the phone on the pretext that you can not make it to the lab on time but you
need to relay the results to your doctor. Most of the time, the lab secretary will
just give out the results without any challenge of the caller's ID. In some cases
they may ask for the doctor's fax number to send the results directly to the
clinic, but very rarely they will actually verify the number which could
correspond to anyone's fax machine.
All this brings forward the fact that the nature of stored personal information
has dramatically changed in the past thirty years, and that its significance has
increased by orders of magnitude. This increase in significance is aided by
the way that personal information is stored and the ease by which it can be
retrieved, referenced and cross-linked. The age-old motto of  "getting anything
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on anyone" is changing into "getting everything on everyone" and this alone
stresses the fact that personal information must remain personal and not fall
prey to those seeking to acquire it for their own illegal purposes.
Thus, systems handling personal information should be treated with the same
meticulous methods that are being used for the protection of those types of
information that are traditionally accepted as invaluable, such as corporate
and strategic secrets, or pertaining to issues of national security.
Furthermore, it should by now be clear that since information of seemingly low
value such as disjointed morsels of personal data can be combined to grant
access to progressively more sensitive information that may in turn lead to
further compromises, any and all information-related security breaches must
be avoided.
2.2.1 Defending IS
The evolution of information handling that lead to the effects described above,
has functioned both as cause and effect for the proliferation of Information
Technology systems in all aspects of our life and all levels of organisational
structures.
As information processing routines are getting more sophisticated and a
plethora of information is becoming more and more accessible, security levels
appropriate to the value of the information must be established. The three
principal issues of confidentiality, integrity and availability must be
delicately balanced if an efficient Information Security scheme is to be
achieved (Pfleeger, 1997, pp. 5-6).
Applying security measures to an information system definitely makes the
system harder to use. A system can be completely secure if no access to it is
allowed -an extreme example of the "Security through obscurity" principle
(Pfleeger, 1997, p. 325)- or be totally open and thus totally vulnerable. The
optimal solution for real-life systems lies, of course, in the gray area between
Social Engineering and Information Security: The status quo
Chapter 2 31
the two extremities. The exact point of equilibrium, i.e. the basic security level,
is defined according to the value of information being processed by the
system.
In a corporate structure, very seldom can a single basic security level be set
for the whole structure. As the number of information-processing systems
increases, the need for a multitude of basic system security levels arises.
Each piece of information must be protected according to its value and
position in the corporate structure. Setting the highest required basic security
level as the common denominator for all systems leads to the unnecessary
over-protection of data that in turn causes the availability of that data to drop
without reason.
To deal with this kind of a situation, informed decisions must be made not only
at the technical level but, most importantly, at the managerial level where the
particular security requirements for each of the information systems have to
be specified. Thus the responsibility for Information Security must be dealt
with as a managerial issue as well as a technical one.
Furthermore, not all aspects of Information Security can be dealt with by the
application of technical measures. As long as human users are relied upon for
the secure operation of a system, the system is inherently vulnerable because
the man at the keyboard of the computer is vulnerable to non-technical forms
of attack. To reduce this level of vulnerability, a clear and concise set of
instructions related to security (in the form of a security policy) must be
established. The end-users must carefully comply with these instructions and
directives. Technical measures being in most cases inadequate to deal with
human behaviour, appropriate mechanisms must be in place to limit the effect
of attacks being directed towards the human side of the information-
processing system.
Such mechanisms include -but are not limited to- efficient methods of
personnel training on security issues, promoting security awareness through
education, actively pursuing a raised everyday level of security among end-
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users through the use of appropriate reminders and the existence of feedback
paths that allow alarms to be raised and counter-measures to kick in once an
attack on security is suspected (Desman, 2001).
The above resolution makes it all the clearer that end-users can not just be
told to obey directions when it comes to security issues. Security policies and
directives must be understood if they are to function efficiently. Thus, bringing
the end-users up to the required level of awareness, should be seen as part of
the overall investment in security and must not be overlooked (Kajavaa &
Siponen, 1997). A misinformed employee may provide the shortest path an
attacker will follow to bypass all security measures that are in place.
2.2.2  Information Security (IS) Policies
An organisation's information security policy is a set of management directives
that establish the business goals, the security framework, the responsibilities
of all those involved, as well as governance.
Furthermore, an organization's Information Security Policy must be a single
document that articulates the philosophy, regulatory requirements and beliefs
that the organization has with respect to securing its information assets. In
this context the IS policy document must specify the scope of the
environment, the personnel to which the policy applies the processes involved
and finally, describe the consequences for non-compliance (ISO/IEC, 2005a).
In an organisation, there exist many policies governing areas critical to the
function of the organisation. Policies addressing resource management,
logistics, financial issues etc, are essential to the organisation. Hence, the IS
Policy is just one of many policies that must be followed concurrently. In a
typical situation as this, the IS Policy must not excessively hinder the other
policies, but, instead should complement and support their application.
Furthermore, after an IS policy is established, it must periodically be reviewed
within the context of the constantly changing security requirements as well as
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the evolving business environment of the organisation (that inevitably leads to
changes in the other organisation policies).
Establishing a security policy is only the first step in efficiently securing the
information within an organisation. Steps must be taken towards making the
commandments of these policies "second nature" to personnel to whom any
degree of responsibility within the scope of the IS policy is assigned, and
raising their awareness on security issues as stated above (ISO/IEC, 2005a,
section 8.2.2). This is not something that can be achieved just by establishing
accountability and counter-motives in the IS policy. It must rather be
addressed through positive methods and incentives. Such incentives may be
in the form of prizes for employees who have been found to comply to the
security policy during penetration testing or an internal audit for secure
practices.
The non-technical issues are the most difficult ones to address in an IS policy
and those invariably have to do with the reactions of people under unexpected
circumstances. In this context, it is impossible to predict all possible attack
scenarios and devise countermeasures against them.
2.2.3 Physical vs. (psycho)logical protection
With a well-designed and specified IS policy in place, an organisation can
ascertain to a high degree that the applied information protection is
appropriate for each type of information involved. In such a policy,
countermeasures against physical attacks must be specified and followed.
Efficient physical security may seem easy to apply if access rights are
assigned to authorised personnel and an access control system is in place
and operational. However, apart from controlling physical access to secure
areas, for complete physical security, there are other aspects that have to be
considered. For example, procedures must exist according to which sensitive
documents must be kept in filing cabinets under lock and key and the keys be
carefully protected (ISO/IEC, 2005a, section 9). A "clean desk" policy may be
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enforced, obliging employees to lock away all documents pertaining to their
work before they leave their office. Official documents should not be allowed
to leave the premises except when such removal is appropriately authorised
(checks must be in place to enforce such rules). Official documents (of any
classification) should not be disposed without being shredded. All magnetic
media should be sanitised and all write-once optical media should be
physically destroyed, perhaps through the use of CD-ROM shredders (Time
Magazine, 2003). Modems should not be installed on Intranet computers. In
special cases, even Floppy Disk drives and other removable storage devices
should not be available on secure PCs either. (This is becoming more difficult
with the current state of technology that provides us with gadgets such as
ball-point pens equipped with on-board 512 MB USB drives).
This list of countermeasures against physical attacks is far from being
complete but gives an idea of the bigger physical security picture.
On the logical side of security, passwords should be protected and never be
disclosed, accounts should be set up following particular security procedures
and access rights of users should not be upgraded by the IT department
without formal authorisation (ISO/IEC, 2005a, section 11). The above two
categories of attacks can be addressed successfully to a large extent,
provided that the personnel are aware of the policy and procedures are
followed.
The type of attack that is very difficult to cater for is the one that targets a
person in such a way, that all the countermeasures provided by the security
policy are bypassed. This is achieved by the clever manipulation of the target
(or "Mark") by the attacker, so that the target never realises that he/she is
tricked into deviating from the security procedures. For such an attack to be
carried out, the arsenal of the perpetrator comprises a mastery of
psychological techniques that disorient the victim and achieve the desired
breach in security.
As far as physical security is concerned, any person can use his/her
judgement and feelings and avoid finding him/herself in a situation leading to
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a security breach. Under an attack based on psychology, the victim can be
manipulated in ways much more subtle than being blatantly asked to cross a
physical barrier or remove a document from the premises. The attacker has to
assume an average level of common sense on the part of the Mark. People
may be persuaded to act in compromising ways only if the request made to
them through manipulation does not make them function outside the limits
of their usual scope.
Furthermore, a cunning Social Engineer will design his/her attack in such a
way that no coherent pattern is formed from the information disclosed by the
Mark. To disassociate the bits of disclosed information even further, the Social
Engineer will not obtain all the information from one person but rather "spread
out" his/her efforts by questioning a number of different employees, preferably
from different levels in the hierarchy. This way, the chance of two victims
coming together and figuring out that something is suspicious, is minimised.
Hence, the victim(s) of the attack are usually unaware that a security breach
has taken place. This causes the extended problem that there are no alarms
raised. It could thus be claimed that every SE attack that is carried out
successfully, is tantamount to a "perfect crime".
2.3 Literature survey
At this point it was considered necessary to include a (non-exhaustive) list of
annotated bibliography in order to provide enough insight into the background
work that gave rise to the train of thought which in turn resulted in the
outcomes of this research. It is hoped that this list gives substance to the
claim that Information Security is and should be treated as a multi-disciplinary
subject.
It should be obvious by now that in order to productively address the research
questions, a number of peripheral issues will also have to be resolved. This
can be justified by the fact that although the issue of Social Engineering
seems to be in everybody's minds these days, comparatively, very little formal
work has been done in this field. (An indication to this can be obtained by
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examining the comparatively very small number of hits returned to a library
search based on "Social Engineering"). This is justified by the difficulties
inherent to the subject, its non-technical nature and its obvious dependencies
on sociological and psychological principles.
It is undeniable though that a lot of work that has been done in the past in
many peripheral fields, is related to the issues dealt with in this proposal. The
degree of this relation, of course, varies immensely, to the extent that
sometimes only morsels of past work can be of benefit to the issues at hand.
Nevertheless, some of this work will be presented here in the form of
annotated bibliography.
Some of the issues that need to be explored in the context of the current work
and play a major role in the formation of defenses against SE attacks are: 1)
ethics in the work environment, 2) development of an IS culture, 3)
interdisciplinary nature of IS, 4) quantisation and metrics of abstract values
relevant both to IS and to the defenses against SE attacks, 5) IS education, 6)
IS policy effectiveness and assurance measurement and 7) the relation
between social interaction and Information Security. The list is by no means
exhaustive and it is almost certain that as research in the field advances,
other, equally important, factors may be brought to light.
The annotated bibliography that follows can only "scratch the surface" of the
issues but can provide and indication of the complexity of the issue at hand
and a solid foundation for further research.
Schlienger and Teufel (2003) in their research "Analyzing Information
Security Culture" claim that in order to improve the security level of an
organisation, socio-cultural measures must be employed alongside the
technical and organisational measures in an effort to "make IS a natural
aspect in the daily activities of all employees". With this in mind, they go on to
present the idea that IS is part of a grander "Organisational Culture" that in
turn is a collective phenomenon which can be influenced (or even designed)
by the management.  In this sense they describe security culture as a three-
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layer entity which begins with the employee education necessary to set the
foundations of security awareness, moves on to the level where the
employees start making conscious decisions regarding security and
culminates at a point where the notion of security becomes embedded in the
employees' minds, thus functioning at a subconscious level to protect the
organisation.
In order to achieve such a scheme, a tool is needed, by which the state of IS
culture at any given moment within an organisation can be analysed and
assessed. An attempt to measure the collective values, norms and
knowledge, can not yield substantial results as values are theoretical
constructs and can be officially stated but do not necessarily reflect the real
values governing everyday practice. Hence, an alternative tool for analysis
must be found, based on the artifacts that function as cultural indicators and
thus help to qualitatively derive the true values and assess the culture. (A
quantitative relation between the artifacts and the values can not be
extracted).
As human behaviour is ultimately driven by cultural, social and ethical values,
security culture must encompass all three types of respective measures to
improve employee behaviour with respect to security.
The authors then continue with the discussion of methods necessary to collect
the data and analyse it to produce useable indicators of security culture. The
staff is subjected to anonymous questionnaires and interviews carried out by
unbiased observers. The results are plotted in a so-called "Radar plot" in an
attempt to obtain an as objective as possible picture of IS culture within the
organisation. This result can help the management in taking corrective steps
in their effort to further build a stronger IS Culture.
The reviewed work by Schlienger and Teufel (2003) puts forward the notion of
assessing the level of IS culture as a tool in the effort to control the non-
technical aspects of security within an organisation. The ideas presented
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could be helpful in designing controls against SE vulnerabilities as well as in
providing for relevent metrics.
In their work "System Architecture for Psychological Customization of
Communication Technology", Turpeinen and Saari (2004) elaborate on the
notion of customising the way information is presented at the content level of
a Digital Communication System, with the intention of inducing a predictable
psychological effect to the user of the system. From the context of the
discussion it can be deduced that the term "Digital Communication System"
can be applied to the digital Man-Machine Interface present in all modern
Information Systems. To formalise the above notion, the term "Mind-Based
Technologies" is used, the basic concept of which is that the way of
presenting information to users falling under certain psychological
profiles may have a predictable psychological effect.
According to the authors, the term "Psychological Customisation" is
considered as "an operationalisation  technique of implementing the concept
of Mind-Based Technologies in system design". They then continue by
describing a basic system architecture to implement such as Psychological
Customisation.
By analysing a Digital Communication System into three layers:
a) the physical layer which comprises the technological devices and
communication channels,
b) the code layer which consists of all the protocols and software necessary
for the physical layer to function and, finally,
c) the content layer where information resides,
the authors isolate the content layer and act upon it to achieve their goal.
They further break down the content layer into i) the substance (or core
message) of the information and ii) the form of the information (i.e. the
aesthetic and expressive ways of organising the substance of the information.
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Although the larger part of the reviewed paper moves in directions digressing
from the scope of the current research, there are many points being raised in
it that would be beneficial to the needs of this research.
a) When users collaborate over what is described as:  "computer mediated
social interaction" (e.g. when working together and communicating on-line
over a computer network), a state of "social presence" may be
experienced, such as intimacy of interaction or a feeling of togetherness
within the bounds of virtual space. As far as the current research is
concerned, this can lead to serious SE vulnerabilities and should be
controlled.
b) The authors state their view that the psychological effects on users during
social presence when in computer mediated social interaction have not
been sufficiently researched. Elsewhere in the paper it is stated that
research has been concentrated on the relation of user emotions to
information and how these change the way in which users respond to a
message. They further make reference to studies of experimental
psychology, which show that "recognition and memory can be influenced
or even enhanced by previous exposure to subliminal visual or auditory
images".
c) Reference is also made to the notion that if one wants to produce emotion
with respect to particular pieces of information presented through a given
user interface, one needs to know which types of variations of the form of
the information may cause  which qualitative types of emotion to users
with different psychological profiles. As this principle may apply to
persuasion among other psychological effects, the relation to the research
at hand is made obvious.
d) Another idea that is put forward is that within limits, the form of information
presented can be automatically adjusted for a certain category of
substance of information, thus creating varying emotions to the user.
This can be of value to the research at hand in the sense that sensitive
material could be automatically presented in a way that triggers different
levels of subliminal user defenses. This "modulation" of the form of
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information could be based on a criterion of access rights to the data
and/or the sensitivity level of the data.
e) For successful psychological customisation, a modeling process of
individual users or groups of users is necessary. The authors consider
three different types of modeling: i) user modeling based on individual
profiling, ii) user clustering which works by automatically grouping users
together based on similarities between their individual profiles and iii)
community modeling which attempts to model a social group as a whole.
In the context of the research at hand, as all three types of model must
supply computer-accessible presentation of information regarding
individuals, groups and social structures, these must be considered as
data of high sensitivity and all measures must be taken to ensure the
privacy of the users.
The authors conclude by stating that "Psychological Customization is founded
on the idea of creating a desired psychological effect with the available means
of automatic variation of substance and form of information". They also state
though that "what is lacking is the systematic and explicit, communicable,
knowledge of what exactly in the elements of design may produce such
effects".
The work of Turpeinen and Saari (2004), as it is presented in the reviewed
paper, may seem at first to be of a different scope than that of the current
research. However, it is hopefully easy to make the short mental leap and
apply the principles they describe to the issue at hand. This researcher
believes that the principles of Psychological Customisation may well apply in
strengthening the psychological defenses of users against SE attacks.
Tsujii (2004), in "Paradigm of Information Security as Interdisciplinary
Comprehensive Science" through a philosophical analysis of present-day
computer systems, stresses the interdisciplinary nature of IS. The national,
social and public security, the protection of privacy and the restriction of
unnecessary monitoring over people, require comprehensive measures.
These measures require close coordination between different systems such
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as administration, management, insurance, information system security and
auditing, information legislation, information morals and other such systems
that are radically social in nature.
The author identifies the changes brought to social structures by the
digitisation of the modern world. Digital technology is tearing down traditional
limits imposed on society such as geographical separation and national
borders, by creating new social continuums.
The author claims that the evolution of computers and networks has formed a
new cyberworld which, as any other unexplored world, requires solutions to its
very particular issues like security, freedom and privacy. The multi-faceted
nature of these issues requires a comprehensive set of measures if the issues
are to be upheld.
To the traditional triad of Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability that defines
IS, the author adds the notion of provability that provides detailed records of
transactions as solid proof that transaction actually took place.
The author considers encryption technology as the cornerstone of the
construction of the "Digital Society", more than just a framework for protection.
However, apart from the technical measures necessary to ensure IS, the
author also places great importance on ethical standards and an appropriately
developed legal system.
Ultimately, the author focuses on four major requirements for effective IS: i)
Technology, ii) Management and Administration, iii) Legal System and iv)
Ethics.
The Technology aspect should rely on Cryptography and Secure Computer
Networks. Management and Administration should be governed by well-
accepted IS standards such as ISO 17799 and ISO 15408. The adjustments
necessary to modernise the Legal System should be in the form of new laws
and rules designed to a) develop social infrastructure and b) prevent injustice,
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both under the light of the digitisation of the modern world and society. Thus,
the general principle behind this modernisation should be to transform the
current legal system to apply both to corporeal entities (as it traditionally has
done) as well as to information assets that are, by nature, intangible. Finally,
on the aspect of Ethics, the author bases his dialectic on the argument that
"barriers should be withdrawn between the social-cultural sciences and
natural sciences". The author then goes on to suggest ways in which ethics
research could be conducted from an engineering or economic viewpoint, in
an attempt to define what the author calls "Information Ethics".
Finally, the author also discusses the necessity of a) international cooperation
in the context of improving Information Security and b) human resource
development for IS, identifying four major classes: organisation leaders
knowledgeable in IS, IS system engineers, ISMS experts and, finally, IS
researchers.
This paper by Tsujii (2004) clarifies the interdisciplinary nature of IS, if an
attempt to comprehensively address security vulnerabilities is to be effective.
The notions put forward in this work can help view traditional measures for IS
under the light of moral and ethical implications, that can help control SE
vulnerabilities.
The paper by Kokolakis et al (2000) "The use of business process modeling
in information systems security analysis and design" deals with the way IS is
incorporated in modern organisational structures. Risk Analysis methods are
used to justify the investment in IS which is usually seen as a necessary add-
on to the existing Information System. Risk Analysis (RA) alone does not
provide for an understanding of the organisational environment in which
Information Systems operate as it is usually based on a very simplistic model
of Information Systems, consisting of hardware and software assets that are
vulnerable to threats. Consequently, although the resulting countermeasures
may help in reducing vulnerabilities, the way the organisation operates is not
improved security-wise. The authors thus propose a comprehensive
methodology for Information Systems Security Analysis and Design, that
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incorporates both risk analysis and organisational analysis that is based on
Business Process Modeling (BPM) techniques. In this context several BPM
techniques are classified, reviewed and compared with respect to their
individual merits under a security perspective and their possible contribution
to Information Systems Security Analysis and Design.
By coupling BPM with RA the authors hope to re-target organisational
procedures towards a) obtaining a better understanding of the organisational
framework within which a secure Information System is to operate, b) re-
designing secure processes and c) integrating IS into Information Systems
instead of importing it as an add-on.
The paper concludes by stating that either existing BPM techniques will be
adapted with respect to IS or several of them combined in order to contribute
to Information Systems Security Analysis and Design, or new specialised
BPM techniques must be developed particularly for Information Systems
Security Analysis and Design.
The work presented in the paper by Kokolakis et al (2000) emphasises the
notion of designing for security preemptively, instead of attempting to adapt
security solutions to fundamentally insecure systems. They stress the fact that
an information system is much more than the sum of its assets as it relies
upon its users for secure operation. Elements of this work can be used to give
a Business Process perspective to the current research.
The paper "An Analysis of Ethics as Foundation of Information Security in
Distributed Systems" by Leiwo and Heikkuri (1998) attempts to analyse the
notion of Ethics as a foundation of IS in distributed systems. The authors
accept that IS requires both technical and administrative foundations, the
latter being based on several non-technical layers added on top of technical
communication protocols such as cryptography etc. They then try to
impartially describe the situation regarding ethics both from the point of view
of the Hacker community and from that of the IS personnel. Due to the major
differences between hacker and IS personnel ethics, significant problems in
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establishing ethical protection measures against violations of IS, arise. The
authors, very early in the paper, stress the fact that their analysis leads to
opposite results than the generally accepted idea according to which the
security of information systems can be founded upon common ethical
standards.
The two conflicting ideologies (hacker vs. IS personnel) lead to both groups
claiming that "they have a right to tell each other what is ethical and what is
not".  However, it seems that the IS personnel group currently have law
enforcement on their side.
Apart from the above philosophical and practical conflict, the expansion of the
Internet brings communities and cultures with different ethical standards and
norms of acceptable behaviour closer to each other. As a result, a de facto
enforcement of policies for ethical use of the Internet governing these
heterogeneous cultures may not be practically possible.
Hence, one of the most important questions of the paper is if and how a
common ethical foundation for IS is possible. No clear answer to this question
is furnished in the paper; instead, many facts are presented and the reader is
allowed to draw his/her own conclusions.
One of the most important points made in the paper is that "ethics in
information technology is such a large question that system designers,
developers and users are not alone enough to give answers. Instead, (the)
entire society should be involved in the discussion concerning responsibilities
of different groups involved". Furthermore, an interesting definition of the dual
character of ethics' purposes is presented: to find criteria to distinguish
between good and bad, and to promote good desires and discourage bad
ones. Ethics can be approached either as deontological, or rule-based, ethics,
or as consequential ethics. According to deontological ethics there are actions
that should be taken and other actions that should not be taken.
Consequential ethics, on the other hand, examine not the actions themselves
but their value as determined by the outcome. IS personnel tend to take the
Social Engineering and Information Security: The status quo
Chapter 2 45
root of deontology while hackers claim that their actions provides good
outcome for the IS community and is thus venerated.
Due to the fact that proposed ethical protection measures are collective in
nature and attempt to provide a commonly agreed upon high moral code for
the usage of communication networks, it is very difficult for hackers to accept
these measures as they tend to maintain their individualism and
independence in their approach towards computing and ethics. If this is co-
examined along with the fact that a large percentage of computer crime is
generated within the bounds of organisations rather than from the outside, the
problem of creating acceptable ethical standards is augmented.
Any attempt towards the creation of a framework for strengthening IS must
take into consideration three fundamental requirements: a) the natural
behaviour of human beings must be supported by the framework through the
establishment of social contracts, b) the frameworks must be of an iterative
nature, so that larger systems can be composed from smaller subsystems
and c) the feasibility of the framework must be ensured based on current
technologies. All this should lead to a two-phase application, comprising an
Ethics negotiation phase where "organisations or individuals representing
themselves negotiate the content of ethical communication agreement over
specific communication channels" and an Ethics enforcement phase where
"each organisation enforces changes in the ethical code of conduct by
specifying administrative and managerial routines, operational guide lines,
monitoring procedures, and sanctions for unacceptable behaviour".
In conclusion, the authors re-iterate the difficulties in bridging the gap between
the ethics of hackers and those of IS personnel and identify the potential risk
of increasing the underground computing community through more stringent
law enforcement.
The reviewed paper by Leiwo and Heikkuri (1998) does not provide any
complete answers to the question of formulation of ethics with respect to the
secure use of information systems. The real value of the paper lies with the
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fact that a comprehensive review of the foundation of such ethics is
presented, along with the problems that do arise in this context. As far as the
current research is concerned, it helps in placing non-technical measures and
controls under perspective and will further help evaluate the feasibility of such
measures.
van Niekerk and von Solms (2005), present in "A Holistic Framework for the
Fostering of an Information Security Sub-Culture in Organisations" a
framework for fostering a sub-culture for IS in organisations. They base their
dialectic on the accepted dependence of information resources on human co-
operated behaviour. Both intentionally or through negligence, and often due to
lack of knowledge, users may pose the greatest threat to IS within an
organisation. Users must thus have a sufficient degree of knowledge on
information security so that IS controls are effectively implemented and
maintained. Users must also exhibit the correct attitude towards IS. These two
qualities of users can not exist without one another, as knowledge without
correct attitude can not ensure IS, neither a correct attitude towards IS can be
sufficient without the foundation of relevent knowledge.
Generally accepted standards and practices such as ISO 17799 / ISO 13335-
1 and NIST 800-16 (ISO/IEC 17799:2000a; 2004; National Institute of
Standards and Technology, 1998 respectively), stress the need for user
education and appropriate training on IS. However, no document defines
"appropriate training".  It is thus necessary to tailor the training program to the
needs of the individual users in the context of the organisation under
examination. Furthermore, even if users have acquired sufficient knowledge
on their role with respect to IS, it is not guaranteed that they will adhere to a
security policy because it might conflict with their beliefs and values. It is thus
necessary to restructure users' beliefs and values, in a way that promotes IS.
This can only be achieved by cultivating an organisational subculture on IS.
By combining various methodologies used for employee education and for the
establishment of an IS sub-culture into a single holistic framework, the
successful secure management of information systems resources in an
organisation can be achieved.
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The authors work results in a proposed framework that is structured as
follows:
1. Attain top management commitment.
2. Define the culture change in the context of the specific business problem
for each business problem.
3. Educate the employees using outcomes based education.
4. Define culture change metrics.
5. Provide feedback to the employees that is backed by both rewards and
counter-incentives or punishments.
6. Review and refine the culture change process in an effort to strengthen the
culture and assist with the internalization of the new culture.
The above framework may provide an effective holistic approach towards the
creation of the organisational culture necessary for IS.
The work of van Niekerk and von Solms (2005) addresses one of the major
issues that the research at hand will be looking at: strengthening the defenses
against SE through the knowledge and behaviour of users. The reviewed
work provides a solid basis for creating effective non-technical
countermeasures and controls.
The paper by Orgill et al (2004) titled "The urgency for effective user privacy-
education to counter social engineering attacks on secure computer systems"
stresses the importance of the human factor in the overall security of an
information system, identifies it as the weakest link and relates this weakness
to the reality of SE attacks. Brief references to the methods of operation of
Social Engineers are made and the merits of the "Approved Social
Engineering Audit" (ASEA) as an evaluation tool for determining compliance
to security standards and internal security policy are presented in detail.
A case study of an ASEA carried out without notice within an organisation is
presented and its results discussed. Certain constraints, prerequisites and the
delimitation of such an audit are also examined.
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The ASEA was carried out by an auditor assuming the role of a social
engineer in order to assist security managers understand the weaknesses in
their system and verify that users are following security policies.
A detailed presentation of the audit itself is made and the results of the audit
are evaluated and discussed. The effects of this exercise on company policy
are briefly discussed and the need for "tailor-made" security education is
highlighted. The need for both technical and non-technical controls for SE
vulnerabilities is identified.
The value of this paper by Orgill et al (2004) to the research at hand is none
other than the very important formal presentation of an audit geared towards
identifying SE vulnerabilities and correlating its results to many aspects of an
active IS policy. Through this analysis, the value of certain aspects of the
audit is made evident and the design of such audits is aided.
Vaughn et al (2003) in the paper titled "Information Assurance Measures and
Metrics - State of Practice and Proposed Taxonomy" deals with the taxonomy
of Information Assurance (IA) metrics. It also summarises the findings of a
workshop on the subject that was held in Williamsburg, Virginia, U.S. during
the period May 21 through 23, 2001. It begins with the definition of the term
"Assurance" as "an expression of confidence that one has in the strength of
mechanisms or countermeasures". It identifies the problem of devising metrics
that reliably depict the assurance associated with a given Information System.
The need for making IS an integral component of corporate IT architecture is
stressed. The lack of generally accepted, reliable measures for rating IS and
security assurance along with inconsistent terminology for IS are highlighted.
The authors then proceed to report on the general findings of the Williamsburg
workshop, among which they discuss the confusion related to the nature and
value of metrics, the lack of proof of correctness of a measurement
procedure, and the non-quantifiable nature of assurance system
requirements.
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An interesting point made is that the "Aggregation of various countermeasures
may result in an inherently less secure system", and that (given the
complexity and inter-relations of computer systems) this can lead to a false
sense of security.
Another point made is that "We remain reliant on the expertise of our systems
administrators or security engineers and their specific knowledge to guarantee
the correctness of a system". Clearly, as "to err is human" this assumption
does not provide enough assurance.
Yet another interesting point is that as time progresses, it is easier to mount
an attack on a system due to pervasive communications and shared
knowledge on the Internet. Attacks need no longer be as labour intensive as
they used to be, neither require as high a level of expertise on the part of the
attacker as they used to, as strong, automated attack tools are ordinarily
created and shared.
As a single homogeneous system of metrics can not address the problem of
measuring assurance sufficiently, at the Williamsburg workshop, there were
three general categories defined:
• Technical category that includes measures/metrics that are used to describe
and/or compare technical objects (e.g., algorithms, products, or designs).
• Organisational category where measures are best applied with respect to
processes and programs; and
• Operational category where measures are thought to describe, “as is”
systems, operating practices, and specific environments.
Another interesting issue raised is that metrics seem to vary between the
government and commercial sectors. In government applications, emphasis is
placed on policy and compliance to regulations and directives. In the
commercial sector the main issues are driven by economics and interest lies
with risk assessment (in financial terms) and the tangible return on the
investment in security.
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Retaining from the wealth of the paper only those pieces of information that
may be of value to the research at hand, in the context of the taxonomy
proposed by the authors, the category types of Information Assurance (IA)
metrics are defined as: objective/subjective, quantitative/ qualitative,
static/dynamic, absolute/relative or direct/indirect. (A discussion is beyond the
scope of this summary and the interested reader is referred to the original
work). In terms of IA metrics Taxonomy, it is stated that "the objective of
assurance measurement could be grouped into two distinct categories: 1)
assessing an organization’s IA posture or 2) measuring the IA capabilities of
systems or products". In this sense, there are two groups of metrics defined:
a) Metrics for Organizational Security and b) Metrics for Technical Target of
Assessment
(TTOA). A further classification appears below:
♦ Metrics for Organizational Security (measure organizational programs
and processes).
• IA Program Developmental Metrics
 Policy Management Metrics
 Process Maturity Metrics
• Support Metrics
 Personnel Support Metrics
 Resource Support Metrics
• Operational Metrics
 Operational Readiness Metrics
¾ Management Readiness Metrics
¾ Technical Readiness Metrics
 Operational Practice Metrics
 Operational Environment Metrics
• Effectiveness Metrics
♦ Metrics for Technical Target of Assessment (measure the level of
assurance provided by a technical object, system or product, in terms of
protection, detection and response).
• Metrics for Strength Assessment
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 Metrics for Features in Normal Circumstances.
 Metrics for Features in Abnormal Circumstances.
¾ Adversary Work Factor Metrics.
¾ Survivability Metrics.
• Metrics for Weakness Assessment
 Risk metrics.
 Operational limitation metrics.
After recapitulating on the main issues discussed in the paper, the authors
conclude by presenting their views on the main qualities of the taxonomy that
they propose, which are summarised as:
- The categories must be accompanied by definitions in order for any and all
IA metrics to find membership.
- The taxonomy must be made comprehensible and suitable for a general
audience.
- The terminology of the taxonomy must be consistent with the established
information systems terminology.
- The classification scheme must provide an IS professional with a tool to help
consider all areas needing measurement and suggestions for types of
measures to employ.
Although not directly aimed at the problem of metrics for SE issues, the
principles behind the general discussion of metrics by Vaughn et al (2003)
can be of great value to the research. The paper once again stresses the
multi-faceted nature of measuring for security and promotes penetration
testing (a highly empirical, non-exact and to a large extent non-repeatable
method but, nevertheless, a method capable of yielding important results) as
a crucial factor for assessing the level of Information Assurance. Furthermore,
the insight on the fundamental differences between the security and
assurance needs of the private and government sector, provides food for
further thought and serves as the foundation of an IS approach that is highly
differentiated with respect to the two sectors.
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Jelen and Williams (1998) in their paper "A Practical Approach to Measuring
Assurance"  challenge the traditional definition of assurance as "the degree of
confidence that security needs are satisfied" and proposes a different
conceptual definition of assurance as "a measure of confidence in the
accuracy of a risk or security measurement". This makes assurance
orthogonal to the measurement of both risk and security. Using this
definition, assurance may be more accurately measured and better
communicated. By combining such measurements of assurance w.r.t
particular issues from different sources, decisions on security risks can be
made more effective due to the better quality of the information that they are
based on.
The authors accept that absolute and consistent measurement of assurance
is probably unattainable. Instead, they claim that one can take advantage of
quantitative risk measurement methodologies that may be employed in a way
that yields a rough measure of assurance. This rough measure permits a
trade off between seeking more evidence and thus gaining greater assurance
on one hand, and employing more safeguards, thus reducing risk on the
other. The conclusion of the authors is that although this method does not
provide an exact measure of assurance, it does provide a good indication of
whether there is enough of it.   
The measurement scales associated with the proposed definition of
assurance and the resulting measurement methods need not be exact. Scales
can employ numeric or fuzzy values and can be relative or absolute. Once a
scale has been decided upon, the "security need" can be expressed as a
threshold value on that scale. By comparing a measurement of the actual
level to the threshold value, it can be deduced whether the need has been
satisified. The possibility of uncertainty in the measurement is taken into
account.
By keeping the concepts of assurance, risk and security orthogonal, a clear
distinction between them is maintained and any confusion caused by the
overlap of their meanings is kept to a minimum. While "high assurance ratings
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have traditionally been associated with high security and low risk", the
authors' new approach "allows high assurance to be associated with low
security and high risk as well".
An example of the above principle presented in the paper is to consider a
network component with a large number of security mechanisms, but no
information to indicate whether or not they are correctly configured. In a
situation like this, it is unclear how the various security mechanisms affect the
amount of assurance. Making security orthogonal to and independent of
assurance, the sources of added security can be considered separately from
sources of added assurance. To raise assurance, it would thus be necessary
to first gather more specific information about the configuration of the security
mechanisms than to add another such mechanism.
The authors continue by presenting in detail this principle and also provide
necessary mathematical models to assess and reduce the uncertainty
inherently related to the measurement and assessment methods. They also
provide insight on how the proposed assurance evaluation methods can be
used to ascertain an organisation's security standing at any given moment,
and, based on that information, subsequently plot the appropriate course of
corporate action.
As the quantification of risk, security and assurance regarding SE
vulnerabilities is very difficult to achieve due to the very nature of these
vulnerabilities, the redefinition of assurance presented in this paper by Jelen
and Williams (1998) can help address such issues in a non-exact way. This
could prove more useful in analysing and assessing the SE problem as well
as dealing with it.
This definitive sociology book (originally published in 1966) by Berger and
Luckmann (1991), titled "The Social Construction of Reality. A Treatise in the
Sociology of Knowledge" deals with the sociology of knowledge in society and
in particular with what constitutes the reality of everyday life for the average
member of society. Berger and Luckmann view society as a dialectical
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process between objective and subjective reality. Humans, through
knowledge, are thus engaged in a perpetual cycle of creating the objective
reality socially and subsequently internalizing these created realities as their
own, subjectively. The authors put particular emphasis to the role of
knowledge in constructing these objective and subjective realities.
The book is divided into three sections:
a) The foundations of knowledge in everyday life
b) Society as an objective reality construct (i.e. How the objective reality is
socially constructed through the mechanisms of institutionalization and
legitimation or how social realities hold their own among social groups of
people and do not rely on the perceptions of any single individual).
c) Society as Subjective Reality (i.e. how the constructed objective social
realities are in turn internalized by individuals as their own subjective
realities through primary and secondary socialization processes).
By applying the principles described by Berger and Luckmann (1991) of
objective and subjective reality to the constructs of ISMSs, interesting
conclusions can be made regarding the social aspects of information security.
As the book by Berger and Luckmann and their theory are widely accepted,
the application of their principles to IS, may yield some interesting sociological
results that may help in explaining several aspects of IS that previously were
not considered in depth. Hence, the multidisciplinary character of IS is once
again brought to light.
Kevin Mitnick has been called a "cyber-desperado". His unusual abilities with
computers led to his conviction and imprisonment on several accounts of
computer fraud. After his release from prison in 2000 he has been offering
security consulting services. In their book " The art of deception" Mitnick and
Simon (2002) present a number of attack scenarios, all based on SE
methodology. The scenarios are analysed and possible defenses are also
discussed. SE methods are dissected and insight necessary to defend against
them is presented. Although some of the scenarios do seem too far-fetched to
constitute plausible SE attacks, the point is not whether they are true or not.
What Mitnick and Simon achieve through accomplished story-telling, is to
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raise the average reader's level of awareness against SE. On the practical
side, Mitnick proposes a number of countermeasures and practices that
should be incorporated in any security policy to better protect against SE.
By studying the analyses that Mitnick and Simon give of a number of SE
attack scenarios, the researcher is exposed to most of the common
circumstances that may act as SE vulnerabilities. By identifying the relevant
risks, efficient measures can be devised to mitigate them to a better extent.
Some of the countermeasures presented in this book can be incorporated in
the formal description of controls against SE.
In their second book, Mitnick and Simon (2005) present a number of attacks
carried out through straightforward hacking methods. The discussions of
these attacks show that most implemented information systems are running
with significant security holes uncovered. This can only be attributed to the
increasing complexity of information systems and the complacency of their
administrators that may be justified by a false sense of security instilled upon
them by the volume of security controls that are in place. By going through the
various scenarios, Mitnick highlights the risks as well as measures that should
be taken to mitigate them. Technical issues aside, the book includes a
chapter on SE contributed by Social Psychologist Dr. Brad Sagarin in which
the fundamentals of SE methodology is analysed.
Although most of this book by Mitnick and Simon (2005) is not directly related
to SE, by studying the analysed scenarios, the SE researcher can quickly see
in which ways, seemingly unimportant information can aid the work of the
attacker and hence how tempting it is for the attacker to use SE techniques to
obtain that information. It is evident that not all hackers possess or can master
the necessary skills to carry out a SE attack, but for those who do or can,
taking the extra step forward is the obvious solution. An attacker who can use
both technical and SE methods against any information system is thus very
difficult to fight against.
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Dr. Cialdini (2001), a professor of Psychology presents in his book "Influence:
Science and Practice" the notion of influence in a structured and concise way.
Cialdini discusses what he sees as the fundamentals of influence, namely:
Reciprocation, Commitment, Consistency, Social Proof, Liking, Authority,
Scarcity and Automaticity. The detailed discussion and practical views of
these fundamental principles enable the reader to obtain a well-founded
insight on them. Furthermore, practical psychological countermeasures
against influence are presented in each chapter.
By placing the fundamentals of influence in the context of SE, a structured
approach to the methods used by Social Engineers is achieved. By identifying
the inner structure of the SE construct, the individual key-components of SE
can be singled-out. This, in effect, leads to the breakdown of the SE problem
in smaller, more manageable morsels. By devising defense strategies against
the smaller issues, the risks stemming from SE may eventually be mitigated to
an acceptable level.
The book "Get anyone to do anything" by Dr. Lieberman (2000) targets the
general audience rather than being a scientific publication per se. Despite the
fact that in some cases the book seems to provide oversimplified explanations
and guidance on issues of influence, its value can not be underestimated. In
many ways it can be viewed as a practical guide on imposing one's will on
others and on the other face of the same coin, defend oneself against such
attempts by others. Most of the techniques and scenarios examined in this
book can be and probably have been) used in SE attacks. Through its easy-
going style, this book can serve as a tool in raising awareness regarding SE.
Its informal ways and unpretentious language make for easy reading. Material
from it could be adapted for use in any security training course, or the whole
book could be included as recommended reading.
By applying the information presented by Lieberman (2000) to the principles
of SE many valid conclusions can be drawn as most of the techniques used
are indeed used in the course of a SE attack. This work supports the more
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formal analysis found in the book by Cialdini (2001) and does help in
specifying controls against SE attacks.
Max Weber (1864 -1920), a German political economist and sociologist, is
considered one of the founders of the modern study of sociology and public
administration. As is the case with many of his other works that are famous
today, "Economy and Society" (Weber, 1978) constitutes a collection of his
writings that was revised and published posthumously in 1922. In the first
volume of this book, Weber sets the basis for the discussions that are to
follow: Basic sociological terms, and definitions of sociological categories,
status groups and classes as well as legitimate domination are discussed. A
detailed discussion of economy then follows where economy is tied to the
social norms and to the relations between organised groups. In the second
volume, Weber discusses the legitimacy of domination that is imposed by
modern law and state, bureaucracy, traditional domination in the form of
patriarchalism, patrimonialism and feudalism, charismatic domination and
political domination. Focusing on Weber's study of bureaucracy as presented
in "Economy and Society", it is generally accepted that this work constitutes
the basis for the "Weberian civil service" generally adopted by European
countries. Many aspects of modern public administration go back to the
original model presented by Weber that laid the foundation for the vertical,
hierarchically organised civil service structure.
Traditional security structures are based on the vertical hierarchical model of
Weberian bureaucracy. Consequently, Information Security structures and, to
a large extent, ISMSs follow the same principles. When viewed from this
angle, shortcomings of modern IS structures that would otherwise go
unnoticed are brought to light. When the subject of domination discussed by
Weber is transposed to the societal structure supporting the ISMS, the effect
that the ensuing power play has on the function of the ISMS, also surfaces.
Hence, the social dimension of Information Security is becoming delineated
and the foundation is set for a more thorough examination.
In his book "Science in Action: How to Follow Scientists and Engineers
Through Society", Latour (1987) questions the very essence of the way that
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scientists view the world. Scientific process is fundamentally challenged and
Latour asks for the re-evaluation "scientific truth". Latour introduces the
bipolar principle that on the one hand states that truth is absolute and the
scientist is there to explore it, while on the other that facts are actually
constructed in the course of scientific work even though they are mostly
presented as axiomatic and unquestionable. In this context, "Actor Network
Theory" is introduced along with the notions of power struggle and black
boxes. In a short, and perhaps oversimplified way, Latour claims that "facts"
are not necessarily so but are instead constructed through the social
interactions between competing groups of scientists. The opinion of the
stronger groups prevails -hence the notion of power is introduced- and the
result of the conflict is henceforth considered a fact and rarely challenged.
This unchallenged fact, in effect, constitutes a "black box", that encompasses
a crystalised opinion which is in turn used as a building block for further
construction. Being buried at the "bottom of the pile" the black box remains
closed and the notions contained in it are never re-examined. Latour thus
claims that although a scientific fact may have reached modern times as
neatly packaged and sterile, when its background is examined by going all the
way back to the time of its creation (or the instance of closure of the black
box) the circumstances that led to the creation may appear tumultuous and
full of recriminations between competing groups. In a radical way, Latour
proposes the re-opening of black boxes in order to evaluate their contents and
hence the paths followed once the black boxes were closed.
As the upholding of security clearly has a social component that may be
exploited and used against that objective, it is necessary to examine
Information Security from the point of view that Latour proposes. IS is
currently built around notions that have remained unchallenged for too long.
These may harbor systemic flaws that can go undetected if the black boxes
are not re-opened and re-examined. This is the idea behind the re-
examination of notions regarding security that are considered indisputable but
could be flawed.
Social Engineering and Information Security: The status quo
Chapter 2 59
Latour (2005) in his book " Reassembling the Social: An introduction to Actor-
Network-Theory" once again challenges the existing notions of Science by
attempting to re-define the term "Social" that, according to him, has lost its
original flexibility as it has become laden with assumptions. Latour thus
attempts to re-define "Social" and allow it to resume "the task of tracing
associations". This approach of "Sociology of Associations" is the essence of
Actor-Network-Theory (ANT). From its original applications in science studies,
in this book, ANT is expanded to include many other domains such as health,
management, art, religion, law, politics etc. As the author states, the objective
of this book is to clarify the ambiguity associated with ANT which is largely
due to the vagueness of the word "social". To reach this objective, the author
claims that "sociology may be construed as the science of associations and
not only as the science of the social".
This work by Latour (2005) gives a better insight on ANT and as such it can
make the application of ANT in the study of security structures more accurate.
Through the evolution of ANT, new paths can be explored and new results
may be obtained with respect to the social construction of security systems.
2.4 Concluding Remarks
This chapter sets the foundation for the following chapters by firmly
establishing what the current situation of Social Engineering in the context of
Information Security is. Through the presented literature survey the main
ideas that helped shape and direct this research are exposed. The multi-
disciplinary collection of reviewed sources ranging from Computer Science to
Business Process Modelling to Psychology and Sociology show that the
solution to the problem of Social Engineering is impossible to be located in a
single scientific field. This problem will thus be approached in the course of
this work from a multitude of angles (IT Sec, IS, Psychology, Sociology and
Metrics) in the chapters that follow.
3. Social Engineering as a backdoor to ITSec and IS
infrastructures
3.1 Introduction
The introduction to the current state of things in Information Security (IS) as
well as the literature survey presented in previous chapters, set the foundation
for the study of Social Engineering (SE) in the current chapter. Here, a
discussion of SE is presented with respect to the methods of operation of
Social Engineers, and the loopholes in the system that can be exploited.
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Figure 3.1: Chapter 3 within the context of the overall dissertation structure
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This chapter, along with the work that will be presented in the next two
chapters on the psychological considerations in SE and on the social aspects
of IS, will help in better assessing the controls of the ISO/IEC 17799:2005
security standard (ISO/IEC, 2005a) with respect to SE, in a chapter to follow.
Figure 3.1 depicts the role of this chapter within the overall structure of this
dissertation.
3.2 Definition of Socia l Engineering
Security policies are created with the common goal to protect the integrity,
confidentiality and availability of information (Pfleeger, 1997, p.4). To this end
they try to comprehensively address all security issues and attempt to cover
everything from physical security, to electromagnetic emissions control, to
personnel certification and authorisation, to user authentication etc. However,
one issue that is very difficult to cater for, is that of the exploitation of
psychological traits that are inherently present in all humans. By exploiting
such human characteristics, an attacker can bypass most (if not all) security
rules and directives specified by even the most stringent of security policies
and gain access to the sensitive information which is thus only falsely
assumed to be safe.
People who employ such methods to circumvent the existing security
measures need not necessarily be technological wizards in the sense that
hackers are. All they need is good communication skills and the ability to
quickly adapt themselves to situations and roles that the ordinary benevolent
person can not. These people are commonly described as "Social Engineers"
(Mitnick & Simon, 2002, p. 7). The "Engineer" part of the title signifies the
attackers' ability to design an attack procedure and successfully carry it out. It
equally denotes the ability of the attacker to swiftly adapt to changing
situations while interacting with a target (or victim or "Mark"). The term also
indicates the possession of problem-solving skills necessary to avoid any
pitfalls and through manipulation of the Mark to achieve the desired effect of
gaining access to the sensitive information required.
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Accordingly, the types of attack that target the human element within a
protected system in an indirect and possibly unorthodox way, in order to
surpass existing security controls, are generally described by the term "Social
Engineering". Those who carry out attacks of this type can successfully apply
methods of Social Psychology against other people, with the ultimate goal of
gaining access to restricted information. Such attacks call for a high level of
preparation and the collection of data that simplifies the attack and makes the
claims of the attacker believable.
A formal definition of Social Engineering is found in the Meriam-Webster
online dictionary (2004), where it is described as the "management of human
beings in accordance with their place and function in society : applied social
science".
Social Science "deals with the institutions and functioning of human society
and with the interpersonal relationships of individuals as members of society"
(Meriam-Webster, 2004). A Social Engineer will focus on building and
exploiting an interpersonal relationship with the Mark. This relationship does
not have to be based on a false sense of trust. Alternative routes that are
followed by the Social Engineer can be based on psychologically negative
principles such as intimidation or fear. Furthermore, the relationship resulting
from a SE attack can not always be prescribed, as it is invariably molded by
the interaction of the Social Engineer and the Mark. This uncertainty can only
be controlled by the skill of the Social Engineer. The Social Engineer's ability
to adapt to rapidly changing situations dictates the degree of success of the
attack.
As it is clear up to this point, definition-wise, there has been no direct
correlation of SE to Computer Systems. This is true because the methods
grouped under the term "Social Engineering" are neither particularly related to
computer technology, nor are they something new. SE techniques have been
used since the birth of mankind to extract information and achieve goals
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through the manipulation of unwilling (at least in principle) people. From the
ancient art of spying and infiltrating the enemy's ranks to the more modern
applied art of advertising, to telephone scams, and pyramid schemes, all fall
under -or have a lot in common with- Social Engineering in the sense that
they all require considerable skill from the part of the attacker in order to
convince the Mark to do something that he/she would not normally do. SE has
always been the weapon of choice used to carry out traditional fraud. Hence,
the extension of SE practices necessary to take advantage of the
opportunities rising from the vast field of computer systems and the
information processed through these, is far from unexpected.
Granger (2001) identifies the goals of computer-related SE as being similar to
those of hacking in general: "to gain unauthorised access to systems or
information in order to commit fraud, network intrusion, industrial espionage,
identity theft, or simply to disrupt the system or network". This statement
formally describes the adaptation of old-fashioned subterfuge to modern
technology-oriented reality.
In an effort to better define "Social Engineering" in the context of the computer
age, the Hacker's Jargon Lexicon (2004) states: "Term used among crackers
and samurai for cracking techniques that rely on weaknesses in wetware
rather than software; the aim is to trick people into revealing passwords or
other information that compromises a target system's security". Note: For
clarity, "Wetware" (also known as "Meatware" or "Liveware") according to
Hacker's Jargon Lexicon (2004) is defined as: "1. The human nervous
system, as opposed to computer hardware or software. 2. Human beings
(programmers, operators, administrators) attached to a computer system, as
opposed to the system's hardware or software".
In the "Complete Social Engineering FAQ" by Bernz (2004) it is stated that
"Hacking takes more advantage of holes in security while social engineering
takes advantage of holes in people's common sense".
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Thus, a more precise definition of SE for the special context of computer-
related crime would be: "The subtle psychological and mental
manipulation of legitimate users of a computer system, leading to the
disclosure of sensitive information that facilitates the attacker to obtain
access to that computer system or the data processed on it". The
manipulation has to be subtle because nobody possessing a reasonable level
of common sense, will succumb to an unreasonable demand made by the
attacker. In this sense, the victim must be manipulated within the scope of
his/her everyday tasks and responsibilities. Social engineering does not
involve any kind of telepathic mind control and as such can not force actions
to be taken by the victim.
3.3 Methods of gathering information
The phase of the SE attack where the attacker actually interacts with the Mark
represents the culmination of the attack. At that point the attacker usually
adopts an "all or nothing" attitude: either "come up with the goods" or "walk
away and close that door for good". In order to launch a successful attack, the
interaction phase only follows after careful preparation. Invariably the Social
Engineer must present the Mark with enough accurate information to produce
the required results. This information may be directly offered, such as quoting
names that the Mark is familiar with, or indirectly, for example through the use
of specialised terminology or lingo.
Gathering the preliminary information that allows the Social Engineer to make
believable claims is paramount to the attack's level of success and takes
place in many and frequently unorthodox ways.
In most -if not all- cases, the Social Engineer gathers information by
correlating disjointed pieces of data that usually have low or no value on their
own. For example, the name, position and internal telephone extension
number, of an employee may be casually obtained during different phases of
the SE attack and not raise alarms as, on their own, these pieces of
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information are not considered sensitive. By combining these with another
piece of information, say, when the targeted employee will be out on vacation,
the Social Engineer may succeed in impersonating that individual. The special
abilities of the Social Engineer have to do with extracting pieces of correlated
data from different sources, in order not to raise suspicions, and
amalgamating them into a smooth-grained object of value. To accomplish this,
the Social Engineer must frequently "fill in the gaps" by, usually, non-factual
but truthful-sounding statements, as well as identify problem areas. The
objective is to present a well-composed line of statements to the victim of the
attack. The problem areas that arise from lack of information (i.e. when the
gaps are too difficult to cover for) must at all cost be avoided during the
conversation of the Social Engineer with the victim. The confabulation
generated by the Social Engineer must thus be carefully steered away from
dangerous areas, without tipping the victim to the direction that anything might
be out-of-the-ordinary. Any harshness in the verbal manipulation on the part
of the Social Engineer or inklings to stupor will most probably trigger the
victim's defense mechanisms.
Irrespective of whether the information gathered is "preliminary", to be used in
the actual attack, or the main objective of the Social Engineer, the methods
used to obtain it demand great levels of ingenuity and lateral thinking on the
part of the Social Engineer. The objective of the Social Engineer is to obtain
information that would be otherwise near impossible to obtain through
traditional technical attacks and hacking.
3.3.1 Dumpster Diving
This technique for gathering information may actually sound worse than it is. It
has to do with sifting through discarded documents, magnetic media or
hardware in general, with the intention of squeezing out any valuable
information from them. Organisations, traditionally, have not been taking care
of their garbage. The general tendency is to regard anything that has served
Social Engineering as a backdoor to ITSec and IS infrastructures
Chapter 3 66
its purpose as useless and, as such, all intrinsic value assigned to it is
automatically nullified. This, however, is far from true.
Of all the documents that are being dumped, some may be regarded as less
important than others and not compromising to the organisation's security of
operations. Although the latest draft report for a revolutionary new product will
probably not find its way into the garbage unshredded, the outdated version of
the internal phone directory that has just been updated, most certainly will. If a
Social Engineer obtains this directory, the internal structure of the
organisation becomes apparent. By perusing this directory, the Social
Engineer can locate targets, impersonate people of influence, or simply refer
to such people in order to clad his/her arguments in a coat of unquestionable
authority.
Discarded internal memos and magnetic media that contain truly unimportant
information per se can be used to provide information about, e.g., an ongoing
project that will help make the Social Engineer's claims believable. Just the
internal name of the project may help convince an unsuspecting Mark that the
Social Engineer is a person with legitimate claims.
Outdated and old revisions of policy documents, system manuals, surplus
workgroup calendar copies including vacations, duty rosters, bad printouts,
unwanted excess photocopies etc, can be used by the Social Engineer to find
weak spots in the security of the organisation as well as decide on the most
appropriate time for the attack when particular people are away from the
office.
Discarded hardware can also provide both substantial information as well as
morsels thereof that can be interwoven to re-create the "bigger picture". From
the extremely obvious hardware pieces such as inoperative hard disks that
could be resuscitated for long enough to give up the information they carry, to
unfixable fax machines that are being thrown away complete with a thermal
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transfer membrane that holds images of the last two hundred incoming fax
pages, all can be used by the Social Engineer to extract information.
In another, indirect way, hardware such as discarded networking cards,  may
provide vital clues to the nature and structure of the organisation's computer
network. If the existence of a wireless network is suspected, the Social
Engineer could try to pick up the signal by using a notebook computer or PDA
from the comfort of his/her car in the visitor parking lot.
Even non-technical material found can be used to allow the Social Engineer
physical access to the premises without raising suspicion. Such material could
be an old uniform bearing the organisation's emblem, an ID card cut in two
that does, however, provide the Social Engineer with invaluable detailed
information on the card's appearance, or even, if people are really not careful,
blank forms, stationary bearing the organisation's letterhead etc, that can be
used to aid the imposter in building the correct image for him/herself.
3.3.2 Physical attacks at the  workplace
The Social Engineer will not resort to being physically present at the target
location unless it is imperative to do so. Any self-respecting Social Engineer
will proceed to such a high-risk operation only after the necessary groundwork
and preparation has taken place and, possibly, fake credentials -like ID
badges- have been produced through manufacture, alteration or theft.
Even in cases where security is supposed to be high, the Social Engineer can
penetrate using a variety of methods that, in general, divert the attention of
security officers away from their specified tasks, i.e. ID checking etc. It has
been claimed that there is no male security guard who will not help a beautiful
female Social Engineer posing as a fresh employee, carrying a large load of
documents and at the same time struggling to reach her ID badge to get
through the automatic gates, by swiping his own security badge to let her
through. This is one of the cases where a little eyelash-batting can get the
Social Engineer a long way.
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On the other hand, instead of trying to pass for an employee, the Social
Engineer may attempt to become one of the "invisible" people who somehow
gain an "all access" pass by just being there! These people are couriers of all
sorts, delivery persons, gofers etc. It is relatively easy to impersonate a UPS
person by just obtaining or making the traditional brown overalls and holding a
fake but properly addressed parcel and a barcode scanner / logger. It would
be very rare for the UPS person to be stopped at the gate, and even if an
attempt to that effect is made, the cunning Social Engineer will definitely find a
way to talk himself out of these dire straits by convincing the security
personnel that the parcel must be delivered by him, in person, immediately.
A very popular method of gaining access to premises restricted to authorised
personnel only, is what is sometimes described as "tail-gating" or "piggy-
backing" (Mitnick & Simon, 2002, p.192). This method is used in cases where
a badge must be presented to an electronic reader to allow access through a
gate etc. What the Social Engineer is counting upon in order to circumvent
this security measure, is the fact that people are generally polite, and will not
object to someone following them through the security gate that they opened
by swiping their personal ID badge. It would be considered impolite to let the
person following them to wait for the gate to close, the system re-arm itself
and then that person to have to swipe his/her own badge to get through. At
large organizations most employees do not know every employee or
recognize every face, but are usually more than happy to hold a door for
someone, especially if that certain someone is of the sex opposite to theirs
and attractive. For the "coup de grace" the Social Engineer may also be
brandishing his/her own "badge" (a fake and inoperative one that only looks
the part), without any intention of using it, to further enhance his/her image
and convince the tailgating victim that he/she is also an authorised employee.
Once again, subtlety is of the essence.
However, if subtlety can not be used for one reason or another, the Social
Engineer may simply opt for the outrageous. With the right approach, an
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outrageous attack may simply go unchallenged. The author recalls reading a
story about a Social Engineer posing as a company official responsible for the
coordination of a fire drill and asking all employees to vacate an office area, in
effect leaving behind confidential information at her disposal. Whether this
was an actual event or a fictitious scenario has little importance. The point
being made is that we are conditioned to accept orders, especially if these are
given in an authoritative manner (Cialdini, 2001). Variations on this scheme
can simply be achieved by the Social Engineer impersonating any person of
authority external to the organisation being targeted, such as a building
inspector or a fire department inspector conducting a surprise compliance
check. In these cases, the more outrageous the scenario, the higher its rate of
success will be.
Another area of physical security that is usually overlooked, is that of
contractors who undertake the responsibility of cleaning, maintenance etc.
The Social Engineer can pose as a cleaning or maintenance crew member to
gain access to the target site. This approach is even more advantageous
because access takes place after hours when the field is clear and the Social
Engineer can do a lot of work. It would thus be quite feasible for a Social
Engineer (normally a highly skilled individual) to actually pursue a job for
unskilled personnel with a housekeeping service contractor to get inside the
target area. Unskilled personnel, such as those sought out by cleaning
contractors, do not have to go through rigorous security checks to get hired.
Even if such security checks were in place they would most probably not
prevent a Social Engineer from getting the job unless he/she is a known
criminal with prior convictions on record. It is obvious that the lack of security
criteria alignment in the personnel selection process that by definition exists
between the organisation and its service contractors, leaves a lot of room for
the Social Engineer to act unchallenged.
Irrespective of the method used to gain access, once inside the target
location, the Social Engineer can obtain very sensitive information by
removing documents lying on desks or even demand copies of restricted
Social Engineering as a backdoor to ITSec and IS infrastructures
Chapter 3 70
financial and technical documents be made for him by assuming some
position of authority. Just by walking through the office space, the Social
Engineer can obtain passwords from sticky notes on monitors, shoulder
surfing, and just pretending to be the new, frustrated and helpless guy/girl
who is under a lot of pressure to make a good first impression to the boss.
The method to be followed is only dictated by the skill and brazenness of the
Social Engineer.
Information can also be obtained from workstations that are logged in but
whose operators have just left them unattended for "just a moment".  Apart
from stealing information from an unattended workstation, the Social Engineer
can install malicious software on it that will enable him/her to access it
remotely through "backdoors". Even if that workstation is not accessible from
outside, there are a number of things that the Social Engineer can do on the
workstation to make his/her next visit easier and more fruitful, such as
creating a personal account, installing a keystroke logging program to obtain
valid passwords for connected servers etc.
If the Social Engineer manages to gain access to the site after hours, the
main advantage is that he/she can act in a relatively more relaxed way without
having people around and access areas and systems that would otherwise be
inaccessible. Sensitive information in all forms that was not properly
destroyed can be retrieved and perused. Hardware and software can be
removed from the premises if that is deemed necessary for the Social
Engineer's goals. New hardware can be installed (such as a wireless link to
the network or audio/video monitoring equipment). Stationery can be stolen.
The list is endless. Furthermore, since information can usually be reproduced,
in most cases there is no physical loss to be noticed and thus alarms are not
raised, allowing the Social Engineer to return and continue his/her work.
Information security can not exist without an underlying, solid physical security
policy in place. Furthermore, it does not suffice to have a physical security
policy in place if that security policy is not equipped to deal with the ingenuity
of SE attacks. In addition to that, a strict physical security policy at the
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perimeter should not provide a false sense of inviolability and lead to
complacency as far as physical security at the protected center, the soft
underbelly of the organisation, is concerned. At the same time, totalitarian
security policies should be avoided because they can only come at the cost of
reduced efficiency and the resulting hindrance in everyday operations can be
devastating as the concepts of confidentiality and availability are antagonistic
to each other (Pfleeger, 1997). Thus, the need for protection of sensitive data
must become second nature to all employees so that every action of theirs in
the workplace is instinctively governed by safe practice rules. This delicate
equilibrium is probably the most difficult goal to achieve because mentalities
can not be enforced; they can only be built gradually and methodically.
3.3.3 Attacks over the telephone
Experience shows that people feel deceptively safe behind a phone. They are
thus more prone to letting their guard down easily and opening up to total
strangers if manipulated correctly. A phone conversation is deprived of most
of the defining qualities of a face-to-face conversation.
The subtle facial grimaces, body language, eye movement etc that normally
help to set the basis of a trust relationship with an unknown person -even at a
subconscious level- are, simply, filtered out in a phone conversation.
Furthermore, presentation of hard, physical evidence that backs up the other
person's claims is practically impossible over the phone. Hence other
methods of "authentication" have to be mutually accepted and these methods
are very hard to standardise in our daily dealings over the phone that go
beyond the authentication protocol applied by an e-banking teller.
The lack of all of the above qualities -and perhaps more thereof- normally
underlying the interaction of two people, when both persons are physically
present at the same location, works in two ways, both of which are in favour of
the Social Engineer performing the attack. First, as it was already stated, the
victim of the attack is more receptive to the Social Engineer's manipulation
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and suggestions due to the false sense of security inherent to a telephone
coversation. Thus, the victim accepts more easily the "facts" presented by the
Social Engineer, directly or indirectly, without really challenging those claims.
Second, the Social Engineer can "stretch the limits" by pursuing extravagant
goals because he/she knows that if something goes wrong, the interaction
can be ended -abruptly if necessary- by simply hanging up the phone, even if
this increases the risk of an alarm being raised.
Barring the possibility of the attacker's bluff being called, the above two
factors, combined together, can lead to a very successful SE attack with
results of very serious proportions.
In conclusion, it can be said that the ethics that govern telephone transactions
dictate paradoxical (and very insecure) practices regarding authentication - or
more accurately, absence thereof. This "customary" lack of authentication and
verification involved in telephone conversations is quite intriguing.
3.3.4 Internet attacks
The Internet is just another means of communication and as such it can also
be used to mount SE attacks. Furthermore, due to the convenience and
speed of communication over the Internet, we all tend to use it in order to
complete business or personal transactions, disregarding, in the process, the
fact that communication over the internet is by default insecure and lacks
authentication, unless special safeguards are in place.
In the above context, unsolicited (spam) eMail messages coming from
strangers are sometimes given more credibility than they actually deserve.
Although any Internet-savvy user knows how to deal with spam email,
sometimes even the more prudent will be tempted to open such an email
item. Furthermore, in the course of a more sophisticated attack, address
spoofing can make a fraudulent email message appear as coming from a
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trusted source. Hence, generally speaking, unsolicited spam email must be
examined in the context of this chapter as a strong tool for SE attacks.
Updated spam email statistics are not easy to be extracted for a number of
reasons: First, most statistics are based on the success rate of automatic
filters employed on mail exchange servers. As any regular Internet user can
testify, the spam email messages that actually get past those filters finding
their way into a mailbox are quite a lot. Thus, email messages that are
automatically characterised as spam do not account for the real bulk of spam
emails sent. Second, statistics based on user reports on spam, such as those
found on "Spam Register" (2005) and "Spam Cop" (2005) web sites, are
declared to reflect more about those websites' usage patterns than they do
about actual spam. Third, spam statistics that are found on commercial
"spam-killer" software sites, could be challenged as over-pesimistic to
convince site visitors to buy a product.
In an attempt to quantify the amount of spam emails as a percentage of all
emails sent, a figure was located on the website of the Wahsington State's
Office of the Attorney General of Washington State (2007). There it is stated
that "Almost 45 percent of all email is now spam and that number is growing
each year." Although the page is current, it is not dated. The percentage
quoted, however, closely matches the figure given in the "Spam Filter Review"
(2006) website, where the statistical analysis regarding spam for 2006 (based
on cumulative email usage data from reputable sources for 2005) estimates
eMail that is considered spam to represent 40% of all email exchanged.
These figures seem rather optimistic as the statistical data obtained from
other sources unveil much higher levels of spam.
Novell's "My Real Box" (or MRB) free email service's statistics page (Novell
Inc., 2003) quoted on January 26, 2005 that out of 2,104,150 email messages
received, 1,805,147 were considered to be spam and, as such, were blocked.
This brought the spam percentage reported by Novell on January 2005, to
86%. It could even be argued that as this was the result of automatic filters it
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probably yielded results that were lower than the actual ones. The same
service, on February 10, 2007, reported that during an up-time of more than
10 days for the MRB server, out of a total of 14,438,749 messages,
12,229,542 of those were blocked as spam, corresponding to a percentage of
84.5%. On January 26, 2005, the quoted real-time 30-day spam statistics
index (updated hourly) on the commercial anti-spam software company's
"AppRiver" web site (Appriver, 2005), was 82%. On February 10, 2007, the
AppRiver site reported the same index in the vicinity of 95%, while its monthly
average spam percentage for the period from mid-February 2006 to mid-
February 2007, fluctuated between 94% and 96.5%. It is interesting to note
that the maximum spam percentage was reached around Christmas of 2006.
Although these figures could be challenged on grounds of either being based
on inefficient filtering results or serving promotional needs for a commercial
product or even being simply arbitrary, this writer's experience strongly
corroborates that current spam figures are indeed in the neighborhood of 80-
90% of total mail received.
Spam mail could not be used as a Social Engineer attack tool if users simply
disregarded it. However, according to a global mail survey carried out by
Yahoo! In May and June 2004 (Yahoo, 2004), a considerable percentage of
Internet users respond to spam or junk email for various reasons. The
percentages of users actually having responded to spam or junk email
messages, broken down by country where the survey took place is reported
as:
Table 3.1: Response to spam email messages
Country Percentage of users having
responded to unsolicited email
UK 18%
France 25%
Germany 16%
Spain 12%
Italy 13%
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This shows that roughly 1 out of 5 users actually responded to the spam mail.
The main reasons for this response were:
Table 3.2: Reasons for response to spam email messages
Reason for response Percentage
1) To give them a piece of my
mind
22%
2) To buy something 7%
3) To unsubscribe 58%
4) Other 13%
By reviewing reasons 1 and 3 above, it can safely be deduced that although
this action taken would probably result to more spam coming the user's way,
the user was not engaged in a form of voluntary transaction with the spam
sender (who could be a Social Engineer). However, reasons 2 and 4 (that
amount for 20% of the total) show that the recipient of the spam was
somehow convinced to engage in some kind of transaction. Assuming that the
spam mail could form the first step of a SE attack, the first line of defense is
thus broken. It then rests with the Social Engineer to manipulate the Mark in a
way that is clever enough to obtain the desired information.
SE attacks mounted over email are getting more clever by the minute. Under
the enticement of free screen savers, free access to sites or anything else that
is offered "for free", Internet users execute attachments without hesitation.
These attachments could provide "backdoor" access to the Mark's computer,
keystroke logging to reveal passwords, false error messages that could make
the Mark prone to a reverse SE attack etc.
As Internet users are becoming more aware of such methods and security
software finds its way on an increasing number of personal computers, SE
attacks mounted over email have become more ingenious. Usually they take
the form of an email originating from the administrator of a system the Mark is
registered with so that they look like the real thing. Almost invariably these
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messages explain that some serious situation has arisen (e.g. suspicious or
fraudulent account activity) that requires the Mark's personal details and
password to be re-entered (the word "confirmed" is usually used). A link is
present "for the convenience of the user" that, if followed, leads the
unsuspecting Mark to a carefully constructed web page/entry form that is
seemingly authentic. If the Mark makes the mistake to enter his/her details
and password(s), his/her account becomes compromised. This type of attack
is generally known as "phishing". "Phishing" is defined in the Michigan State
Official Web site (2006) as " the act of tricking someone into giving them
confidential information or tricking them into doing something that they
normally wouldn't do or shouldn't do. For example: sending an e-mail to a
user falsely claiming to be an established legitimate enterprise in an attempt
to scam the user into surrendering private information that will be used for
identity theft".
It should be made clear that in order to make the link presented in the email
believable, the lengths to which the Social Engineers go in order to produce
whole web sites that look like the real thing but are set up in order to extract
sensitive information, have no limit. Apart from building fake web pages that
look exactly like the real ones, they also try to imitate the URL by creating
URLs that look like the original one. A characteristic example is the case of
using "www.paypa1.com" instead of the real "www.paypal.com" URL of the
well known online payments' web site, as documented in the "Fight Identity
Theft" web site (Fight Identity Theft, 2006). Alternatively, a subdomain
address is adopted that refers to the real thing, while in fact it is fraudulent. An
example of such a method would be an address of the form:
www.paypal.confirm.com. Obviously (but, unfortunately, not to all) this
address has nothing to do with the original PayPal domain. It is just a
subdomain of some irrelevant "confirm.com" domain (Fraud Watch
International, 2007).  Other techniques are also used, a prime example of
which is the one where a hovering text box is superimposed over the address
bar of the visitor's browser. The real URL that the user is being redirected to is
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thus masked by projecting over it the proper address that the user expects to
see (Fraud Watch International, 2007).
Although fraudulent eMail messages employing "phishing" techniques are
usually blindly directed to groups of people (like the customers of an e-
banking service or those of an on-line auction house) in an effort to "lure"
some of them into revealing sensitive information, there is nothing obstructing
a Social Engineer from using such a technique in an attempt to compromise a
much more constrained computer system by attacking particular users who
are authorised to access it.
Practically all "classic" fraud methods have found new scope in the context of
communication via the Internet. Age-old chain-letter/pyramid schemes as well
as "get rich quick" schemes have been re-introduced in their e-form
reincarnation. Typical examples of the latter are the "Nigerian" scams. These
are named after the original scenario of Nigerian state employees trying to
export funds from illegal pay-offs with a help of an foreign citizen-turned-
victim. Details of pyramid frauds and Nigerian scams are beyond the scope of
this work but can be found online (Fraud Watch International, 2005a; 2005b;
PopSubCulture, 2005).
Any form of communication over the Internet can be exploited to fuel SE
attacks. Internet Relay Chat (IRC) and Instant Messaging (IM) are no
exception to this. To protect Internet users from such attacks, CERT has
published a relevant Incident note since 2002 (CERT, 2002). According to this
note "Intruders trick unsuspecting users into downloading and executing
malicious software, which allows the intruders to use the systems as attack
platforms for launching distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks".  The
standard method of operation is that automated tools are used to post
messages to IRC and IM users, offering to them improved music downloads,
protection against computer viruses etc and/or, falsely assuming a position of
administrative authority, threatening the user with an impending
discontinuation of IRC and IM services if a particular "protection" software is
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not immediately downloaded and installed. The downloaded software, when
installed, typically functions as spyware, Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS)
attack agent or backdoor to relinquish control of the Mark's PC. Thus, the
compromised PC can be remotely controlled, private data can be exposed,
other malicious software can be installed or propagated, resulting in data loss
or tampering. According to CERT, this definitely constitutes a SE attack since
its success relies on the decision of the user to follow the instructions put forth
in the message.
As reported to NewsFactor Top Tech News (NewsFactor, 2005) by McAfee
officials, another interesting approach is to target particular IRC or IM users
and in the first phase of the attack flood their mailboxes with unusually large
quantities of spam mail. During the second phase, a message is sent with an
offer for (free) software that eradicates all spam. Clearly, this software is
anything but what it is claimed to be. Although, strictly speaking, this is not a
Reverse SE attack in the traditional sense (as discussed in the following
section), it can be argued that it is a modern form of the old method.
Depending on how well it is planned and executed, it can yield very useful
results to the Social Engineer who employs it.
3.3.5 Reverse Social Engineering
Irrespective of which of the above approaches the Social Engineer chooses to
mount his/her attack, a very interesting technique that Social Engineers
employ is that of a "Reverse Sting". In that case, the Social Engineer causes
a problem to manifest itself (or in the lack of a real problem, the Social
Engineer somehow convinces the victim that a problem does exist) and then
makes him/herself available to eradicate that problem. As expected in any
such real-life situation, the Social Engineer is then perceived as a "knight in
shining armor", is implicitly trusted and never challenged.
It is remarkable how easy it is to create the underlying situation that will make
a Reverse SE attack successful. The possessor of ordinary hacking abilities
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can enhance the level of success of his/her  attacks by employing SE
methods. A compromised system can be made to fail in some pre-determined
fashion and the Social Engineer can take advantage of this "mishap" in order
to appear (without raising suspicion) and solve the problem, gaining the
victims' trust in the process. Furthermore, a subtly compromised system can
provide an "error message" that instructs the target of the attack to get in
touch with a particular phone number in order to resolve the "error". When the
number is dialed, the Social Engineer starts "reeling-in" the victim. Even if it
has not been possible for the Social Engineer to gain access to the system,
there are ways that the Social Engineer may be able to indirectly convince a
victim that a problem exists. If the victim falls for this, the Social Engineer can
carry on with the attack.
The above methods are very neatly analysed by Nelson (ca 2000). In his
article Nelson identifies three parts to a Reverse SE attack: Sabotage,
advertising and assisting.
As shown above, the sabotage can take place in different ways or even be a
virtual one. In this phase of the attack an "alarm" somehow goes off, placing
the victim in a psychological state that ranges from informed concern to primal
fear. The "advertising" phase can precede or follow the sabotage phase or
even take place simultaneously with it. In any case, advertising must take
place in such a way that the victim's preferred course of action after the alarm
goes off, is to contact the Social Engineer rather than anyone else. Finally, the
Social Engineer must be able to "assist" by solving the "problem". The Social
Engineer can mount the attack either by asking the Mark for sensitive
information that supposedly solves the problem, or just solve the problem and
use the opportunity as a first step in gaining the victim's trust and thus making
the extraction of the sought-after information easier at a later stage.
In the same article by Nelson (ca 2000), an interesting comparison is made
between ordinary SE attacks and those based on Reverse SE. The results of
this comparison are tabulated in table 3.3 below:
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Table 3.3: Social Engineering vs. Reverse Social Engineering
Social Engineering Rev. Social Engineering
Dependence The Social Engineer
places the call and is
dependent on the
victim
The victim places the call
and is dependent on the
Social Engineer
Indebtedness The victim feels that
the Social Engineer is
indebted to him/her
The victim feels indebted to
the Social Engineer.
Completion Issues often remain
unresolved in the mind
of the victim
Most -if not all- issues are
resolved, no suspicious
loose ends for the victim
Control The victim has control
of the flow of
information
Due to the nature of the
attack, the Social Engineer
has more control in
extracting the information
Preparation Little or no preparation
required by the Social
Engineer
A significant effort must be
made by the Social
Engineer into planning the
attack and previous access
is usually needed
The above table is quite interesting because it begins to show that the
psychological mechanisms in action in each of the two techniques of attack
are highly disparate. The interaction between the Mark and the Social
Engineer takes a totally different form and the outcome of the attack may thus
vary. Clearly, the two methods can not be used indifferently by the Social
Engineer, but are, instead, chosen according to the particular situation.
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3.4 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter the fundamentals of SE were presented. The basic forms of SE
attacks were discussed, and the main methods of operation of Social
Engineers were accounted for. These can be classified in three primary
categories:
• Attacks at the physical level
• Attacks over the telephone
• Attacks over the Internet and email
This categorisation is important and will be used in later chapters of this
dissertation.
Even so, the discussion presented in this chapter is by no means sufficient to
give the reader an idea of the full extent of the problem at hand. The
presentation of the Social Engineer's methods of gathering information, must
be combined with a deeper understanding of SE attacks if changes that are
effective against SE are to be proposed and implemented in the context of an
IS policy.
The required insight will hopefully be provided in the next two chapters that
investigate psychological and social issues related to SE and IS. The results
of those chapters combined with the analysis of the SE methods of operation
presented here will offer a better view of the SE problem.
4. Psychological considerations in Social Engineering
4.1 Introduction
The study of the Social Engineering (SE) methods of operation presented
in the previous chapter, showed that a strong element of psychological
manipulation and exploitation is always present in all of the SE attacks
that require some form of contact between the Social Engineer and the
Mark. This chapter will look into the psychology behind SE attacks in an
effort to better understand the issues involved and take another step
towards building better defenses against SE.
Social Engineering attacks exploit vulnerabilities that are based on
principles of human psychology. In conjunction with loopholes in the
security structure of the organisation, these attacks can yield results that
would be difficult, if not impossible, to obtain through the use of purely
technical hacking methods. As SE attacks are based on deception, they
are very difficult to categorise. Hence, designing countermeasures for
them is even more difficult. Thus, a more fundamental approach is called
for, if effective defense methods are to be devised.
In this chapter an attempt is made to identify the methods and techniques
used in SE attacks by examining psychological principles as these are
applied to the field of Information Security. In a subsequent chapter,
psychological countermeasures leading to defense mechanisms will be
examined in an effort to provide controls for SE vulnerabilities.
The combination of results from the current chapter, the previous one on
SE methods and the next one on the social aspects of Information
Security (IS) will ultimately lead to the more accurate assessment of the
controls of the ISO/IEC 17799:2005 security standard (ISO/IEC, 2005a)
with respect to SE.
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The following diagram depicts the role of this chapter within the overall
structure of this dissertation.
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Figure 4.1: Chapter 4 within the context of the overall dissertation structure
4.2 Persuasion - variat ions on an old theme
Even though the object of this work is Social Engineering and its relation
to information systems, the methods and attacks used today in computer-
related crime are far from new. They have been in use for at least the past
40-50 years through other standard methods of communication as those
were available at the time. For example, telemarketing has been thriving
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for many decades in the U.S. over the telephone. Although telemarketing
can be (and has been) used in ways ranging from legal to undeniably
illegal, it is always based on the power of persuasion the telemarketer has
over the prospective client/victim. On the other hand, it has always been a
general truth that a good salesman can sell anything. The salesman's
abilities are not dependent on the merchandise. Again it is the power of
persuasion that comes into play.  Con artists have been thriving since the
dawn of mankind. Their special ability is their power to influence other
people. Politicians and cult leaders have been doing the same thing for
thousands of years. Whether used for good or not, in all of the above
cases there is a common factor in the methods used: the exploitation of
human nature. Irrespective of whether they are used for good or not,
influence and persuasion methods have been successful because they
exploit the same basic property: human psychology. Thus, the bottom line
is that although technology evolves, providing societies with different
channels of communication, the basic human psychological
characteristics have remained the same as they have been for centuries,
if not millenia. Hence, modern SE attacks are based on the same
psychological traits that are governed by the very essence of human
nature.
4.3 The psychology of  physical attacks
Physical presence on the site under attack is, by far, the least attractive
method for the Social Engineer. However, there are cases that this can
not be avoided. The main method of operation of a Social Engineer
mounting a physical attack (usually through impersonation) is to a) blend
in with the surroundings and b) use such psychological manipulation
techniques that are necessary for the achievement of the goal of the
attack.
Carefully orchestrated gestures, facial grimaces and body language are
essential before even "first contact" is made. For example, in order to use
a tail-gating technique successfully, the Social Engineer must have the
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right timing but also the right attitude towards both the person being
followed in, as well as the security guard potentially present. Exploiting
the natural tendency of people to be nice or the equally normal positive
pre-disposition towards handsome people of the opposite sex, the Social
Engineer can go a long way. Porting him/herself with the air of authority
or, at least, ease, the Social Engineer can surpass most first-contact
checks and exploit those mental shortcuts that will allow him/her to move
around the target premises unchallenged. If challenged, the Social
Engineer will have to be prepared to provide some information (obtained
in the earlier phases of the attack) that will back up or explain the reasons
for his/her presence on the premises.
There are at least three techniques that can be used efficiently by the
Social Engineer in physical attacks:
1. Exploitation of the human tendency to be helpful. This natural tendency
has already been mentioned in this research but has to be emphasised in
this context. A Social Engineer impersonating an employee in a hurry for
a meeting who's also carrying a large load, may pretend to be fumbling for
his/her badge or authentication token while the security officer instinctively
rushes to his/her help. Another, pretending to be a courier for a large
company holding a number of boxes, may ask for someone to "hold that
door" for him to pass through etc. In most cases, because everyone is
conditioned to offer their help to fellow people in need, this conditioned
response overrides the call of reason that dictates to carry on with the
security check, with obvious results.
2. False appeal to authority. All hierarchical structures are based on the
authority of higher level personnel upon lower level personnel.
Unfortunately, this authority, although originally delegated in order to
make the function of the structure possible, is frequently abused to
facilitate those possessing it in situations and conditions that they are not
supposed to be treated differently from anyone else. It is a very frequent
occurrence that VIP members of staff will try to "pull rank" in order not to
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have to wait in line to be authenticated or, even worse, to be allowed
access when they have forgotten their authentication token (ID card,
smart card etc). The lower-ranking personnel responsible for security at
points of entry etc, will usually succumb to the minimal of pressure
because they are not willing to challenge someone who could get
displeased with their "overzealous" behaviour and affect their own
standing in the structure. This situation clearly presents an oxymoron
since lower-level personnel who are responsible of security are in fact
doing nothing more than what is really required of them according to their
job description, and should be appraised for that instead of being
reprimanded. Such a situation can be exploited by a Social Engineer who
can either impersonate someone with authority, or claim to be acting for,
or on behalf of, such a person.
3. Exploitation of "Low Involvement" personnel. Harl (1997) introduces the
idea of "Involvement" as a contributing factor to the success (or not) of a
SE attack. People who are highly involved in the system the Social
Engineer is trying to compromise (such as administrators, computer
security officers, computer technicians and users who are well
accustomed to the use of the system) have to have strong arguments
presented to them by the attacker in order to be persuaded. Weak
arguments act as warning signs to them and may bring the attack to an
early and unsuccessful end.  On the contrary, night-shift guards, cleaners,
or working-hour receptionists at a computer system site are classed as
"Low Involvement" employees because they have very low interest in
what a Social Engineer may actually ask them to do and weak arguments
may actually prove very successful with them. Mitnick and Simon (2002,
pp. 150-155) a story is given about a security officer being conned by a
teenager whose method of manipulatory attack to convince the guard on
the validity of his claims was well thought out, but at the same time was
very simple indeed. In similar fashion, a member of the cleaning staff may
be persuaded to allow a Social Engineer after-hour access to a site or run
an errand for him/her that could well lead to the compromise of
information the Social Engineer needs to mount an attack. A receptionist
Psychological considerations in Social Engineering
Chapter 4 87
(a position that requires the employee to be particularly courteous, polite
and helpful) may provide the attacking Social Engineer with critical
information or even access to restricted areas after some careful
manipulation (Mitnick & Simon, 2002, p.162).
In all cases, a physical attack on the target premises requires meticulous
preparation. It also demands the attacker to acquire a state of elevated
psychological resilience that is necessary to withstand the pressure
inherent to such an attempt, as well as the special ability to constantly
monitor and actively manipulate the psychological status of the potential
challenger to allow the planned attack to unfold. All of the above are not
always possible, hence the attacker must also have an escape plan from
the premises in case things do not turn out as expected.
It could thus be argued that if strict physical security is applied both on
entering as well as leaving an establishment's premises, this could
constitute an effective measure towards better control of SE attacks at the
physical level.
4.4 Persuasion tactics
SE attacks eventually have to employ persuasion tactics in order to
achieve the desired result. There are two routes to persuasion: the Direct
or Central Route and the Peripheral Route (Rusch, ca 1999).
The Direct Route is systematic and uses logical arguments in order to
stimulate a favourable response from the person being persuaded and /
or prompt this person to take the action desired by the persuader. This
technique is unfavourable to SE tactics because there simply is no logic
behind a request to reveal sensitive information to unauthorised persons.
The Peripheral Route is the tool preferred by Social Engineers who
invariably use this technique to misrepresent their objectives. Mental
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shortcuts, peripheral cues and distraction techniques are applied in order
to trigger acceptance without thinking and reasoning.
In psychological terms, such persuasion can not be considered equivalent
to brainwashing. However, strictly speaking, it still is a form of
manipulation of a human's mind by another individual in an attempt to
achieve an opinion shift, without the manipulated person being aware of
what caused his/her opinion shift (Sutphen, nd). Sutphen, in the same
article, also argues that the basis of persuasion is always to access one's
"Right Brain". In an oversimplified attempt to explore the mechanisms of
persuasion, it is stated that while the left half of the human brain is
responsible for analysis and logic, the right half is responsible for
creativity and imagination. Thus, persuasion techniques attempt to
distract and keep busy the left half of the brain in an effort to find a
shortcut to accessing the right half. An example of such a technique
would be to present the Mark with an arguably dangerous situation that
needs to be analysed and assessed by the left half of the brain. This
leaves the task of simultaneously processing the main request (that could
lead to the disclosure of sensitive information) to the right half of the brain,
which is more prone to the suggestion that it would be "ok" to comply with
this request. As an example, a Social Engineer posing as an bank IT staff
member could call a Mark in the middle of the night and state that unusual
activity is being monitored with respect to the Mark's account, with sums
of money continually being transferred out of the account. The Social
Engineer could then offer to help reverse the transfers and block the
account if only the Mark gave him/her the password needed to access the
account. At the same time the Social Engineer does not forget to state
that it would be irregular to do so and that he/she "is risking his/her job by
doing that". While in a state of shock and confusion, the Mark could
conceivably fall for such an attack.
Guidelines, for aspiring Social Engineers are provided by Bernz (2004) in
the form of a tutorial. Tips and tricks of the trade are given and although
this text will definitely not win any literary competitions, it does drive its
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main points home rather successfully. Many SE techniques are discussed
and almost all of them are based on the application of practical
psychology methods in order to persuade the Mark to release sensitive
information.
In Grangers' commentary of the above reference (Granger, 2001) there
are several persuasion tactics identified:
1. Impersonation. This technique can be applied over the phone or in a
physical attack. Depending on the type of Mark, different approaches can
be taken. Usual roles for impersonation over the phone include an
administrator or technician from the company's IT department calling a
user, a distressed user calling the company help desk, an executive
requesting information or a trusted third party (like the president's
secretary) requesting information for the president etc. In physical attacks,
the role faked is usually that of an employee, of a person of authority
within the organisation or a person acting on behalf of one, a repairman
urgently called in to fix a problem, an external IT technician paying a
support visit, a delivery person delivering urgent, important or bulky items
etc.  A good impersonation act combined with other techniques can prove
very fruitful for the attacker.
2. Ingratiation. If the Mark of the attack is given a good opportunity to gain
favour with or be favourably accepted by persons of power within the
organisation, he/she will be more willing to go the extra length and do
something that he/she is not really supposed to be doing. A Social
Engineer posing as a person of importance has a lot to gain by exploiting
this principle. If one also considers the opposite side of the coin, which is
the fear of the Mark that the person of power asking for the favour will
begin harbouring ill feelings for him/her if the request is not granted, it is
made even more obvious that the Mark will fairly easily succumb to the
Social Engineer's request.
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3. Conformity. No one likes to be different than everybody else as this could
make him/her look out-of-place or even obnoxious. The attacker
capitalises on this concept by offering to the Mark those mental shortcuts
that justify actions that would seem unreasonable at first. The attacker will
let the Mark know that what is being requested of him/her, has already
been provided by the Mark's peers or even superiors. The mental shortcut
in this case is that if everybody else is doing it, it must be the right thing to
do. This information, however, has not been independently acquired by
the Mark but it is the product of, usually, indirect hinting on the part of the
attacker. A simple, direct statement like: "I have already obtained such
information from your colleagues, why don't you give it to me also?" will
probably raise an alarm in the Mark's mind. If however this information is
indirectly allowed to surface in a way such as: "When I was talking about
the same subject to Ms. Smith (the Mark's superior) she let me
understand that…", the Mark will feel more at ease and will be more
willing to accept that by releasing he requested pieces of information,
he/she is only doing what everybody else has already done.
4. Diffusion of Responsibility. The attacking Social Engineer will, as a matter
of course, ask for sensitive information or require the Mark to perform
some kind of action. The Mark will almost certainly hesitate due to the
nature of the request, in part because of the responsibility that the Mark
feels he/she has to protect the information and/or to uphold certain rules
and regulations by not taking the requested action. The challenge for the
Social Engineer is to alleviate that burden in order to make the Mark feel
comfortable with the situation and proceed as it is requested of him/her.
The techniques of diffusing the responsibility include elements of the
Conformity technique discussed above, as well as tactics based on what
the psychological effect of who the Social Engineer pretends to be with
respect to the Mark's position in the hierarchy. If the Mark is convinced
that he/she conversing with the IT manager or one of his/her superiors,
the Mark feels less stressed talking about sensitive pieces of data. If the
Mark also feels that he/she is doing nothing significantly different than
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what peers and colleagues are doing, the personal portion of
responsibility that the Mark has, suddenly feels as less of a burden.
5. Friendliness. Although friendliness and saying "please" and "thank you"
with a smile, does not suffice for a successful SE attack, it is one
important component that must not be overlooked. The Mark not only
wants to believe the person on the phone and wants to help out, but, also,
it is always more difficult to be "sceptical" or "obnoxious" enough to decide
to challenge the caller if the caller is really polite, outgoing and open-
hearted. ("If the caller is all of the above, then he/she must be a good
guy/girl!"). Even friendliness though has its limits and a good Social
Engineer always knows how to not become unnaturally friendly and when
to stop extracting information. Stopping at the right time and perhaps
"leaving a door open" for use at a later time is always a good practice
during SE attacks. This also forms the basis of a relation-building
technique employed by Social Engineers where initial contacts are always
friendly and not overly demanding, so that trust is gradually built. This
attack culminates when the Social Engineer has become enough of a
"phone-pal" with the Mark and is being trusted enough to ask the really
important questions that are answered by the Mark without a hint of
hesitation.
In addition to the above tactics, Makosky (1985) suggests the following
three persuasion techniques:
6. Appeal to or creation of needs according to Maslow's hierarchy of needs
(Maslow, 1987): Physiological, Safety, Love and Belonging, Esteem, and
Self-actualisation). The attacking Social Engineer will address as many
types of the Mark's needs as possible. Flattery may appeal to the Mark's
need for Love and Belonging or it will boost the Esteem factor. An urgent
phonecall, in the middle of the night, warning of impending financial loss
as a consequence of account compromise will definitely strike against the
Mark's need for safety, forcing the person under attack to take action
while under shock or confusion. Similarly, a request made on behalf of a
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potentially very angry supervisor or, worse, employer, will immediately hit
on the Mark's physiological needs, as the potential of a reprimand that
could eventually lead to job loss, automatically increases.
7. Social and prestige suggestion. While social suggestion is almost identical
to the Conformity tactic already mentioned, prestige suggestion has to do
with a well-known, respected person or a person of authority making a
recommendation or request. Common usage of this technique is made by
Social Engineers who frequently use the names of respected individuals
who are well-known to the Mark, in the "name-dropping" phases of their
attack. In the SE scenario, the request does not actually have to come
from the well-known individual, it suffices to just let subtle hints surface,
suggesting that the respected individual has already complied or is in
agreement with the request being presented to the Mark.
8. Use of loaded words and images. A word used in the right context can
have an expected positive or negative effect. For example, a sentence
phrased as "can you fetch that document for me" instead of "can you
find/bring that document for me" will almost certainly have a negative
effect on the Mark on the receiving end of that request. This will put the
Mark in a rather defensive state of semi-confusion that could help in
making him/her more open to suggestion. A suggestion towards the Mark
to visualise an angry boss or another unpleasant situation, could also lead
to a state of confusion.
Finally, Cialdini (2001) presents another persuasion technique with instant
persuasion results:
9. Providing a reason. As described by the author, the desired effect is
obtained through the use of the word "because". I.e. simply providing a
reason -any reason- for making a request. Cialdini describes an
experiment performed by a Harvard researcher named Ellen Langer who
kept trying to bypass the lines at the photocopier machine by phrasing her
request in three different ways. The first version was: "Excuse me, I have
Psychological considerations in Social Engineering
Chapter 4 93
five pages. May I use the Xerox machine because I'm in a rush?" A
legitimate reason was given for this request and the request was
successful 94% of the time. In the second version, no reason was given:
"Excuse me, I have five pages. May I use the Xerox machine?". This
request was only successful 60% of the time. One could assume that
giving additional information that justifies the request in the form of a
reason for it, was responsible for the different success rates. However,
the third request formulation was: "Excuse me, I have five pages. May I
use the Xerox machine because I have to make some copies?" This
version of the request had a success rate of 93%. Clearly enough, neither
a real reason was given nor additional information presented that justified
the request. The "reason" given was simply a statement of the blatantly
obvious.
It is concluded that the presence of the word "because" was responsible
for triggering the effect of what Cialdini calls "Human Automaticity". The
mere use of the word "because" was sufficient to extract a positive
response from people and it did not even matter that there was no
substantial reason given. In practical terms, this indeed was "instant
persuasion". It is also a trick that leaves the victims of SE attacks
wandering "what just happened"!
4.5 Influence techniques
Cialdini (2001) identifies six fundamental psychological principles:
reciprocation, consistency, social proof, liking, authority and scarcity. As
these principles direct human behaviour, they effectively give rise to
influence techniques that are being efficiently put to use by "compliance
practitioners" to power their tactics. (The term "compliance practitioners"
is used by Dr. Cialdini to generally identify those people who try to make
others comply with  their wishes. Clearly, Social Engineers form a subset
of this group).
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1. Reciprocation. One of the basic principles of human society is that if
someone gives something to someone else, then the right thing for the
recipient to do, is to somehow return the favour. This stems from the
reciprocal nature of human society and goes back to the formation of the
first human groups. The members of those groups had to share food and
skills in order to survive. These basic principles evolved into the
interdependencies of modern societies. Clearly, the action of giving and
then expecting something in return as well as the other way round, on
average, characterises all humans. The ways that this principle can be
exploited by Social Engineers are many and range from the basic to the
really intricate. "Free" offers on the Internet are very common. Most of the
time, offers such as screensavers or background images are given away
with the sole intention of persuading the recipient to register an email
address in order to receive the free offer. At its most innocent form this
technique is used to build up an e-mailing list to be used for promotional
material or, worse, to be sold to others for the same use. Apart from the
resulting spam mail flooding one's inbox, this type of attack is not very
dangerous security-wise and this is the reason behind its popularity and
success. Through the use of free email services one can create an
address and register as requested, only to abandon the address at a later
stage when spam sent to it becomes a nuisance. However, the Social
Engineer may introduce a new twist to this story by directing the offer to
particular targets and instead of providing just a piece of well-meaning
software, entice the Mark to install software that could perform a
secondary spying function in addition to its advertised primary function.
The principle of Reciprocation can also be applied in the already
discussed "Reverse SE" attacks. When the Social Engineer solves the
problem that torments the Mark, the Mark feels indebted to the Social
Engineer and grants the Social Engineer the requested favours.
In an even more subtle form of reciprocation, the Social Engineer may
make an almost unreasonable request, knowing that it will not be
granted. By then making a lighter and less unreasonable request, the
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Social Engineer augments the odds of this second request being granted,
compared to the situation where the second request was the only one
being made. Although seemingly unreasonable, there is logic behind this
sequence. It should be clear that the Social Engineer's target was to not
have the first request granted. The first request was only made to
predispose the Mark according to the Social Engineer's plan. When the
first request is turned down, the fact that the Social Engineer continues
with a less demanding request, constitutes a concession on the Social
Engineer's part. The Mark then feels obliged to reciprocate with a
concession of his/her own because of the natural tendency to co-operate
in the bounds of our societal interaction. This is similar to soliciting for
money. A rather high amount of money is first asked for, and after this
request is turned down, a second, smaller amount of money is almost
certainly guaranteed to end up in the solicitant's money bag.
2. Commitment and Consistency. It is a known psychological fact that
people are mostly consistent within their words, beliefs, attitudes and
actions. This is fueled both by the fact that consistency is a virtue valued
by society as well as by the useful shortcuts it provides. These shortcuts
make daily life easier in the sense that if one remains consistent with
previous choices, the load of re-processing all the data in similar
situations as they arise is avoided. One simply sticks to earlier decisions.
As far as commitment is concerned, one has to just examine the positive
load that the word "committed" carries in everyday conversations. If
someone is characterised as "committed", then that someone can
implicitly be trusted, is considered to be a person who brings results, is
highly dependable etc. (For reasons of clarity and to avoid misconception,
another use of the word "committed" is to describe someone who has
been admitted to a mental institution. According to Meriam-Webster
Online dictionary (Meriam-Webster, 2004) the first two meanings of the
verb "commit" are: "a: to put into charge or trust : entrust, b: to place in a
prison or mental institution". Clearly for the purposes of Cialdini's
argument, reference is made to the first of the two meanings).
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The Social Engineer makes good use of this principle by subtly
manipulating the Mark so that the Mark gradually finds him/herself in such
a position that turning down the Social Engineer's request is not an option.
This entrapment is based solely on the Mark's previous conduct towards
the Social Engineer. In order for the Mark to be consistent towards the
Social Engineer, assuming that the Mark has already granted the Social
Engineer's inconsequential small favours, the Mark must keep granting
the Social Engineer favours that are being gradually built up over many
phone calls and an extended period of time. Doing otherwise, will make
the Mark look inconsistent with respect to prior behaviour. In this case, the
driving force behind the Mark's obsession with consistency is not, so
much, what the public reaction would be if the fact that the Mark is
inconsistent was brought to light, but rather the fact that if the Mark turns
down the Social Engineer's request, this would force the Mark to
holistically re-evaluate his/her position and evolved relation with the Social
Engineer, since first contact was made. Not only can this make the whole
mental-shortcut-based-on-previous-experience structure collapse
(Cialdini, 2001), but it really is not an option in the mind of the Mark, since
the Mark has to put his/her weight behind previous choices in order to
remain psychologically balanced.
This attitude is further enforced by the fact that when person A asks
person B for a favour and B grants it, A becomes part of B's personal
history of good deeds that contributes to self-esteem. B (who granted the
favour) will have to like A from that point onwards because B has to justify
his/her action by convincing him/herself that this was the right thing to do
as A "is a really nice person". It should also be noted that at the time of
the favour being granted, B does not have to like A in order to grant the
favour, but other reasons may lead B to this decision. Another interesting
point is that none of the above necessarily holds true for A. A does not
need to like B to ask for the favour, neither B becomes likeable by A after
the favour is granted. On the contrary, it is possible for A to develop a
dislike for B in order to justify that it was not a favour being granted but
that somehow, B being a worse person than A, was obliged to grant A's
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request.
All that is required from the Social Engineer in order to "cash in" on such
attitudes is careful planning. A commitment in the form of a promise on
the part of the Mark (direct, implied or even suggested) may be called
upon by the Social Engineer in order to "nudge" the Mark at times of
hesitation ("Aaaah… but you promised!").
3. Social Proof. According to Cialdini (2001, p.100) "we determine what is
correct by finding out what other people think is correct". In part, this
principle has already been discussed under Conformity, above. SE
techniques based on the principle of Social Proof are most influential on a
Mark, under conditions of either a) uncertainty or b) similarity. In the first
case, if the situation is so ambiguous that the Mark does not know what to
do, providing information on the actions of others will most certainly turn
the Mark in the same direction (see Conformity above). In the second
case on the other hand, since people are more inclined to follow the lead
of others, similar to them, the work of a Social Engineer can be
significantly facilitated or significantly impeded.
In a direct attack, the Mark may hesitate in providing the Social Engineer
with the requested information. This hesitation indicates uncertainty and
the Social Engineer will provide such conformity-related information to the
Mark, that the Mark will be nudged in the desired direction.
Indirectly, the Social Engineer may benefit by lax security that allows
users (i.e. potential targets) to function haphazardly with respect to
security measures. This is a regenerative process that is fuelled by
similarity and leads to an increasingly insecure work environment as more
and more users following the example of others before them, develop
disrespect towards security measures. On the other hand, if the proper
security policies and directives are applied and the correct incentives are
given to workers in order to uphold security and be rewarded for it, the
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regenerative effect due to similarity will become positive and lead to
augmented security.
4. Liking. People tend to respond favourably to other people with whom they
share some common interest, hobby, birthplace etc. This natural tendency
of ordinary people to like and even to seek out others who are like
themselves, arms the Social Engineer with a powerful tactic. That of
undertaking the role of a persona that appears more likeable to the Mark
by virtue of similarity.
Generalising, people prefer to respond positively to those who they know
and like. It is thus imperative that a Social Engineer become "liked" by the
potential Mark. Apart form similarity, the most obvious aspect of all, that of
physical beauty, is probably the most important factor for which people
like other people. Whether it is conditioning or natural selection, research
has shown (Cialdini, 2001) that physical attractiveness has an immediate
effect on others, who instantly like those blessed with it. More interestingly
though, other qualities of attractive people are further enhanced by the
mere fact that their possessors are attractive! Hence, an attractive person
will most probably also be considered to be kinder, more intelligent, more
talented and, of course, more trustworthy than he/she really is.  As a
result, attractive people can be more persuasive than others
Liking can be achieved by familiarity over repeated contact (this was also
mentioned under Friendliness, above). Also, if the circumstances under
which contact takes place are positive rather than negative, liking is much
more certain to be achieved sooner than later.
In SE attacks, these techniques are used to boost the level of liking that
the Mark holds for the attacking Social Engineer. In physical attacks, the
external appearance of the attacker has a major part in the scenario
played out and the success of the attack altogether. In attacks over the
phone and the Internet, a deep, resounding voice (natural or filtered
through the appropriate voice-changing device) can contribute to the
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success of the attack. Additionally, "chatting-up" the Mark in order to
establish some common points of reference on which to build a trust
relationship can make or break a successful attack. Stretching out the
contacts in time can also help a Social Engineer build a trust relationship
over the phone with the Mark and use that trust build-up when the attack
culminates.
5. Authority. It has already been discussed that a false appeal to authority is
one of the preferred methods of operation in SE attacks. The reason that
such an impersonation is successful, is based on the respect that the
average person has for authority. Modern societies systematically employ
practices to instill in their members that obedience to legitimate authorities
constitutes correct conduct (Cialdini, 2001, ch.6). Furthermore, persons of
authority are considered to normally possess high levels of knowledge,
wisdom and power. Hence, a mental shortcut can be established by
deferring the complexity and responsibility of decision to such persons.
This, in effect constitutes an automatic response to persons of authority.
Alarmingly, though, as it is also discussed in the above reference, this
automatic response tends to be to the symbols of authority and not
necessarily to its credential-backed substance. Such symbols have been
shown by research (Cialdini, 2001, p. 201) to be titles, clothing and
automobiles. These symbols, used by the Social Engineer and combined
with the right attitude and composure, can effectively project a convincing,
albeit false, image of authority that will evoke an automatic response from
the targeted Mark. Moreover, due to the automatic nature of the response,
the Mark tends to underestimate the effect of authority pressure on his/her
behaviour, thus making the attack more difficult to identify and protect
against.
6. Scarcity. According to this principle, a higher value is assigned to goods
and services that become less available. As this happens, their apparent
value increases and so does the appreciation of their quality. Additionally,
it is argued that as things become less available, our freedoms are
effectively curtailed in the sense that we are no longer able to acquire
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them as we used to. Psychological Reactance theory dictates that the
human response to loss of freedom is to desire them even more strongly
(Cialdini, 2001, pp.208-218). Hence, something that becomes scarce also
becomes more desirable. (In other words, we appreciate something when
we lose it).
Although it is clear that the scarcity principle applies more to deception
based on fraudulent on-line auctions, the same principle can be used to
enhance the effect of many other types of SE attacks.
For example, in the case of the "well-meaning" e-banking employee who
wakes up the Mark in the middle of the night to inform him/her that money
is being transferred out of his/her account and subsequently makes a
request for the Mark's password to block the transaction, an extra piece of
information about how the Social Engineer is risking his/her position in the
bank to help the Mark is also usually supplied. Apart from the sense of
gratitude that the Social Engineer is trying to conjure, the element of
scarcity of the supplied service is also indirectly invoked. The Mark
realises that if he/she hesitates to give the requested information to the
Social Engineer, the offer may be swiftly withdrawn because of the
impending risk of job loss for the bank employee / Social Engineer. This
scarcity element makes the quality and sincerity of the offer to appear
higher, and thus provides the Mark with a mental shortcut and the Social
Engineer with the information he/she is after.
In the case of "phishing" attacks over email, IRC etc, an offer valid "for a
limited time only" or "for the first X replies received" may trick the Mark
into thoughtlessly and impulsively submitting personal information that will
be used to impersonate him/her during a later phase of the SE attack or,
even worse, be used to directly gain access to a system.
The above techniques are e-variations on a very old theme. Marketers,
politicians, advertisers, sales people and con artists have been using
them for ages to convince their Marks to respond positively to their
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suggestions. Amazingly, although these methods were identified and
brought to light decades ago, they are still very successful and the fact
that computer-age Social Engineers use them, is a testament to their
effectiveness. The average computer user is thus very vulnerable and the
only means of defense is proactive education and distribution of
information relevant to these methods of attack.
4.6 Exploitation of attitudes and beliefs
Apart from the tactics of influence and persuasion already discussed,
Social Engineers make use of several shortcomings in the function of the
systems they target for compromise.
One such shortcoming is the lack of the flow of information about an
attack in large, and mostly authoritarian, hierarchies. This is a well-known
situation among Social Engineers and attackers who justifiably consider
most hierarchies of this type to be governed by what is called in Hacker-
jargon the "SNAFU" principle. According to the Hacker's Jargon Lexicon
(2004), the acronym originates "from a WWII Army acronym for ‘Situation
Normal, All ****ed Up: True communication is possible only between
equals, because inferiors are more consistently rewarded for telling their
superiors pleasant lies than for telling the truth”. Despite the annoying
vulgarity of the acronym, this principle describes a situation that has
definitely been holding true for millenia. It is a well-known fact that military
couriers in the times of the ancient Persian empire were either treated as
honoured guests when they brought news of victory from the battlefield, or
summarily executed if they brought news of defeat. In today's terms, it is
not unusual to treat someone who raises an alarm, as if he/she is the
cause of the alarm! In this most ostrich-like behaviour, ordinarily vigilant
employees feel compelled to "turn a blind eye" and ignore the observed
signs of a security breach. This is the same type of hierarchy where an
impersonation attack by a Social Engineer based on a false appeal to
authority, would be more successful. Consequently, the hierarchy's
decision-makers become progressively disconnected from reality, leading
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to the systemic failure of the hierarchy itself. A term currently gaining
acceptance that is used to describe such situations that lead to chaos is
"Discordianism".  This is actually a recently (1958) created philosophy /
religion / joke that has been built to reflect, "formally" describe and
discuss the principles of chaos, confusion and disorder in the world
(University of Virginia, 2005).
Another attitude exploit stems from the conventional fact that when two
parties engage in a transaction or communication, this is done "in good
faith", unless, of course, there are serious indications to the contrary. As it
holds true in any case of pre-meditated deceit, the deceiver (the Social
Engineer for the purposes of this work) has the Mark at a disadvantage.
The Mark's attitude of initially acting in good faith by default, effectively
delays the triggering of mental alarms and consequently impedes reaction
and an efficient response to a SE attack. This is an issue that must be
addressed by effective counter-measures that function by making
potential targets less naïve and gullible, thus minimising the reaction time
to raise alarms.
4.7 Alternative routes
If a Mark can not be persuaded to relinquish the requested data or
perform the actions required of him, there always exist harsher ways of
getting him/her to comply. Extortion has always been such a way.
Although, strictly speaking, extortion is not a SE attack, it is more than just
conceivable that sensitive information regarding the Mark can be collected
through SE methods and subsequently be used against him/her in an
attempt to extort further information. It is no secret that Private
Investigators have been using SE tactics to gather information on their
subjects, long before the term was coined to describe the principle under
which these tactics worked. Regarding the subject of extortion itself,
further discussion is beyond the scope of this work.
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4.8 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter the fundamental psychological aspects of SE were
presented. The common psychological loopholes that Social Engineers
exploit as well as the techniques that they use were analysed. This is
another necessary step towards building better defenses against SE.
Effective controls can only be devised once the problem has been
identified as clearly as possible. In this case, the issue has to do with the
mind of the attacker against that of his victim. If there is a chance to
counter the acts of the Social Engineer, the potential victim must be
rendered capable of recognising and resisting the psychological "nudges"
of the attacker as well as raising an alarm. In effect the human element
becomes the last line of defense in this battle.
In a subsequent chapter, the defenses against SE will be discussed,
ultimately leading to the assessment of the ISO/IEC 17799:2005 controls
with respect to SE in another chapter. To be able to reach that point
though, yet another issue must be first discussed: that of the social
aspects of IS. This is the subject of the next chapter.
5. Social aspects of Information Security
5.1 Introduction
As this work deals in principle with issues related to Social Engineering (SE)
attacks and their effects on Information Security (IS), it would be unwise to
ignore the social elements and social foundations of Information Security.
In previous chapters it has been shown that SE attacks target the human
element of IS by exploiting human relations to the maximum. In that context, a
discussion of the psychological aspects of SE was presented in hope of better
defining the SE problem. However, by ignoring the very nature of social
structures that govern all aspects of human relations, fallacious working
assumptions can be made, consequently leading to the creation of insufficient
controls against the identified Social Engineering threats.
This chapter attempts to strengthen the pursued research by providing a solid
foundation for the ensuing detailed analysis of the ISO/IEC 17799:2005
standard with respect to Social Engineering. The diagram of figure 5.1 depicts
the role of this chapter within the overall structure of this dissertation.
Social relations between the individuals involved in an Information Security
Management System (ISMS) structure, along with the frequently
unpredictable fashion that humans act and react to stimuli, provide
opportunities that Social Engineers may and do exploit. Although great effort
has been invested in forming Information Security standards and procedures,
these may prove inadequately equipped to ensure Information Security at the
end of the day. It is stipulated that the design flaws do not result from the
standards' structures being technically incomplete. Despite being complete
from a technical viewpoint, Information Security standards do not encompass
provisions for the idiosyncratic nature of the human element, especially within
a social context. By providing some insight on the social mechanisms at work
in the development and function of an ISMS, certain design flaws of the
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related standards and procedures may be brought to light and steps be taken
towards rectifying them.
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Figure 5.1: Chapter 5 within the context of the overall dissertation structure
The average person’s notion of Information Security stems from the general
idea of Security. Security in general, on the other hand, has been traditionally
related to the police, law enforcement, the military etc. In many modern
languages, even the word for "security" is used to signify the police force in
general or one of their main branches dealing with public safety. Furthermore,
whenever and wherever it was needed, security has always been applied in a
stern, bureaucratic way, actually taking advantage of bureaucracy and the
hierarchical structures associated with it. By using such hierarchical
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structures, the application of security is achieved through regulation and
control (Foucault, 1989, p.65). This mentality is accurately expressed in the
age-old saying: «To trust is good but to control is better». The idea of security
has been applied to material and immaterial issues alike since the birth of the
first human societies. Be it the protection of gathered sustenance supplies
and, later, capital (material) or the protection of information and even life itself
(immaterial), security against the ever-present foe has been one of our most
basic needs. As the bureaucratic application of security has constituted
standard practice for a long time, long before the arrival of the computer, it
was the obvious step forward to achieve the security of (non-computerised)
information in the same way. Furthermore, with the evolution of computer
systems as information-handling devices, the existing principle was simply
extended to include IT Security by adding more appropriate controls.
It can thus be safely deduced that any modern ISMS implementation still
relies on bureaucracy for its fundamental functions. It could even be argued
that a bureaucratic structure through which regulation and control are applied,
is a necessary pre-requisite for an ISMS to exist, on the assumption that the
imposed technical and physical controls can mitigate all identified risks.
However, it must be stressed that the current bureaucratic system was
conceived, defined and described by Max Weber in the late 19th and early
20th centuries and still functions along the prescribed way (Bottomore, 1990,
p. 203). This, in principle, should constitute an indisputable oxymoron as the
futility of attempting to secure Information in the 21st century by using 19th
century models and tools is obvious. Consequently, the controls existing
within this context may prove inadequate in today’s terms.
5.2 Current Practice - The Modernist approach to ISMSs
Information Systems are designed and built in a purely deterministic fashion.
They are created to bring order to organisations by forcing human actions to
take place within the strict context and limits of ordered workflow
implementations. Such strict implementations ensure that human actions are
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disciplined and unambiguous and that the results of those actions are
predictable, clear-cut and exact and, if necessary, securely leading to further
pre-defined actions.
In transcribing the processes of the analogue world into workflows for
computer-based Information Systems, all uncertainty must be eradicated. The
tools of the trade for such an accomplishment are business process analysis,
flowcharts and, of course, Boolean logic. This way, all processes and user
actions are transcribed into algorithmic sequences of exact questions strictly
requiring unequivocal "yes/no" replies.
All of the above ideally lead to the design and implementation of an
Information System which has all ambiguity removed from it and is no more
and no less than a finite-state system. All state transitions must be fully
reproducible and all user actions must be clear and exact. Such an
implementation would thus lead to business practices that are also clear,
exact and deprived of all ambiguity. (The feasibility of such a system is
unimportant for the present discussion).
As the Information Security Management System must form an integral part of
the Information System, the above notions are extended to cover Information
Security Management as well. The ISMS is thus covered by the same
providence and governed by the same principles described above.
Stemming from the concept of Reason as this was set forth during
Enlightenment (Mendelssohn et al., 1989, p.28), rational knowledge is
assumed to possess an objective existence which is independent of the
observer's posture. This forms the basis of Modernism (Deligiorgi, 1996, p.
18) which builds intellectual structures on rational knowledge and through
these promotes innovation and progress. In the context of Modernism, the
complexity of intellectual structures is anything but limited as even large-scale
processes can be described through modernistic methods and principles.
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Indubitably, Modernism has actually been the motive power behind the
industrial revolution that resulted in modern technology. Information
Technology is clearly modernistic as its very nature requires the observer to
be detached from the system being observed. In their inspired paper, Low et
al. (1996) argue that software engineering is at present solely viewed from a
modernistic perspective. This principle can easily be expanded to encompass
the whole of the Information Technology construct. IT Systems are thus
confronted as objective entities that are exact, discreet, identifiable,
predictable and independent from the observer.
This leads to Information Systems being viewed as machines that function in
a precise, repeatable and predictable way.
Gareth Morgan, in his book "Images of Organization" (1996), discusses a
number of ways to view and understand organisations which he calls
"Metaphors". The first of these metaphors calls for the organisation to be
viewed as a machine with interchangeable components, which is firmly set on
a goal. According to this metaphor, human and technological components
form a stable machine that operates in a repetitive, predictable and secure
way. This is achieved by having rational actors make rational decisions with
predictable, reproducible and unambiguous effects in a purely modernistic
fashion.
For such a system to function, everything must fall in its place in a larger, well-
described framework. Such a framework can only be created by the existence
of processes that are governed by standardisation, control and regulation.
The interlocking components of the machine are thus combined together
according to a complex blueprint and their roles in the machine are fully
prescribed.
It does not come as a surprise that these issues are addressed in a default
manner in procedures that have to do with the current analysis and design
techniques applied in any IT-related project. Tools and techniques used in
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system analysis, such as top- down or bottom-up design methods, data flow
diagram methodologies etc (Schach, 2005; Whitten & Bentley, 2007) fully
comply with the modernist approach . It also has to be noted that all of the
above are governed by strict standards leading to normalisation and making
control, regulation and evaluation possible.
Furthermore, as businesses and organisations do not just rely on their IT
department for number-crunching but are instead built around a skeleton and
nervous system formed by that department, it is not unusual for global change
and business process re-organisation to initiate within the IT department. The
reason for such a decision is that IT is the one centre of operations that is de
facto regulated and aligned to processes governed by standards, thus forming
a solid and flexible platform to build upon. Information Systems thus tend to
dictate the way that an organisation evolves and govern its responses to the
ever-changing business demands.
To drive the above points home, one only has to consider the various issues
that lead to successful Information Security management by today's
standards:
a) Use of rules and regulations aiming to provide a secure environment.
b) Commitment of everyone involved to a set of prescribed guidelines or
policy. This in effect constitutes behaviour control.
c) Use of technical measures for controlling the application of (a) and the
upholding of (b) above.
d) Use of non-technical measures to complement (c) above.
e) De facto existence of a technocratic elite of Information Security
professionals that oversees the application of (a), (b), (c) and (d) above.
There are three issues that must be brought forward here:
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First, the above points are by definition dealt with in ISO/IEC standards
17799:2005 and 27001:2005, proving the modernist character of these
standards which may prove to be inadequate for today's challenges.
Second, the above five points and perhaps more significantly point (e) show
that an ISMS is indeed a social construct that has to be examined in detail.
Third, as a whole, points (a) to (e) above form the modernist blueprint for an
organisation viewed as a well-oiled machine according to Morgan's (1996)
metaphor of "organisation as machine" discussed earlier. Furthermore, these
points nicely tie in with bureaucratic definitions as presented by Max Weber a
century ago. Max Weber is assumed to have written "Wirtschaft und
Gesellschaft" (Economy and Society) between 1910 and 1914. This work was
first published around 1922, after the author's death in 1920 ( Oakes, 1998)
and has watermarked all organisational efforts ever since. Using the
translation -obtained from L. Ridener's (1999) website- for "Wirtschaft und
Gesellschaft" (part III, chap. 6, pp. 650-78), the first of the characteristics of
bureaucracy is described as:
I. There is the principle of fixed and official jurisdictional areas, which are
generally ordered by rules, that is, by laws or administrative regulations.
1. The regular activities required for the purposes of the
bureaucratically governed structure are distributed in a fixed way
as official duties.
2. The authority to give the commands required for the discharge of
these duties is distributed in a stable way and is strictly delimited
by rules concerning the coercive means, physical, sacerdotal, or
otherwise, which may be placed at the disposal of officials.
3. Methodical provision is made for the regular and continuous
fulfilment of these duties and for the execution of the
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corresponding rights; only persons who have the generally
regulated qualifications to serve are employed.
As ISMSs currently adopt the above principles, their nature becomes
fundamentally bureaucratic, thus causing a deficiency in the level of
democratic processes within the organisation structure that are deemed
necessary by prevailing trends in management. Bureaucracy pre-supposes
strict hierarchical structures of a vertical nature while, today, the push is
towards flat, horizontal organisational structures, the governing principles of
which were described by Ostroff and Smith (1992).
According to Dhillon and Backhouse (2000), the fast progress of the electronic
age and the evolution of IT have caused the emergence of new organisational
structures. Consequently, the traditional hierarchical organisations are being
transformed into loosely coupled networks that are characterised by co-
operation on a horizontal level rather than hierarchical control in a vertical
direction. As a result, direct interpersonal and inter-organisational
communication, connectivity and the sharing of information have seriously
augmented in volume compared to the time when the traditional
organisational models based on hierarchy were solidly and exclusively in
place.
Hence, the inadequacies of the current bureaucratically-built ISMS are bound
to create opportunities for social engineers to thrive in. The assumption that
all members of an organisation will play their ISMS-prescribed roles flawlessly
during an attack, because of bureaucratic pressure, is wildly optimistic at best.
Furthermore, bureaucracy may even hinder essential practices such as
reporting of security-related incidents. This will come as a direct result of the
inconvenience caused to the person reporting the incident by necessary
paperwork etc.
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5.3 The ISMS as a social construct
Bruno Latour, in his two books, "Science on Action" (1987) and "Laboratory
Life" (1986), among other things discusses how Science and Technology
affect social constructs and how they are in turn affected by them. This
strengthens the idea that all systems that are based on science and/or
technology constitute social constructs and should be treated as such. An
ISMS, comprising both human as well as technological components, is indeed
socially constructed.
In their book "The Social Construction of Reality", which was first published in
1966, Berger and Luckmann (1991) provided one of the definitive works on
Social Constructionism. The functionalist interpretations presented by Berger
and Luckmann can be readily applied to the ISMS structure in an effort to
analyse and understand the social construction of such systems, as has been
attempted by Albrechtsen (2004).
Although it may sound oversimplified, for the purposes of this analysis it
suffices to concentrate on the discussion of Berger and Luckmann on the dual
nature of societal objective and subjective reality. The notion of Objective
reality concerns the production and maintenance of a shared sense of reality.
This reality is ultimately constructed through the processes of externalisation,
habitualisation, institutionalisation and legitimation. On the other hand,
Subjective reality according to Berger and Luckmann (1991, p.167) differs
from objective reality in the sense that it refers to the reality "as apprehended
in the individual consciousness rather than on reality as institutionally
defined". In other words, subjective reality is the sense of the socially created
objective reality that each individual human being acquires as its own
(internalises). This acquisition takes place mainly through the process of
secondary socialisation.
Through the application of Burger and Luckmann's principles to ISMS
structures, some of the system's inherent shortcomings can be identified and
Social Aspects of Information Security
Chapter 5 113
perhaps catered for. In this sense it was decided to follow the same structure
as the one followed in Berger and Luckmann's (1991) book for reasons of
proper succession of the principles' applications. Thus the social construct of
the ISMS as an objective reality and then as a subjective one, will be
discussed in the next two sections.
5.4 The Objective reali ty of the ISMS
The first step in the social construction of Information Security objective reality
is that of externalisation. Externalisation, is defined in (Berger & Luckmann,
1991, p.70): “Human being is impossible in a closed sphere of quiescent
interiority. Human being must ongoingly externalize itself in activity”.
Externalisation as such, is an anthropological necessity originating from
human biological pre-disposition. Human beings must continually externalise
themselves through activity. Furthermore, (Berger & Luckmann, 1991, p.122):
“As man externalizes himself, he constructs the world into which he
externalizes himself.  In the process of externalization, he projects his own
meanings into reality.” The inherent instability of the human organism makes it
imperative that humans produce for themselves a consistent and stable
environment for conduct and social order in general. It is exactly such a need
that is covered by the creation of an ISMS. Externalisation with respect to
ISMSs has taken place through the evolution of the notion of security and
measures for ensuring it in general, as this has already been discussed. As
the threats particular to Information Systems were identified, it became
obvious that if left uncontrolled, these threats would result in Information
System chaos and disarray.  As a result, action against the threats was taken
by appropriate controls being applied etc. Hence, a computer user who
decides to turn off and secure a PC when unattended, to set up password
protection of files and systems or to make backup copies of a day's work is
actually externalising.
According to Berger and Luckmann (1991, p.70), Habitualisation denotes the
principle that "any action that is repeated frequently becomes cast into a
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pattern, which can then be reproduced with an economy of effort and which,
ipso facto, is apprehended by its performer as that pattern". Human actions
have an innate tendency to habitualise. Hence, all the actions that are taking
place as a result of Externalisation with respect to ISMSs, eventually fall into a
pattern that helps the individual go automatically through the motions
necessary to apply essential controls. Thus, the simple examples of actions
described above, after a certain point in time, are carried out as a matter of
course. The user who free-mindedly decided to go through these motions,
having established that these are good and effective things to do against data
loss or compromise, incorporates them into a daily routine. This way, the
necessity of such actions does not have to be re-examined every time they
are carried out.
Habitualisation is the first and necessary step towards Institutionalisation.
As can be found in Berger and Luckmann's work (1991, p.72),
Institutionalisation "occurs whenever there is a reciprocal typification of
habitualised action". They further go on to state that "any such typification is
an institution" and that  "the institution posits that actions of type X will be
performed by actors of type X". Finally they claim that "institutions further
imply historicity and control.". Habitualised actions regarding social
relationships form the basis for the creation of institutions that in turn enforce
action. The interesting turn takes place as the established institution is
"objectified" by bequeathing it to the subsequent generation that did not invent
it initially. For the new generation, this socially created institution appears as a
fully objective reality and, as such, is taken for granted. This is why Institutions
always have a history, of which they are the products. "It is impossible to
understand an institution adequately without an understanding of the historical
process in which it was produced" (Berger & Luckmann, 1991, p.72).
Institutions thus, by definition, control human conduct by setting up predefined
patterns thereof. Shifting back to the ISMS paradigm, Institutionalisation takes
place when the actions of individual user(s) like the ones described above,
give rise to and become parts of an Information Security Policy.
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Legitimation is defined (Berger & Luckmann, 1991, p.110) as "a ‘second-
order’ objectivation of meaning.  Legitimation produces new meanings that
serve to integrate the meanings already attached to disparate institutional
processes". The purpose of legitimation is to explain and validate the existing
institutions. This is an important process if the presence of institutions is to be
seen by individuals as subjectively plausible.  If this is achieved, then the
institutions themselves become acceptable. Legitimation is viewed as a
'second-order' objectivation in juxtaposition to the 'first-order' objectivation.
'First order' objectivation denotes the process by which principal meanings are
attached to the institutional directives themselves. Legitimation is thus a
'second order objectivation' process in the sense that through it, the
institutional directives are explained and justified via the application of
cognitive and normative elements. This means that through legitimation actors
are told not only how things should be done but also why it should be so and
what things are in the first place. In this sense, legitimation provides a
balanced combination of knowledge and values. Legitimation in ISMS comes
in the form of Information Security standards and guidelines. IS standards
such as the prevailing ISO/IEC 17799 (ISO/IEC, 2005a), 27001 (ISO/IEC,
2000b), 13335 (ISO/IEC, 1997; 1998; 2000; 2001; 2004), 15408 (ISO/IEC,
2005c; 2005d; 2005e) and the like, by means of their existence, legitimise the
institutional directives of IS. It must be highlighted though, that IS standards
effectively incorporate a high level of formalism in IS management, at the
same time bringing forth its bureaucratic nature that is largely based on
control and regulation.
Through the above four processes, the social construct of the ISMS as an
objective reality is effected.
5.5 The Subjective rea lity of the ISMS
As it has already been discussed, Subjective reality is that "version" of
objective reality that is internalised by individuals through secondary
socialisation. Berger and Luckmann (1991, p.150) define socialisation in
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general as "the comprehensive and consistent induction of an individual into
the objective world of a society or a sector of it". Primary socialisation takes
place during childhood. It is the process through which people first become
members of society. Secondary socialisation is "any subsequent process that
inducts an already socialised individual into new sectors of the objective world
of his society". This is effectively the process of internalising institutional
directives. Within this process, an individual acquires behaviours and
knowledge that are specific to the role the individual is called to assume within
the society. It is important also to note that formality and anonymity strongly
characterise the process of secondary socialisation (Berger & Luckmann,
1991, p.162). A typical example of secondary socialisation is the educational
process. A teacher is perceived as an institutional functionary and thus the
social interaction between teachers and learners can be formalised.
Stemming from this formality, the roles of the teachers and the learners carry
a high degree of anonymity. The teachers are entrusted with the particular
role of the passing of specific knowledge to the learners. As such they are in
principle interchangeable and thus anonymous. (This of course does not
come into conflict with the subjective differentiation of teachers with respect to
their abilities, stature, performance etc, all of which are qualities that are in
principle irrelevant to the formal process of knowledge-passing). As far as the
learners are concerned, the learners are also in principle anonymous to the
teacher and are strictly viewed as the recipients of specific knowledge.
To shift all this into the context of ISMSs, it must be first considered that the
socially constructed objective reality of an ISMS, has evolved from existing
objective realities in the pre-computer era and the relevant security efforts. As
such, it relies heavily on a bureaucratic infrastructure and in turn offers a
number of Information Security solutions. The ISMS objective reality is
internalised as a subjective reality by all those who actually follow the offered
Information Security solutions. "Those who follow the offered solutions" can
be identified as three major groups in any type of organisation: a) the
Information Security professionals who are responsible for carrying out the
ISMS development, design, evaluation, maintenance and operation, b) the
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Management and c) the end-users. The groups have differences in interests,
perspectives, goals and agendas. It is these differences that warrant the
division into groups. The segregation of the three groups is more important
than it may be assessed at first, as it severely affects the secondary
socialisation process and the way subjective ISMS reality is internalised by
each group. As Berger and Luckmann put it (1991, p.158): "Secondary
socialisation requires the acquisition of role-specific vocabularies, which
means, for one thing, the internalisation of semantic fields structuring routine
interpretations and conduct within an institutional area". Hence, different roles
result in (or require) different role-specific vocabularies and may lead into a
lack of common ground that the three groups can share. This, in turn, inhibits
communication and co-operation between the groups. Berger and Luckmann
(1991, p.158) give a good (and frequently adopted) example to clarify the
point: "a differentiation may arise between foot soldiers and cavalry". In that
example, the cavalry have their own language and employ their own methods
for achieving their goal that the foot soldiers do not comprehend, as they don't
need to. However, the foot soldiers have every confidence in the cavalry's
actions that always get them out of a dire position. In the case of the three
groups involved with an ISMS (IS professionals, Management and End-users)
the case is quite similar. Bearing in mind that in most cases the group of IS
professionals is a subgroup of the organisation's IT professionals or a group
that has evolved from IT, the Management rarely fully understands what the
IS professionals do and how they do it. Nevertheless, management trusts the
IS professionals with the "crown jewels" of the organisation. Furthermore they
assume that the IS professionals will keep the end-users in check with respect
to information security. Again, management has a rather vague notion on how
this is accomplished, generally assuming that technological measures applied
by the IS professionals will do their work for them. Thus, it is not unusual for
the IS professionals to be under-powered to carry out their work. The disparity
between the subjective reality internalised by the two groups, creates a
serious gap of understanding between them with respect to IS. On the other
hand, the end-users group view the Management group with respect to IS as
being very remote and detached from practical issues, feeling that it is they,
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the end-users, that are overburdened by security measures and who are also
frowned upon when something goes wrong. The end-users also view the IS
professionals with scepticism, more-or-less as a "necessary evil". Although
the end users do place their confidence in the IS professionals' abilities to
help avoid disaster or rectify situations that have gone astray, they also view
them as "techno-mages" performing black art and not doing any "real" work
within the organisation, as the product of their work is neither always tangible
nor consistent in volume. Sometimes, the IS professionals are compared to a
cruise-ship's doctor who is not busy unless a crisis situation brews. The doctor
is certainly not needed every hour of every day on the ship but when the need
arises, it is absolutely essential that he is present. Again, mentality gaps with
respect to IS are created between End-users and IS professionals as well as
End-users and Management. Lastly, in the case of the IS professionals'
group, the situation is also quite complicated. Sometimes there is a tendency
to deal with Management on a competitive basis, always struggling for more
of the power that is in principle denied to them. If that is not the case, there is
always the case of differing mentalities as management officials view the
world under a different light compared to computer engineers and scientist
who usually fill the ranks of IS professionals. To further aggravate things,
when IS professionals have to deal with the inability and, worse, reluctance of
members of the other groups to internalise the ISMS objective reality in the
same sense as they do, the IS professionals may develop a tendency to
dispraise the other groups as conglomerations of technologically ignorant
people. The gap in the internalisation of the ISMS reality is thus enlarged and
the common effort towards the mitigation of IS threats becomes even more
difficult to achieve.  (It is interesting at this point to note that what is described
by Leiwo and Heikkuri (1998) as an ethical divide between hackers and IS
personnel is really also a result of the differences in the two groups' subjective
realities).
All in all, the above analysis provides the theoretical justification of what is
being described as "lack of IS culture" in organisations. What is lacking
though, is not IS culture per se but the common internalisation of the objective
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reality regarding IS. The push towards "holistic" security is based on the
creation of such a common ground that is necessary to advance
understanding and co-operation between the organisation's groups towards
attaining the required level of IS. By attempting to establish an IS culture,
what is in effect being done is moving towards bringing together the naturally
diverging agendas towards IS of the different groups. This, though, can not be
attained by simply bringing each of the groups to the same level of expertise
that each of the other groups has attained in their respective fields. That
would be a futile exercise, as experience is not easily or efficiently
transferable.
As we currently stand though, differences between the groups within an
organisation remain very severe and the main problem lies with the fact that
each group can not identify with the methods and tactics imposed by the other
group(s) with respect to IS. As IS professionals are responsible for IS within
the organisation, they are the ones who set the pace by defining the essential
directives and practices. The other groups although in theory are bound to
follow the IS directives (top-level management commitment to the security
policy is essential as is strict control of end-user compliance), in practice they
usually fail to do so. This difficulty in common acceptance and internalisation
of the security effort by all members of an organisation creates innumerable
security holes and provides social engineers with the opportunity for
successful attacks.
5.6 Actor-Network Theory and the ISMS
In his "Science on Action", Bruno Latour (1987) brings forth the Actor-Network
Theory (ANT) and in "Reassembling the Social", Latour (2005) redefines the
notion of "the Social" and provides a fresh view of ANT as the "sociology of
associations". ANT, considered as a subset of Social Constructionism,
originated in the field of science studies. It is described as a 'material-semiotic'
method used to map relations that occur simultaneously between people
and/or objects (hence its 'material' nature) and between immaterial concepts
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(thus 'semiotic'). As a result, any system in the context of which the
interactions between people, their ideas and their technological tools involve
simultaneous material and semiotic relations, forms a single "network" for the
purposes of ANT. The banking system is traditionally used as an obvious
example to demonstrate a typical ANT network. Even everyday activities like
driving to work every morning can be examined under the light of ANT. The
network in that case comprises people, their behaviour on the road, their cars,
the road network, the traffic regulations, the Highway Code and the
interactions between them.
In the Information Technology sector in general and in ISMSs in particular,
interactive relationships exist between the management, IS professionals,
end-users, technological solutions, equipment, security policy, bureaucracy,
administrative practices and the experiences, behaviours and ambitions of all
individuals involved. Therefore, the ISMS makes a prime subject for study
from the ANT viewpoint. Tatnall & Gilding (1999) and Albrechtsen (2004)
present strong cases for examination through ANT of Information Systems
Research and Information Security Management respectively. Their
arguments certainly hold true for the particular case of ISMSs under
examination in the context of this work.
Latour's view of the world as a network of "actants" (human and non-human
actors) connected by complex links and relations, makes ANT useful in
examining the reasons behind the success or failure of systems, technologies,
scientific theories and social endeavours, as the direct result of changes in
their network integrity. ANT does not give answers to the question of why a
network is formed in a particular fashion. It is rather a tool for examining how
actor-networks get formed and subsequently either hold their form and
integrity or fall apart. In ANT, one of the central issues is the study of the
forces that hold the network together.
Social Aspects of Information Security
Chapter 5 121
In the interest of clarity, a few points must be clarified before attempting to
apply ANT to ISMSs regarding "actors" and the notions of "black boxes",
"inscription" and "translation".
"Actors" are, first of all, assumed to lie within the network of relations. Second,
all actors are assumed to be shaped through their relations with one another.
Third, it is assumed that there is no difference in the abilities of actors,
irrespective of their form, nature or function. Fourth, as soon as an actor
engages with an actor-network it too becomes part of that network and is
actively introduced in the network's web of links and relations.
"Black boxes" are used by Latour (1987) to describe an entity (material or
immaterial, human or non-human etc) that has been thoroughly dealt with,
examined and transcribed into a particular known function where the output is
a direct and predictable result of its input. If x and y denote input and output
respectively, a black box can be seen as the function y = f(x). These black
boxes can represent various constructs such as a) the actions of users in an
Information System, b) a known and generally accepted theory or practice, c)
applied technologies etc. Hence, actors in an ANT network can be considered
as black boxes and whole networks can also be black-boxed and viewed as
entities with specific input/output transfer functions. When "opening up" such
a black-boxed network, it can be viewed as a collection of other, smaller black
boxes interconnected to and interacting with one another. This notion helps
both in employing a divide-and-conquer approach to dealing with ANT
networks, as well as explaining the tendency of taking things "for granted".
"Inscription", according to Hanseth and Monteiro (1998, ch.6), "refers to the
way technical artefacts embody patterns of use".  In the same work, they also
quote Akrich (1992, p.205) who makes the following statement regarding
inscription: "Technical objects thus simultaneously embody and measure a set
of relations between heterogeneous elements". Hence, Inscription is the
process through which a 'pattern of use' or 'action' is coded or embedded in
an artefact. However, this does not necessarily signify a strictly deterministic
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process. Artefacts can either be seen as "determining their use" or, on the
contrary, be "flexibly interpreted and appropriated" (Hanseth & Monteiro,
1998, ch.6). Thus, inscription can be seen as the process through which, the
designer's expectations including the desired form of future 'patterns of use' or
'actions' are involved in the development and use of the technology that is
expected to enforce them. At the same time though, a feedback path exists as
this technology definitively contributes in shaping the designer's expectations.
Insofar "Translation" is concerned, Latour (1987) postulates that in the context
of ANT, stability and social order are dynamically and continually negotiated
as a social process of aligning interests. This is achieved through
"translation". According to Law (1992, p.366) translation "generates ordering
effects such as devices, agents, institutions, or organisations". In simpler
terms, according to Singleton and Michael (1993), translation is "the means by
which one entity gives a role to others". Furthermore, in the context of
Information Systems, "In ANT terms, design is translation" according to
Hanseth and Monteiro (1998, ch.6), who go on to explain that interests of all
actors involved in the network are translated into specific "needs" according to
typical ideal models. Furthermore, the specific needs are translated into more
general and unified needs that, through further translation, result into one, all-
encompassing solution/system. When the solution/system enters production
mode, it becomes adopted by the involved individuals by translating the
solution/system into the context of their specific roles.
Translation is of paramount importance to the well being of ANT networks, as
through the process of translation, the integrity of the network is maintained.
This is achieved by the perpetual occurrence of translations along links, in
order to maintain the network’s functionality and thus ensure its success. As
translations along the links pre-suppose communication among actors, the
overall process of translation and communication leads to  power relations
among human and non-human actors. ANT is thus perfectly equipped to deal
with power relations in ISMSs, something that can not be efficiently done
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using the frameworks discussed so far. This ISMS 'Powerplay' will be later
discussed in detail.
5.7 Black boxes in the  ISMS
ISMSs are full of black boxes. This is primarily done in an attempt to break
large and complex problems into smaller, more manageable morsels.
Through the process of dealing separately with every individual vulnerability,
devising an appropriate control for it and including this as a solution in the
ISMS, the vulnerability and its control are effectively black-boxed. This black
box is then assumed to have a known transfer function and as such it
interacts in a predictable fashion with other entities in the ISMS, becoming
effectively an actor of the ISMS network. Hence, in the context of an ISMS,
technology constitutes a black-boxed actor in its own right.
From the ANT viewpoint, the users involved in the ISMS are also considered
as black boxes. The conformance of their actions to the enforced directives is
supposed to be unquestionable and their actions rational, governed by the
ISMS rules and human logic. Thus, with an assumed stable transfer function,
the black-boxing of human actors is complete. In the extended sense, groups
of users with common characteristics and/or roles can also become larger
black boxes that are more than the sum of their constituent individual user
black boxes. The reason for this is that the black box for the group does not
merely contain the user black boxes but, instead, also contains their relations
and translations between them. From an ANT perspective, the user group is a
stand-alone network which can nevertheless be itself black-boxed for the
purposes of the larger ISMS network.
Expressing almost everything in terms of black boxes facilitates the
breakdown of problems and the synthesis of a solution such as the one
provided by an ISMS. The down side of this process is that simplifying
assumptions must occasionally be made in order to "close the lid" on black
boxes. In the ISMS context the most dangerous such assumption is that the
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humans can be viewed as rational actors -the equivalent of black boxes with
known transfer functions. The fallacy in this assumption comes in total support
of an earlier statement presented in this work in the discussion of the
modernist view of ISMSs according to which "The assumption that all
members of an organisation will play their ISMS-prescribed roles flawlessly
during an attack is wildly optimistic at best".
The problem lies in the fact that according to ANT, if the operation (or transfer
function) of a black box is proven to be inaccurate, the lid of the black box
must be "re-opened" and the black box definition be revisited. Consequently,
the links or relations of that black box actor with other nodes as well as the
relevant translations running along those links must also be re-examined and
amended. To aggravate things, the larger black box that contains the
amended entities (smaller black boxes and the relations between them) must
also have its lid opened and its operation re-evaluated.
This approach provides a more systematic view of the shortcomings of the
modernist view of a mechanistically designed ISMS where all constituent
parts are supposed to execute their function flawlessly in a fully predictable
manner. It goes to prove that a wrong design assumption at the basic level of
user behaviour may lead to the collapse of the whole system. The ISMS may
fail to protect the Information if a single user in a critical position falls prey to
the attacking Social Engineer.
The only way to avoid such design flaws as much as possible, is to constantly
keep re-evaluating the validity of the user black boxes and be ready to re-
define the black boxes to any extent required, in order to cater for their
shortcomings. The current tendency is to bundle all users under the lowest
level of generic incompetence with respect to Information Security and based
on that assumption attempt to "idiot-proof" systemic functions and operation.
This simplistic approach is definitely ignoring the following facts: a) that users
are neither simple-minded nor ignorant by default, b) that users may indeed
yield under the pressure of a Social Engineering attack but they can also be
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the only effective means of defence against such attacks and c) that the level
of resistance of users against Social Engineering attacks can be raised
through training and the promotion of a security-aware culture. By looking at
user behaviour in detail, new black box definitions for users will arise, with
more appropriate controls for user-related vulnerabilities.
One issue that ANT is particularly capable of analysing is the relation between
technical and non -technical actors. In this sense, ANT can provide a really
good insight of how technical measures can be used to control non-technical
vulnerabilities. In other words, how technical measures can be employed to
steer the users' behaviour in such a way that it becomes resistant to Social
Engineering threats. Extensions of this notion can have many repercussions,
one of which is that political decisions can be inscribed in any solution/system
in the form of a technical measure able to actively affect the organisation's
culture-building effort and direct the human element towards a particular goal.
Black boxes can also help in providing an insight on the (previously
discussed) issue that was raised by Berger and Luckmann on the
differentiation of role-specific vocabularies between groups (Berger &
Luckmann, 1991, p.158) and the resulting lack of common ground,
communication and co-operation between the groups. The groups actually
view other groups as black boxes and do not attempt to "open the lid" on
them.
In similar fashion, technological issues and solutions remain in tightly closed
black boxes for the majority of users who simply assume that these black
boxes magically "do their job". This may lead to overconfidence on the part of
their users that may result in them becoming complacent, lowering their level
of alertness as well as their defences. This is not unlike what can be observed
when a user installs an antivirus solution on a PC and automatically assumes
that the PC is fully protected against all Internet threats. What most users do
not realise is that this sense of protection may become a false one if, for
example, the scope of the solution is not understood, if regular virus list
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updates are not carried out or if the users themselves take such actions that
compromise the integrity and effectiveness of the solution.
Through the above discussion it must have been made clear that Actor-
Network Theory, through the use of 'black boxes' comes in direct support of
the corollaries of Social Constructionism regarding ISMSs, goes further into
providing better understanding of the issues and may even lead the way into
devising appropriate solutions.
5.8 Inscription and Translation in ISMSs
The notions of Inscription and Translation certainly help in the formal analysis
of phenomena present in ISMSs. It was stated earlier that "Inscription is the
process through which a 'pattern of use' or 'action' is coded or embedded in
an artefact ". (An example of this statement can be obtained by considering
how traffic rules are embedded in the traffic lights' patterns at a crossroad). In
the case of the ISMS, the 'artefacts' of the previous statement are the
technical and non-technical measures that are applied in an effort to reduce
vulnerabilities. These artefacts ensure, among other things, that the human
element of the ISMS behaves in a particular and predictable manner. In the
context of the ISMS, a technical measure would be the use of passwords for
logging-on to systems. A non-technical measure on the other hand would be
the requirement for the use of strong passwords or, on a different note, the
administrative directives that govern reporting of possible social engineering
attacks.
According to the already stated definition of translation by Singleton and
Michael (1993), as "the means by which one entity gives a role to others", the
above technical and non-technical measures seriously affect the behaviour of
other actors (human users in this case) in the ANT-defined ISMS network.
For example, users are not accepted into a system if they do not use a
password that uniquely identifies them and sets their rights properly on the
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system. Thus, the password infrastructure technical artefact defines the
behaviour of the user to the extent that a password must be used. Having said
that, the fact that a password infrastructure does exist as a technical measure,
does not mean that users will not write down their passwords in obvious
places or that they will not voluntarily share them and thus, in effect,
compromise the system. If this technical measure is supported by the non-
technical administrative measure of establishing serious penalties for such
negligent behaviour, the overall result will indeed be better password
protection.
On the other hand, the non-technical measure/artefact/directive regarding use
of strong passwords also defines the behaviour of users, but to a different
extent. Such directives should be followed but, as practice shows, are not
necessarily followed by all users.
The same holds true as far as SE attack reporting is concerned. There is no
way that a user can be forced to take such reporting action. It is rather an
issue of having convinced the users beforehand as to the importance of
reports been filed in the case a SE attack is suspected. Ultimately, unless this
type of behaviour becomes the users' "second nature" in their everyday
dealings, SE attacks will remain unnoticed. The responsibility for such a goal
remains with the management who must promote the appropriate security
culture and thus effectively establish yet another, very important, non-
technical measure.
As standard procedure, when a new or amended security policy is effected, all
office workers sign statements that they have been duly notified of this and
thus the security policy is considered to be active. As organisations are feeling
the pressure to adopt IT in order to become more efficient or more
competitive, the integration of IT into the business process is not always a
carefully planned one, especially with respect to security. Even if this is not so
and the new security policy is indeed a carefully produced one, the hysteresis
involved in the office workers' understanding and internalisation of the new
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situation, usually lies at the basis of the inefficiency or even of the de facto
demise of any security policy. Office workers may well be acquainted with the
security requirements governing physical access or those requirements
relevant to protecting a filing cabinet. They usually, though, understand very
little regarding the security of an IT system and consider this to solely be of
interest to, as well as the responsibility of, the IT department. Having being
notified of and having signed documents pertaining to the new security policy,
does not actually make the average worker more security-aware neither does
it help in altering the office workers' day-to-day activities towards achieving a
higher level of IT security. Combining this with the fact that the average office
worker is the first weak link that the Social Engineer will attempt to exploit on
the way to the primary target, clearly demonstrates the gravity of the situation.
Hence, once again, the need for the promotion of a security culture that
appropriately caters for the IT-based organisational reality is brought forward
as an indispensable non-technical measure.
Strong incentives and counterincentives can support non-technical measures,
as can additional technical measures. Such a technical measure could very
well be the operation of a password-checking mechanism that rejects weak
passwords.
Thus, technical and non-technical measures can come in efficient reciprocal
support, effectively dissolving the idea that IS is either a purely technical or
purely administrative issue.
Furthermore, an ISMS that is realised under the assumption that users are
rational actors, is probably doomed by design. The reason for such a failure is
that assuming a fully rational and predictable behaviour by the human users
involved, leads to the adoption of a minimal set of inscriptions. This would in
turn produce inadequate or incomplete translations. Thus the deciding
question in this case would be what the full set of inscriptions and translations
is.
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Figure 5.2: Effect of PDCA cycle on users' diverging subjective realities
Unfortunately, there is no deterministic way of identifying every potentially
vulnerable aspect of an organisation and incorporating it in the design of an
appropriate ISMS, especially when Social Engineering is factored in. On a
more optimistic view though, more SE vulnerabilities can be identified if the
diverging subjective realities of the users are acknowledged and examined.
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From that point onwards, the greater the number of SE vulnerabilities that are
catered for in the context of an ISMS, the harder it will be for the next Social
Engineer to mount a successful attack, especially when the Plan-Do-Check-
Act (PDCA) cyclic process for the ISMS' continual improvement is adopted.
The diagram of Figure 5.2 should help in visualising the effect that a correctly
implemented PDCA cycle may have on the divergence of the users' subjective
realities.
As it can hopefully be seen, the PDCA cycle causes the users to espouse
more of the actual policy directives as their own subjective reality (hence the
double-shaded area increases) and thus the opportunity for a Social Engineer
to act, diminishes.
5.9 Powerplay within the ISMS
Having dealt so far with the shortcomings of the modernist approach to
Information Security and having identified the inherent difficulties stemming
from the differences of individual groups within an organisation, it would be
naïve to ignore the repercussions that the balance of power in the context of
an ISMS has on its own functionality and effectiveness, as well as on the
organisation in general.
"Power" is generally accepted to be the ability of an individual or a group of
people to realize their own will in communal action, even against the
resistance of others (Giddens, 2001, p.420). In viewing the ISMS as a social
construct, it has to be taken for granted that the individual groups involved in
its operation will ultimately fight for power. The Marxist view is that the
struggle for power always has economic motives and in particular the
possession of goods and opportunities for income. Also according to Marx, a
grouping of people constitutes a “class” and class action ensues, when a
class becomes conscious of its interests, in the context of its relation, as a
class, to other classes (Giddens, 2001, p. 669). Weberian theory gives a more
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refined view of power and classes that aptly conforms to any bureaucratic
system, including ISMSs: According to Weber, the Marxist view of a single
source for power is dogmatic. Instead of having motives of a strictly economic
nature, Weber argues, that individuals seek power for its own sake due to its
intrinsic values and the social honour it carries (Bottomore, 1990, p.238). This
notion is then taken one step further and Weber sets the foundation for the
"politics of power" (Doujon, 1990, p.13). Regarding classes, Weber introduces
an additional structural category, that of the "status group". Marxist classes
are defined with respect to their place in the market or in the process of
production. Furthermore, classes may or may not exist as communal
groupings. In contrast to those, Weberian status groups are, in principle,
communities formed and held together by commonly accepted values, shared
beliefs, similar lifestyles and, most importantly, by the social status, esteem
and prestige conferred upon them by others (Giddens, 2001, p.285). Thus,
“social distances” are established between status groups. Furthermore,
according to Weber, status groups are independent of class divisions. Status
may vary independently of class. When a status group gradually develops the
idea that the magnitude of the social distance between it and the next
superordinate group is too great and that it should be diminished or even
nullified, conflict takes place. This conflict ultimately upsets the existing
stratification until a generally acceptable equilibrium point defining
subordination and superordination is reached. When such a point is reached,
conflict subsides and tranquility returns, with members of groups accepting
their position and assuming their place in the hierarchy. When the situation is
such that warrants the ascension of a group to a higher status stratum,
conflict eventually begins again and the cyclic procedure re-iterates itself.
During the time of tranquility (which is the usual case), subordination tends to
become more prominent. Under those circumstances, the members of the
subordinate group tend to acknowledge the authority that the members of the
superordinate group exercise over them. Furthermore, the members of the
subordinate group usually become fearful of displeasing those that are higher
in hierarchy than themselves. As it is mentioned elsewhere in this work, this is
a fact that is always exploited by Social Engineers during their attacks. What
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can be seen clearly at this point is the obvious need for an equilibrium point to
be reached in the social distances between the groups. This equilibrium point
should neither be unstable, thus leading to perpetual conflict between groups,
nor predispose members of one subordinate group to carry out orders
supposedly coming from their superordinates, in an automatic and mindless
fashion. Social Engineers are very apt in using authority, fear and intimidation
to their advantage and would thrive in either of the two situations.
In the particular case of the ISMS, the stratification phenomenon and the
separation of the individuals involved into various users’ groups, is justified
not only by the divergence of the groups’ interests, but also by the distinction
in the life-styles, views of the world and postures of their constituents. As IS
professionals seek the status and authority to carry out their mission,
management group members fear that this may constitute a flanking attack
against their own hard-earned status. The highly technical nature of the
means employed by the IS professionals in the line of their work, is seldom
fully understood by management. This makes members of the management
group feel insecure and even aggravates the chance for conflicts between the
groups.
Additionally, the group of IS personnel, frequently, does not occupy a clearly
defined position in the organisation’s hierarchy. In effect, this creates a two-
fold status problem for the IS experts group. The first facet of the problem is
that high-ranking officials may disregard the security-related control attempted
by the IS personnel. This disregard can be passive, in the sense that high-
ranking officials may simply ignore the efforts of IS personnel to control them,
or active, through intimidation and commination of the IS personnel. Secondly,
as long as the higher status of the management group in the hierarchy is
undisputed, members of the management group may use the vagueness of
the IS group's status to their advantage by discreetly fuelling the status
struggle of the lower-ranking groups in the organisation, as part of a typical
divide-and-conquer strategy that results in the strengthening of their own
status. As a result, the members of the IS group are viewed by members of
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the other groups as “floating” within the organisational structure, not having
any particular role or real control over the other groups' members' actions.
This fuels inter-group competition, and in effect further undermines the IS
group's role while crippling the IS effort. A Social Engineer will definitely make
the most of such a situation, either by using the weaker spots in the crippled
security system or by actively (and carefully) assuming the role of a high-
ranking official in order to achieve the SE objective through intimidation or by
otherwise using the status of the assumed role.
The above analysis follows the modernist view of power and although useful
in analysing the social structure of an ISMS, it would be unacceptable to
ignore the post-modernist view of power that can also apply to ISMSs. The
best known such view of power is presented by Foucault, a self-pronounced
champion of post-modernism, throughout his works (1988, p.39; 1989, p.65;
2005). Foucault views power as one of many societal controls aiming at a
variety of targets from production for financial gain to disciplinary systems to
normalisation procedures, all the while being dispenced through historical
institutions and exalted by definitions of normal vs. abnormal. Translating this
into the reality of the ISMS, power can be seen as originating from the set of
technical and non-technical controls that effectively influence the behaviour
and actions of the human actors. In effect, power in the ISMS is stemming
from the conglomeration of tools, instruments, techniques and procedures that
are defined in it.
The fact that ISMS implementations are currently highly technological in
nature, has the effect that power is de facto passed to the IS professionals
who have the responsibility of specifying, designing and implementing the
ISMS as well as maintaining its operation. In ANT terms, the IS professionals
are responsible for the inscription and translation of the bulk of the effort
towards IS. It is interesting to note that apart from the technical controls which
are obviously within the scope of the IS professionals’ work, non-technical
controls have both technological and administrative inscription components
which also require the extensive involvement of IS professionals. The
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controlling artefacts of an ISMS are the fruits of the IS professionals’ efforts
and mentality. These artefacts thus function as conduits for the power of the
IS professionals which permeates all aspects of the organization, not just the
ones related to the ISMS at hand.
Using the barrier of technology, the group of IS professionals can effectively
create an impenetrable perimeter, that neither end-users nor management
can break through. This may lead to inadequate ISMS inscription and
translation as groups other than that of the IS professionals are isolated from
the ISMS design process. For efficient and generally acceptable ISMSs to
exist, they should not be designed by IS professionals alone but with the
active participation of all groups within the organisation. Every ISMS
inadequacy is bound to be exploited by the Social Engineer under the proper
circumstances. Hopefully, if all groups participate in the creation of the ISMS,
it will be easier for members of groups other than the IS professionals to
espouse the directives of the ISMS (or in ANT terms "internalise" those
directives), and make the ISMS function more efficiently. The possible
disadvantage to this is that there may exist a higher level of conflict between
the groups during the design phase of the ISMS. Care should be taken for
such a situation not to become explosive and either hinder the creation of the
ISMS or produce an ISMS with severe design flaws.
Either the absence of an ISMS altogether, or the existence of a flawed one,
will give ample opportunity for the Social Engineer to act.
5.10 Concluding Remarks
By attempting to create a security policy that governs any kind of hierarchical
structure, complex interactions come into existence. The social construct
underlying the hierarchical structure affects, or even defines, the design,
functionality and efficiency of the security policy. On the other hand, the
security policy itself affects and transforms the dynamic relationships within
the social construct. When this mechanism is set in motion and until an
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equilibrium point is eventually reached, a period of tumult may be incited.
Inconspicuous vulnerabilities that are due to purely sociotechnical reasons
arise during such periods, leading to a significant drop in the efficiency of the
security policy. Consequently, a Social Engineer may find ample opportunity
to mount successful attacks. Furthermore, there is always a possibility that
some of the vulnerabilities of the described type are not identified and may
thus remain unmitigated for a long period of time after the initial establishment
of the security policy. Thus, emphasis must be placed in attempting to identify
these "socially-induced' vulnerabilities and establish controls for them, if SE
attacks are to be repelled.
The study presented in this chapter, combined with the analysis of the
intricacies of SE and Psychological considerations provide all the necessary
information for the study of possible defences against SE. This is the subject
of the next chapter and it will pave the way towards the examination of the
ISO/IEC 17799:2005 controls with respect to SE that will follow in a
subsequent chapter.
6. Protection against SE attacks and the introduction of  
Ψ-wall 
 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter attempts to combine the results of the previous three chapters on 
the methodology of Social Engineering (SE), its psychological aspects and the 
social aspect of Information Security (IS) into devising an effective strategy for 
strengthening defenses against SE.  
 
Chapter 1: The problem of
Social Engineering in
Information Security
Chapter 2: Social engineering
and Information Security:
The status quo.
Chapter 3: Social
Engineering as a
backdoor to ITSec and
IS infrastructures
Chapter 5: Social
aspects of Information
Security
Chapter 7: Examination
of ISO 17799 with
respect to Social
Engineering
Chapter 8: Proposals on
SE-related Measurement
Techniques
Chapter 9: Conclusions
Chapter 4:
Psychological
considerations in Social
Engineering
Chapter 6: Protection
against SE attacks and
the introduction of
"Ψ-wall"
 
 
Figure 6.1: Chapter 6 within the context of the overall dissertation structure 
 
The role of this chapter in the overall structure of this dissertation is 
graphically depicted in figure 6.1. 
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Through the course of this dissertation so far it has, hopefully, been made 
clear that when preparing for defense against hackers, the focus should not 
just be on detailing a firewall policy, adding protection to servers available 
over the Internet and securing internal network connections and file access. 
Direct attacks against the people authorised to use these computer systems 
should be prevented, and this, in effect, is much more difficult to build a 
firewall for.  
 
As long as people are accessible through a phone line or email, then they are 
vulnerable to SE attacks. There are many levels of defense against such 
attacks and they range from creating stronger security policies and 
implementing controls on physical security and data protection, all the way to 
increasing awareness regarding SE methods of operation and educating 
users on how to turn the tables on the attackers. In effect, this constitutes the 
psychological equivalent of a firewall, or "Ψ-wall" (from the greek letter "Ψ" -
correctly pronounced "Psee" but more frequently "Psi"- that serves as an 
internationally accepted shorthand notation for "psychology", as a quick 
search on the Internet shows). 
 
6.2 Increasing awareness (through constructive brain-
washing?) 
Since SE attacks are based on psychological manipulation and influence / 
persuasion tactics, the only way to block them is to inform the users on 
applied psychology techniques and alert them to the tricks of the trade as 
these evolve. As is the usual requirement with all security policies and 
practices, the responsibility for implementation of such policies lies with the 
management. A strong commitment to continual research, implementation of 
new directives and re-evaluation, must precede any related effort if the effort 
is to bear fruit.  
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Although security policies must be in place and an incessant cycle of 
effectiveness measurements and updates must be established, most 
importantly, it is the Users that must be educated and constantly be re-
educated, in order to keep up with the rate of evolution of threats based on SE 
methods.   
 
Clearly, it is insufficient to just give theoretical lectures on SE methods to 
groups of bored users. Neither would it suffice to make a one-off impressive 
presentation and never follow it up. The attack on the problem must be two-
fold. First, the issue of security must be presented in such a way that it 
becomes a very high priority for the average user. Second, after making 
security "second nature" to the users, the weapons to fight this battle against 
SE should be handed out in the form of practical tips, tricks and methods 
designed to nullify the success rate of SE attacks.  
 
One way to direct the attitude change of users towards making security a very 
high, if not their first, priority, is to "bombard" them with pro-security 
messages. These messages must be variations on the same theme, always 
urging users to make security their priority. It is common empirical knowledge 
that the least effective type of message directed to a user is the one 
appearing everyday on his/her login screen. It was shown by Sears and 
Freedman (1965) that even if new ideas are not included in a message, the 
expectancy alone of new ideas in the message, makes the message more 
persuasive. In practice this means that if security-related messages are re-
phrased and re-introduced, they become more persuasive than just re-stating 
a single message. Thus, the idea of producing and distributing "trinkets" such 
as catchy mouse pads, coffee mugs, pens, calendars etc, bearing well-
designed pro-security messages, should be quite successful in promoting 
security as a necessity that must be upheld by everybody.  
 
The above method is only the first step in creating an effective Ψ-wall. 
However, it is a necessary one in getting the message through that all security 
issues can not be addressed by technical measures alone. The second step 
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is to make all employees aware of the methods employed by Social 
Engineers. This can be in the form of short enactment videos in the usual 
"Discovery channel" hands-on-experience format. The video clips can be 
distributed over the corporate network or shown in staff meetings and any 
other gathering opportunity. Although there should be security awareness 
sessions per se, these airings do not have to be limited to dedicated meetings 
but should take place as frequently as possible. Such a visually rich method is 
much more effective than any other kind of textual distribution because, in our 
day and age, the motto "One picture is worth a thousand words" is stronger 
than ever. 
 
6.3 Psychological defenses (the brick and mortar of the Ψ-
wall) 
One of the main targets of the awareness programs discussed above, must 
clearly be to address techniques against SE attacks exploiting the 
psychological characteristics of humans as were discussed earlier. A good 
point to start would be defense recommendations for influence techniques as 
presented by Cialdini (2001) and appropriately adapted for the scope of this 
work. Before a defense can be raised, though, the attack must be identified as 
such.  
 
Despite the nature of the attack (be it physical or over the telephone), when 
interaction between the Social Engineer and the Mark takes place, there are 
tell-tale signs that the attacked employee should always be on the lookout for 
and constantly use as "filters" for any and all claims made by an unknown 
requester. 
 
These, typically, are: 
• Requests of forbidden information  
• Refusal to give contact information 
• Logical "holes" and small mistakes 
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• Name-dropping 
• Rushing 
• Intimidation 
• Naivete  
• Flattery 
Although this is not a complete list of possible signs (no such list could 
probably be complete), it gives a clear indication of what to look for. 
 
Furthermore, personnel should avoid taking mental shortcuts based on 
appearances that could help in the success of an impersonation attack: A 
person wearing a brown uniform with a courier logo stitched on and carrying 
parcels, does not automatically mean that he/she is working for the courier 
company. A different person dressed in the typical attire of executive class 
personnel does not automatically become a trusted person to be obeyed. A 
technician with tool belt and name-tag arriving in a semi truck during after 
hours does not necessarily have an assignment to carry out authorised 
maintenance. Thus, mental shortcuts must consciously be blocked and first 
impressions must be discredited. It is only the hard facts that must be taken 
into account and although courtesy should always be in order, proper security 
procedures must always take precedence. 
  
Having identified the possibility of an SE attack, defenses against influence 
techniques should be applied: 
 
Reciprocation. When the psychological / social rule of reciprocation is 
invoked, the attacker has already granted the Mark a favour. The Mark then 
feels obliged to return this favour or be scorned upon as an ingrate. Usually, 
the nature of the favour will be such that the favour would not be granted 
based on the Mark's free will, and this is why some kind of reciprocation must 
be called upon. So, the dilemma the Mark finds him/herself in is between 
granting a favour that could lead to security breach or be scorned upon and 
also have an immediate reduction of his/her self-esteem. The fact that the 
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reciprocation rule is called upon should be a dead give-away for the possibility 
of a SE attack. The Mark should realise that the previous favour is actually 
being used against him/her and thus take steps towards defusing the 
reciprocation rule.  
 
It would be irrational to reject all genuine favours and all offers. This would 
quickly become a social problem. Nor is it easy to distinguish between a 
genuine and a trick offer at the time that it is granted. However, in due course 
the sincerity of the person making the offer or doing the favour will be proven. 
At that time, the original offer can be re-evaluated and if found to be insincere 
(in the context of the favour that is requested in return), the obligations 
resulting from the reciprocation rule be nullified. In retrospective, it is only 
genuine offers that should be met with equivalent ones. There is no such rule 
or obligation for trick favours or offers. 
 
Commitment and Consistency. According to previous discussion, the Social 
Engineer puts these two principles to use by subtly manipulating the Mark so 
that the Mark gradually finds him/herself in such a position that turning down 
the Social Engineer's request is not an option. This entrapment can only be 
reversed if the Mark pays attention to the "gut feeling" he/she has when faced 
with the Social Engineers request. To resist the pressure based on 
Commitment and Consistency, the Mark must develop the ability to 
continually re-evaluate the initial decision (or chain of decisions) previously 
made, that lead to commitment and to the situation at hand. The crucial 
question for the Mark to answer would be "knowing beforehand what I now 
know, would I have made the same initial commitment that lead to this 
situation had I been able to reverse the clock?" If the answer is negative, 
(which in such situations always is), the problem should be addressed directly 
and it should be explained to the Social Engineer that granting his/her request 
would be a breach of security and that compliance is not an option.          
 
Social Proof. When the Social Engineer subtly or directly suggest a course of 
action to the Mark, he/she does so by either providing false data (mr. So-and-
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so has already given me this information) or by using a true basis of 
conformity and at the same time twisting it to serve his/her purpose. In either 
case, a convenient mental shortcut is forced upon the Mark in order to have 
him/her comply with the Social Engineer's request. In effect, the Mark is 
supplied with false social proof data. The only possible defense against this 
technique is for the Mark to first evaluate the validity of the data presented by 
the Social Engineer and then take into perspective that even if this data is 
true, the actions of his/her peers simply do not form the only basis for his/her 
decisions and subsequent actions.   
 
Liking. Social Engineers are willing to spend a lot of effort in building a 
portrayed persona that is well liked by the Mark in order to befriend the Mark 
and thus soften the impact of a request and increase the probability of 
compliance. Thus, the potential victim of such an attack must be aware to the 
technique and be alert to the potential situation of developing an undue liking 
for a requester. The potential victim must be sensitive both to the extent of the 
liking as well as how fast this has come to occur.  
Anybody can befriend anyone else very fast under false pretences of 
similarity, cooperation, association and compliance to the other's whims and 
desires. Other methods include flattery or, simply, graceful social interaction. 
Physical appearance also plays a decisive role.  
Thus, upon realising that the "liking level" for a requester is unjustifiably high 
under the circumstances, the Mark must classify that requester as a potential 
Social Engineer carrying out an attack. The request must then be dissociated 
from the relation developed with the requester through social interaction. In 
this state of dissociation, the true nature of the request must be objectively 
judged and the potential for a breach of security resulting from complying with 
the request must be identified. If such a security breach is possible, needless 
to say, the request must be denied.  
 
Authority. It has been analysed, that a Social Engineer's false appeal to 
authority can bear fruit in the course of an attack. As far as security is 
concerned, strictly speaking, all claims to authority must be challenged and all 
Protection against SE attacks and the introduction of Ψ-wall 
 
 
Chapter 6  143   
 
persons must be identified as to who they really are, irrespective of their 
position in the hierarchy of the organisation. This can be achieved by 
disregarding the effect of obvious status symbols such as an expensive suit or 
a company executive car and taking into consideration only hard evidence, 
like a secure ID badge etc, in order to authenticate the individual. There also 
exist cases where a true person of authority acts in an unwise manner with 
respect to security (such as allowing unauthorised personnel on the grounds 
etc). In this case, the person of authority's knowledge of security procedures, 
sincerity and trustworthiness must also be challenged. In order to accomplish 
this inarguably difficult task, the correct procedures must be in place so that 
employees charged with such tasks can protect themselves against spiteful, 
retaliatory attacks, by simply sticking to procedures and "going by the book".   
 
Scarcity. The reactions to this psychological principle are difficult to control. 
This is because these reactions have an element of emotional arousal and 
while in this state, straight thinking is practically impossible. Perhaps the only 
means of defense would be to use this emotional arousal as an indication of a 
possible SE attack. Steps can then be taken to suppress the arousal and 
attempt to rationalise the situation. If the interaction with the Social Engineer 
takes place in real time, the element of rushing will also probably be very 
strongly present. The combination of these two signs put together may help to 
surely identify and efficiently resist the attack. 
 
6.4 Changing the social model of IS 
From the discussion of the social aspects of IS several practical results were 
obtained than bring to light the gap existing between the expected result of 
implemented IS policy directives and the actual outcome of its 
implementation. This discrepancy is largely due to the following issues: 
 
• A gap exists between what the IS professionals perceive as Information 
Security and what everybody else understands. 
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• Competition exists between the various groups of an organisation, 
including but not being limited to Management, IS professionals and 
Administrative employees.  
• Organisation employees who have an IS policy imposed on them but had 
no involvement in its creation have great difficulty in understanding, 
accepting and following its directives.  
• Barriers are unavoidably raised between the groups of an organisation 
with the direct consequence that one group does not know how the other 
groups operate, or worse still, makes erroneous assumptions about this. 
Thus, when one group is requested to make decisions that affect the other 
groups as well, the solutions proposed are not optimised for all of the 
groups. 
• The outdated hierarchical structures in today's organisations make the 
application of IS just another part of them. By nature though, many 
aspects of IS and especially all that are related to SE can not be forcefully 
applied through traditionally vertical hierarchical structures but should 
rather be applied horizontally. 
• In the quest for status, groups in the organisation that expect to gain 
lateral benefits (that are irrelevant to IS) from the application of an IS 
policy, may promote it more fervently while competing groups will oppose 
it as a means of denying power to their adversaries.  
 
All of the above prove that an IS policy invariably carries with it political power 
in the context of the organisation it is being applied to. Needless to say that 
the larger the organisation, the higher the political power involved in the IS 
policy.  
 
As it is impossible to change organisational structure and mentalities 
overnight, it is important to use those measures that will provide the desired 
effect within the current organisational context.  
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To begin with, a well-designed security awareness campaign must work in the 
direction that IS is essential to the well-being of the organisation and the 
individuals that work for it.  
 
Once the above is accomplished, the procedure of defining or assessing the 
IS policy and proposing changes to it should be guided by experts but be 
open for all to contribute and challenge.  
 
To the extent that this is possible IS must be disjointed from the vertical 
administrative hierarchy. At the same time it must not be enforced in the 
traditional sense but rather aided to permeate all aspects of the organisation's 
scope.  
 
What is probably the most difficult challenge is to have IS detached from any 
power play within the organisation. To accomplish this, the application of IS 
must not be considered as the privilege of an elite group who controls and 
enforces it but should rather be entrusted in the care of all employees 
throughout the breadth and width of the organisational structure as van 
Niekerk and von Solms (2005) propose. This may indeed sound as a utopian 
suggestion given the de facto creation of a horizontal structure within the 
organisation, but if the necessary preparation has taken place through 
security training and awareness, then it might just become plausible. 
 
6.5 Strengthening security policies 
Effective IT security is based on solid security policies. Security against SE 
attacks adds further complications to the creation of security policies because 
the nature of the attacks is much less pre-determined when compared to that 
of purely technical vulnerabilities. Hence, apart from the usual measures 
found in security policies, certain areas of security must be especially 
strengthened in the particular direction of blocking SE attacks.   
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The principles presented here for devising controls against SE risks will be 
further discussed in a subsequent chapter of this work, in the context of the 
evaluation and strengthening of the ISO/IEC 17799:2005 standard with 
respect to SE. The inclusion of the present, brief, examination only serves in 
placing the principles into perspective for the sake of completeness and 
continuity. 
   
6.5.1 Physical security measures 
• In central, controlled entrances and exits to the premises, measures must 
be taken so that "tail-gating" or "piggy-backing" is not allowed by the 
automated access and logging system. Since it is not practical to have the 
post's security guard oversee every entry that takes place and efficiently 
block every attempt to tail-gate, the configuration of the access doors 
must be such that two people are not allowed to pass through 
simultaneously. This could be realised by double doors or gates where 
the outer one has to be closed before the inner one opens. In the space 
between them, only one person should be allowed to fit. Alternatively, the 
typical triple-bar access-control turnstiles could be used, one turn of which 
should be initiated per valid card presentation.  
• Exit from the premises should be controlled in as an efficient manner 
as entry to them. This will impede a Social Engineer's attempt to escape 
from the premises unnoticed. If a person leaving the building is not able to 
produce the necessary credentials, that person should be held until 
his/her identity is verified. 
• Access ID tokens should be as secure as possible, so that a lost or 
stolen one can not be used by a Social Engineer to gain access. PIN 
codes should be in use and, as technology progresses, biometrically-
protected smartcards to match the card to the owner and ensure the 
owner's physical presence at the point of access. 
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• Ideally, all visitors should be accompanied by staff or personnel in 
and out of the premises. As this is not always practical, general visitors 
should be logged and bear badges indicating their destination. 
Nevertheless, specialised visitors who must have access to more 
sensitive areas, such as systems' maintenance technicians from outside 
vendors, must always be accompanied by the local site administrator 
(who is supposed to be well known and thus identifiable). In any other 
case, a procedure should be in place requiring all personnel whose area 
of responsibility the visitor enters, to call the appropriate site administrator 
to check if the visitor should really be there. Staff should be required to 
follow this procedure in order to overcome their natural reluctance to do 
this, as they would feel that it would make them look unfriendly, distrustful 
or even paranoid if they challenged visitors. 
• Shredders and incinerators must be used and all data-carrying media 
that have served their purpose or lifetime must be destroyed (including 
magnetic media of all types as well as paper-based documents). If a 
recycling scheme is in place, all material must be thoroughly rendered 
unusable before placed in the recycling bin. (I.e. paper must be shredded 
and magnetic media physically destroyed beyond recovery, before being 
put up for recycling). 
• Garbage should be checked by assigned personnel for items containing 
sensitive information. Penalties should be in place for employees who do 
not follow security procedures.    
• In addition to the previous controls, recycling and garbage bins should 
rest in a controlled and monitored area to deter dumpster diving.  
• Physical access to networked computers should be allowed through 
the use of secure authentication tokens (such as smartcards) that should 
remain in place for as long as the workstation is used and be removed 
when the user leaves the station. As a result, the screen and keyboard 
should get locked. An interesting development would be the design of a 
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proximity device that locks unattended workstations and unlocks them 
while the authorised user is within two meters of his/her station. This 
could be realised by a two-piece device, one piece remaining permanently 
connected to the computer and the other one resting in the user's pocket.   
• Employees should be aware of their surroundings and be especially 
suspicious of "casual" onlookers who may be on a "shoulder surfing" 
spree.  
• Further to the above measure, specially designated members of the 
security staff could make it their job to walk around the 
premises/floor/unit with the objective to get to know all employees. If a 
Social Engineer has managed to penetrate the premises, he/she will be 
spotted by the special security officer.  
• Contractor personnel, after being securely authenticated at the point of 
entry and escorted by staff members to their work area, should be 
continually monitored by trained security personnel. When their work 
involves access to computer systems, they should be monitored by 
designated staff members of the IT department who can evaluate their 
actions.  
• Reception personnel should be instructed to only release documents, 
parcels etc to securely authenticated individuals. Even then, a detailed log 
of released items must be kept, including the personal identification data 
of the receivers. Requests for forwarding via fax should also be logged 
and the requester positively identified.  
• All areas containing network equipment, phone exchange equipment, 
wiring racks etc should be secured and access to them should be 
controlled via ID tokens, logged and recorded.  
• The above should hold true for the mail room also.  
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6.5.2 Internet security measures 
• Users should be warned not to take part in unsolicited traditional mail 
or e-mail surveys that are not authorised by the organisation. Since this 
can not be efficiently controlled when the user receives the survey at 
his/her home address or when he/she has Internet access via his/her 
home computer, users should be at least forbidden to disclose personal 
information related to their work. Users should be informed of continually 
running audits to raise alertness. All mail survey solicitations should be 
reported to the SE attack coordination centre. 
• Users should be alerted to the existence of fraudulent web sites that 
require registration with username and password. Although it is 
convenient for most users to use the same password or PIN for access to 
all of the accounts that they have, by using the same identification pair at 
a compromised site, control of all of the user's other accounts will be 
relinquished. Users should thus be forbidden to submit the authentication 
information that they already use to gain access to the organisations' 
computer network, in registrations to other systems.  
• Under no circumstances should users install software or open 
attachments received over the Internet.    
• Users need to be aware of how much the public knows about their 
position. In addition, users should be aware of how much information 
about them is available on the Internet. Social Engineers will conduct 
searches on the Internet for users' names and attempt to impersonate 
them once they have gathered enough information.  
• Organisational phone lists should not be published on the Internet 
as they can provide a wealth of information to the attacking Social 
Engineer.  
• Users should be suspicious of windows popping up while they are 
working on their computers telling them that the network connection has 
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been lost and that their user name and password must be re-entered. 
This can very well be part of computer-based attack that forwards the 
private data to the Social Engineer 
6.5.3 Phone security measures 
• If a called party can not securely identify a caller who asks for sensitive 
information including, but not limited to, personal information about the 
called party or anyone else, or for information about the corporate 
computer system, no information should be provided. The called party 
should insist on verifying the caller’s identity by calling them back at 
their proper telephone number as listed in the organisation’s official 
telephone directory. Legitimate activity is not severely hindered by the 
proposed procedure but SE attacks are effectively blocked. 
• Call forwarding to external lines should not be enabled on dial-up 
numbers or numbers equipped with a fax machine. This measure will 
prevent the Social Engineer from intercepting faxes and / or requesting 
information to be sent to an internal phone number while the information 
will actually be forwarded to an external number belonging to the Social 
Engineer.   
• All employees eligible to support via a phone-operated help desk, should 
be given an authentication PIN particular to the help-desk service. 
Furthermore, help desk personnel can have access to limited personal 
data on employees so that secure authentication can take place through 
the combination of a PIN and the correct response to a question 
pertaining to that data.    
6.5.4 General measures  
• Any inquiries made about passwords, or any other sensitive 
information should be considered as a SE attack and measures against it 
be taken including raising an alarm with the appropriate coordination 
centre, if possible while the attack is in progress. 
Protection against SE attacks and the introduction of Ψ-wall 
 
 
Chapter 6  151   
 
• Better protection of personal data of employees in general, is also of 
paramount importance. Access to it should be limited in an effort to thwart 
Social Engineers from gathering enough information to stage an 
impersonation attack. Such data should be given out on a justified need-
to-know basis only and only to authenticated staff members. 
• Apart from information related to security that is prepared and presented 
by the competent directorate within a corporate or organisational 
structure, all staff members should actively remain informed on 
current security issues and encouraged to make security their priority. 
 
The above list of proposed measures is by no means exhaustive, neither can 
all of the proposed measures be directly converted to security procedures. 
They do mark, however, the general direction that the construction of a 
security policy should be moving in, in order to cater for SE attacks.  
 
6.6 Security compliance measurement 
Measuring the degree of effectiveness of any implemented security measure 
is difficult to begin with. Nevertheless, this constitutes an important factor in 
the continual re-assessment of the current security policy and a most valuable 
guide in pinpointing problem issues and addressing them.  
 
In principle, the effect of SE attacks is difficult to operationalise.  Collins 
(2000, p. 68) defines Operationalisation as the process of transforming a 
theoretical concept into an empirical variable, i.e. making the defined concept 
measurable. Consequently, measuring the effectiveness of a set of 
countermeasures designed to block SE attacks (the Ψ-wall) is at least as 
difficult as operationalising the effects of the SE attacks themselves. This is 
mainly due to the non-descriptive nature of controls against SE that are based 
on purely psychological techniques.  
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In short, how can issues like the psychological effect of an awareness 
campaign on individuals or the actual effect of the psychology-laden process 
against a potential SE attack be measured?  
 
To operationalise a concept such as the effectiveness of the proposed Ψ-wall 
(in other words the level of defense against SE attacks), it is imperative to 
identify all of its dimensions or indicators, where an indicator is an 
observable measure (Collins, 2000, p.68). A later chapter of this work deals 
with the operationalisation in question and hopefully succeeds in proving that 
operationalisation can indeed be achieved and that the effectiveness of the Ψ-
wall may be measurable. 
 
6.7 Audits and Penetration testing 
Be it for empirical assessment or exact security compliance measurement, or 
simply to keep the alertness levels of computer users, and employees in 
general, high, the combination of internal audits and third-party penetration 
testing constitutes an indispensable tool for maximising security. Through 
such methods the shortcomings of any ISMS are brought to light and 
effectively catered for, thus raising the level of security. 
 
Employees should be alerted to the fact that audits and penetration testing will 
be carried out at indeterminate points in time. A system of rewards or merit 
points for blocked attacks could also be established.  
 
In testing for SE attacks, the usual problems regarding the sincerity of the 
testers, the access limits of the testing, possible liabilities etc that apply for 
traditional IT penetration testing, do exist. In addition to these, yet another 
complicating factor comes into play. In applying penetration testing methods 
to computer networks and computer systems in general, it is argued that a 
well-trained security engineer is not deficient in knowledge compared to a 
hacker (Lowery, 2002). As SE attacks constitute a non-technical kind of 
intrusion that relies heavily on human interaction and often involves tricking 
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people to break normal security procedures, in testing for vulnerabilities that 
can be exploited by Social Engineers, the testers have to have honed mental 
and communications skills (probably on top of engineering skills) in order to 
duplicate the effect of an attack by a real Social Engineer. Clearly, these 
abilities can not be taught as part of a course for testers, neither would it be 
advisable or ethical to employ active Social Engineers or confirmed 
colleagues of theirs that have supposedly repented or retired. Thus, the 
selection of testers (either internal or external) may prove to be an arduous 
task. Although carefully prepared scripts for use by the testers might be 
helpful, even a half-decent SE attack can not simply rely on scripts. 
 
Another issue is whether the testers are given an advantage over real-life 
Social Engineers in the form of a copy of the structure's security policy. If they 
are given such a copy they will know exactly what to look for and where to 
focus their efforts, something that real attackers will not be able to do as 
easily. However, the notion of testing for "worst case conditions" is not one 
without merit.  
 
Ideally, to test for worst case conditions, all of the situations discussed earlier 
in this chapter -and more- should be examined and the related techniques 
applied. To this end the paper by Orgill et al (2004) should prove quite helpful. 
A further complication of testing for SE techniques is that the scope of such 
an investigation is far greater than that for a straight-forward attempt to e.g. 
break through the firewall and into the corporate network of the organisation. 
In the latter case the effort can easily be focused and all attempts be made to 
bypass countermeasures. While testing for vulnerabilities exploitable through 
SE attacks, an exhaustive test would involve applying SE techniques on every 
single employee of the company, simply because the security "chain" is as 
strong as its weakest link, which in this case is the individual most susceptible 
to SE attacks (Schneier, 2000). Thus, an exhaustive test would be very 
difficult to carry out in all but the smaller of organisational structures. 
However, as the effects of discordianism become more prominent as an 
organisation augments in size, smaller structures, where interpersonal 
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relations between employees are more common and stronger, are less prone 
to successful SE attacks. Hence, for larger structures, the difficulty in carrying 
out exhaustive tests is very serious. 
 
Random testing in this case does not solve the problem because if 
penetration was not achieved, all that the subsequent report would state 
would really apply to the random subset of employees that were actually 
tested. Since this would be a small part of the whole, the conclusions drawn 
could be very disputable. In this context, let it not be overlooked that in a real-
life attack the Social Engineer will keep carrying out attacks on different 
employees until the desired information is extracted either in whole or pieced 
together.  
 
A scheme to efficiently address employees who are more susceptible to SE 
attacks would be to base the testing on the results drawn from psychological 
profiling of employees, perhaps in the context of evaluating the efficiency of 
awareness programs as it has already been discussed. The main difference in 
the philosophy of the two exercises, though, would be that instead of 
processing the results of anonymously submitted questionnaires as would be 
the case of program efficiency evaluations, the profiling should be carried out 
on individual employees and the results be kept on file. This, in itself would be 
a very controversial issue.   
 
A defense against the relentless nature of a real-life Social Engineer who will 
keep carrying out attacks on different employees until the desired information 
is extracted, might only be possible through reporting and coordination 
procedures by a central authority in the organisation. Indirectly, the audits and 
penetration tests should thus also address the effectiveness of such an 
authority by staging such an attack scenario that would purposely take a 
number of attacks to be concluded.  
 
All in all, testing for vulnerabilities exploitable by SE attacks is very difficult to 
orchestrate, extensive preparations need to be made, the people taking up 
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the role of the attackers should be highly skilled and controversial issues 
about psychological profiling of employees come into play. Furthermore, every 
new employee who is hired, forms a new parameter in the security equation 
that needs to be evaluated and controlled. It has been said that no system 
can be considered totally secure no matter how well it has been audited and 
tested. This is even more so when the psychology of individuals becomes a 
crucial factor. Even after all audits and penetration testing has been carried 
out, the author believes that there would be no real assurances as to the level 
of security against SE attacks. The most important contribution of such 
procedures would probably be the overall raised level of alertness among 
employees.  
 
6.8 Promotion of higher ethical standards in the workplace 
Reekie (2004) introduces the need for the creation of a set of ethical 
obligations stemming from the organisation's responsibility to the client, as 
well as its responsibility to itself to protect its interests. Additionally, the need 
for inclusion of relevant countermeasures in security policy implementation is 
supported.  
 
In the context of guarding against SE attacks, the promotion of ethical 
standards in the workplace is of paramount importance. As it has been shown 
in this chapter, invariably, SE attacks count on some aspect of human 
psychology to produce results. Whether this aspect is fear of authority, the 
natural willingness to help, the application of convenient mental shortcuts, the 
reluctance to become disliked etc, the SE attacks work because people are 
simply left to their own devices as far as their reaction to an attacking Social 
Engineer is concerned.  
 
By promoting ethical standards in the workplace, feelings like (but not limited 
to) fear of powerful people of authority, ingratiation and the feeling of risking 
being disliked when challenging a fellow employee who might instead be a 
potential attacker, will be reduced. In a work environment where ethical 
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standards form the basis for everyday activities, there is no space left for acts 
of intimidation, coercion or exploitation. Thus, the attacker is faced with a 
greater challenge than expected or planned for.  
 
Furthermore, in an ethically-bound environment, incident reporting becomes 
more efficient as the effects of discordianism are reduced and the 
effectiveness of proper channels of communication between the base of the 
organisation and its highest levels increases. This invariably leads to better 
defense against SE attacks. 
 
6.9 Monitoring Social Engineering attempts 
The idea of a central point where all reported SE attempts are logged and 
evaluated and countermeasures coordinated has already been presented 
elsewhere in this work. Reporting procedures for security incidents as well as 
the formation of a coordination centre is also prescribed in the directives of 
the ISO/IEC 17799:2005 standard (ISO/IEC, 2005a). However, in the context 
of this standard, the coordination centre and reporting procedures may not 
cater as efficiently as possible for the particular case of SE attacks given that 
immediate response and even guile are required in order to beat the attacker 
in his/her own game. The evaluation of the relevant ISO/EC 17799:2005 
controls though, is the subject of a later chapter. Ideally, the existence of such 
a centre will assist in identifying problem areas within the organisation and will 
also help those responsible for security, identify the nature of the attacking 
Social Engineer's interest. This in itself is of great importance because it can 
give clear indications regarding what the motives behind the SE attacks are. 
Concise reports made by the SE attack monitoring authority could give the 
management information on important issues such as a secret project being 
compromised or that attempts are made to extract financial information before 
a takeover etc.  
 
The most difficult part is for personnel to identify a SE attack as one and 
report it. Ideally, it would also be very useful to let the attack run its course in 
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an effort to identify its ultimate target. This, however, is clearly beyond the 
abilities of the average employee. Manipulating the manipulator would be a 
challenge for even the most cunning expert on counteracting SE attacks.  
 
Thus the most reasonable expectation would just be for the average 
employee to be able to identify an attack and report it as a result of the whole 
security education, training and awareness program. The employees manning 
the monitoring and evaluation centre though, should be highly specialised 
security professionals who can sift through all the reports, weed out the false 
ones and extract information of value to the management or the top levels of 
the hierarchy. Furthermore, they should be able to predict (to some degree) 
future attacks based on forming patterns and thus call for raised levels of 
alertness and strengthening of security measures. Most importantly, they 
would form the mortar holding together the Ψ-wall.  
 
6.10 Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter the fundamentals of SE were presented. The basic forms of SE 
attacks were discussed, backed by a presentation of the most important 
Persuasion tactics and Influence techniques as modern psychology accepts 
them.  
 
Due to the complicated and highly non-technical nature of SE attacks, it is 
argued that in order to defend against them, an organisation must invest upon 
its human resources and, most importantly, their psychology. Traditional 
technical measures simply do not offer sufficient provisions to stop non-
technical attacks such as SE ones. Thus, a case is presented in support of 
psychological defenses with the objective of strengthening security policies 
and improving security mentality and practices in an attempt to provide better 
protection against SE attacks. 
 
It thus follows that a "psychological Firewall" or "Ψ-wall" must be built mainly 
through awareness and psychological training programs. The objective of the 
Protection against SE attacks and the introduction of Ψ-wall 
 
 
Chapter 6  158   
 
programs should be to expose the employees to the reality of SE attacks 
before they actually have to face one. Mastery of psychological defenses 
against these attacks can be taught to a certain extent, as is the ability to at 
least identify them. 
 
The principles governing supporting controls against SE were also specified 
for inclusion in existing security policies. This discussion sets the foundation 
for the thorough examination of ISO/IEC 17799:2005 standard (IS/IEC, 
2005a) with respect to SE to follow in the next chapter of this dissertation.  
 
The issues of measurement and compliance were addressed through the 
proposed use of operationalisation methods and the identification of relevant 
indicators. This direction is further pursued in a subsequent chapter. 
 
It was also maintained that raising ethical standards in the workplace can help 
against SE attacks as many of the psychological barriers of employees that 
the Social Engineers thrive upon simply fall apart. 
 
Finally, the importance of auditing and penetration testing was stressed as a 
means of raising alertness, and the need for a central point of coordination 
against SE attacks was highlighted. 
 
7. Examination of ISO 17799 with respect to Social 
Engineering  
 
7.1 Introduction 
All of the research carried out so far aimed at providing the necessary 
background information for the examination of the ISO/IEC 17799:2005 
standard (ISO/IEC, 2005a). This chapter deals with the main research 
question of assessing the standard's directives with respect to Social 
Engineering (SE). Figure 7.1 depicts the role of this chapter within the overall 
structure of this dissertation. 
 
Chapter 1: The problem of
Social Engineering in
Information Security
Chapter 2: Social engineering
and Information Security:
The status quo.
Chapter 3: Social
Engineering as a
backdoor to ITSec and
IS infrastructures
Chapter 5: Social
aspects of Information
Security
Chapter 7:
Examination of ISO
17799 with respect to
Social Engineering
Chapter 8: Proposals on
SE-related Measurement
Techniques
Chapter 9: Conclusions
Chapter 4:
Psychological
considerations in Social
Engineering
Chapter 6: Protection
against SE attacks and
the introduction of
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Figure 7.1: Chapter 7 within the context of the overall dissertation structure 
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(For reasons of simplicity the ISO/IEC 17799:2005 standard will simply be 
referred to henceforth as "ISO 17799"). 
 
As the ISO 17799 currently constitutes the most widely accepted Information 
Security standard and having already identified the IS issues pertaining to SE 
attacks and methods thereof, it was deemed essential to examine ISO 17799 
under the light of SE. In previous research, (Frangopoulos and Eloff, 2004) 
the 2000 version of the ISO 17799 (ISO/IEC, 2000a) is compared to other IS 
standards and practices and the relevant merits, shortcomings and common 
ground covered are examined. From that examination, ISO/IEC 17799:2000 
proved to be the most appropriate standard, in its ability to cover a large 
variety of risks, that are neither purely technical nor limited to the IT 
infrastructure of the organisation. In many ways ISO/IEC 17799:2000 also 
proved to be a "superset" of the other documents. Thus, the results of the 
current research can easily be correlated back to the other examined 
standards and practices. Even though this comparison takes place between 
the 2000 version of ISO 17799 and other material, its results are still valid as 
the character of ISO 17799 did not change drastically between the 2000 
edition and the 2005 revision. For all of the above reasons, it was decided to 
use ISO 17799 as the subject for assessment with respect to SE. The 
standard's shortcomings were identified, control elements were proposed and 
perhaps steps can be taken towards encompassing SE-related issues in a 
future revision of the standard. 
 
7.2 Structure of the ISO/IEC 17799:2005 
The 2005 revision of ISO 17799 comprises 11 security control clauses. 
Altogether, these clauses contain 39 main security categories. In addition to 
the above, an introductory clause sets the basis for risk assessment and 
treatment. 
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The eleven security control clauses (accompanied by the main security 
categories included in each clause) are: 
 
1) Section 5. Security Policy  
i. Information security policy 
2) Section 6. Organising Information Security  
i. Internal organization 
ii. External parties 
3) Section 7. Asset Management  
i. Responsibility for assets 
ii. Information classification 
4) Section 8. Human Resources Security  
i. Prior to employment 
ii. During employment  
iii. Termination or change of employment 
5) Section 9. Physical and Environmental Security  
i. Secure areas  
ii. Equipment security 
6) Section 10. Communications and Operations Management  
i. Operational procedures and responsibilities 
ii. Third party service delivery management 
iii. System planning and acceptance 
iv. Protection against malicious and mobile code 
v. Back-up 
vi. Network security management 
vii. Media handling 
viii. Exchange of information 
ix. Electronic commerce services 
x. Monitoring 
7) Section 11. Access Control  
i. Business requirement for access control 
ii. User access management 
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iii. User responsibilities 
iv. Network access control 
v. Operating system access control 
vi. Application and information access control 
vii. Mobile computing and teleworking 
8) Section 12. Information Systems Acquisition, Development and 
Maintenance  
i. Security requirements of information systems 
ii. Correct processing in applications 
iii. Cryptographic controls 
iv. Security of system files 
v. Security in development and support processes 
vi. Technical vulnerability management 
9) Section 13. Information Security Incident Management  
i. Reporting information security events and weaknesses 
ii. Management of information security incidents and 
improvements 
10) Section 14. Business Continuity Management  
i. Information security aspects of business continuity management 
11) Section 15. Compliance  
i. Compliance with legal requirements 
ii. Compliance with security policies and standards, and technical 
compliance 
iii. Information systems audit considerations 
 
Insofar the main security categories are concerned, each of those contains:  
a) a control objective stating what needs to be achieved, and  
b) description(s) of one or more controls that can be applied to achieve the 
control objective. 
 
A typical control description comprises:  
a) a definition of the specific control statement to satisfy the control objective, 
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b) guidance and information in support of the implementation of the control 
and how to achieve the control objective,  
c) further information, pertinent to the control under examination, such as 
legal aspects of its implementation and references to related standards.  
 
7.3 Examination of the security control clauses. 
Following the structure of ISO 17799 presented above, an attempt was made 
to view each of the eleven security control clauses under the light of a 
possible SE attack. Due to the length of the analysis, the detailed results of 
this effort are included as Appendix C of this work. In that analysis 
discussions are presented for each of the clauses along with some thoughts 
on how to further fortify the clauses against SE attacks whenever this is 
deemed necessary. The results of the examination are summarily presented 
in the form of the following table. In that table information is given for each of 
the individual controls regarding its relevance to the defense against SE and 
whether it needs to be enhanced to serve this role better.  
 
Table 7.1: Examination of ISO 17799 controls with respect to SE  
 
Section Relevant to the 
defense against 
SE attacks? 
Needs to be 
enhanced? 
5 SECURITY POLICY    
5.1 INFORMATION SECURITY POLICY   
5.1.1 Information security policy document YES YES 
5.1.2 Review of the information security policy YES YES 
6 ORGANIZATION OF INFORMATION SECURITY   
6.1 INTERNAL ORGANIZATION. - - 
6.1.1 Management commitment to information security YES NO 
6.1.2 Information security co-ordination YES NO 
6.1.3 Allocation of information security responsibilities YES YES 
6.1.4 Authorization process for information processing 
facilities 
YES YES 
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6.1.5 Confidentiality agreements YES NO 
6.1.6 Contact with authorities  YES YES 
6.1.7 Contact with special interest groups  YES YES 
6.1.8 Independent review of information security  YES YES 
6.2 EXTERNAL PARTIES . - - 
6.2.1 Identification of risks related to external parties. YES YES 
6.2.2 Addressing security when dealing with customers . YES YES 
6.2.3 Addressing security in third party agreements . YES YES 
7 ASSET MANAGEMENT   
7.1 RESPONSIBILITY FOR ASSETS. - - 
7.1.1 Inventory of assets  YES(indirectly) NO 
7.1.2 Ownership of assets  YES(indirectly) NO 
7.1.3 Acceptable use of assets. YES NO 
7.2 INFORMATION CLASSIFICATION.   
7.2.1 Classification guidelines YES YES 
7.2.2 Information labeling and handling YES YES 
8 HUMAN RESOURCES SECURITY.   
8.1 PRIOR TO EMPLOYMENT  - - 
8.1.1 Roles and responsibilities . YES YES 
8.1.2 Screening  YES YES 
8.1.3 Terms and conditions of employment  YES YES 
8.2 DURING EMPLOYMENT  - - 
8.2.1 Management responsibilities  YES NO 
8.2.2 Information security awareness, education, and 
training  
YES NO 
8.2.3 Disciplinary process . YES YES 
8.3 TERMINATION OR CHANGE OF EMPLOYMENT. - - 
8.3.1 Termination responsibilities . YES NO 
8.3.2 Return of assets YES NO 
8.3.3 Removal of access rights  YES NO 
9 PHYSICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY    
9.1 SECURE AREAS  - - 
9.1.1 Physical security perimeter  YES YES 
9.1.2 Physical entry controls  YES YES 
9.1.3 Securing offices, rooms, and facilities  YES YES 
9.1.4 Protecting against external and environmental threats YES YES 
9.1.5 Working in secure areas  YES NO 
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9.1.6 Public access, delivery, and loading areas YES YES 
9.2 EQUIPMENT SECURITY. - - 
9.2.1 Equipment siting and protection YES NO 
9.2.2 Supporting utilities  YES YES 
9.2.3 Cabling security YES YES 
9.2.4 Equipment maintenance. YES YES 
9.2.5 Security of equipment off-premises YES YES 
9.2.6 Secure disposal or re-use of equipment  YES YES 
9.2.7 Removal of property  YES NO 
10 COMMUNICATIONS AND OPERATIONS 
MANAGEMENT 
  
10.1 OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES AND 
RESPONSIBILITIES 
- - 
10.1.1 Documented operating procedures YES NO 
10.1.2 Change management  YES NO 
10.1.3 Segregation of duties  YES NO 
10.1.4 Separation of development, test, and operational 
facilities. 
YES NO 
10.2 THIRD PARTY SERVICE DELIVERY MANAGEMENT 
. 
- - 
10.2.1 Service delivery YES NO 
10.2.2 Monitoring and review of third party services. YES NO 
10.2.3 Managing changes to third party services YES NO 
10.3 SYSTEM PLANNING AND ACCEPTANCE - - 
10.3.1 Capacity management . YES(indirectly) NO 
10.3.2 System acceptance . YES(indirectly) NO 
10.4 PROTECTION AGAINST MALICIOUS AND MOBILE 
CODE 
- - 
10.4.1 Controls against malicious code YES YES 
10.4.2 Controls against mobile code  YES YES 
10.5 BACK-UP . - - 
10.5.1 Information back-up  YES NO 
10.6 NETWORK SECURITY MANAGEMENT - - 
10.6.1 Network controls YES YES 
10.6.2 Security of network services  YES NO 
10.7 MEDIA HANDLING . - - 
10.7.1 Management of removable media YES NO 
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10.7.2 Disposal of media  YES NO 
10.7.3 Information handling procedures . YES NO 
10.7.4 Security of system documentation YES NO 
10.8 EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION  - - 
10.8.1 Information exchange policies and procedures. YES YES 
10.8.2 Exchange agreements . YES NO 
10.8.3 Physical media in transit . YES NO 
10.8.4 Electronic messaging YES NO 
10.8.5 Business information systems  YES NO 
10.9 ELECTRONIC COMMERCE SERVICES  - - 
10.9.1 Electronic commerce  YES YES 
10.9.2 On-Line Transactions . YES YES 
10.9.3 Publicly available information  YES YES 
10.10 MONITORING - - 
10.10.1 Audit logging  NO NO 
10.10.2 Monitoring system use  NO NO 
10.10.3 Protection of log information  NO NO 
10.10.4 Administrator and operator logs . NO NO 
10.10.5 Fault logging  NO NO 
10.10.6 Clock synchronization  NO NO 
11 ACCESS CONTROL    
11.1 BUSINESS REQUIREMENT FOR ACCESS 
CONTROL . 
- - 
11.1.1 Access control policy YES YES 
11.2 USER ACCESS MANAGEMENT - - 
11.2.1 User registration YES YES 
11.2.2 Privilege management . YES NO 
11.2.3 User password management YES YES 
11.2.4 Review of user access rights . YES YES 
11.3 USER RESPONSIBILITIES - - 
11.3.1 Password use YES YES 
11.3.2 Unattended user equipment  YES YES 
11.3.3 Clear desk and clear screen policy YES NO 
11.4 NETWORK ACCESS CONTROL - - 
11.4.1 Policy on use of network services NO NO 
11.4.2 User authentication for external connections NO NO 
11.4.3 Equipment identification in networks . NO NO 
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11.4.4 Remote diagnostic and configuration port protection  NO NO 
11.4.5 Segregation in networks  NO NO 
11.4.6 Network connection control. NO NO 
11.4.7 Network routing control  NO NO 
11.5 OPERATING SYSTEM ACCESS CONTROL - - 
11.5.1 Secure log-on procedures NO NO 
11.5.2 User identification and authentication  NO NO 
11.5.3 Password management system YES NO 
11.5.4 Use of system utilities  NO NO 
11.5.5 Session time-out. NO NO 
11.5.6 Limitation of connection time  NO NO 
11.6 APPLICATION AND INFORMATION ACCESS 
CONTROL . 
- - 
11.6.1 Information access restriction  NO NO 
11.6.2 Sensitive system isolation  YES(indirectly) NO 
11.7 MOBILE COMPUTING AND TELEWORKING - - 
11.7.1 Mobile computing and communications . YES YES 
11.7.2 Teleworking  YES YES 
12 INFORMATION SYSTEMS ACQUISITION, 
DEVELOPMENT AND MAINTENANCE 
  
12.1 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS OF INFORMATION 
SYSTEMS 
- - 
12.1.1 Security requirements analysis and specification NO NO 
12.2 CORRECT PROCESSING IN APPLICATIONS  - - 
12.2.1 Input data validation NO NO 
12.2.2 Control of internal processing NO NO 
12.2.3 Message integrity NO NO 
12.2.4 Output data validation. NO NO 
12.3 CRYPTOGRAPHIC CONTROLS  - - 
12.3.1 Policy on the use of cryptographic controls  NO NO 
12.3.2 Key management NO NO 
12.4 SECURITY OF SYSTEM FILES. - - 
12.4.1 Control of operational software  YES YES 
12.4.2 Protection of system test data YES NO 
12.4.3 Access control to program source code YES(indirectly) NO 
12.5 SECURITY IN DEVELOPMENT AND SUPPORT 
PROCESSES  
- - 
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12.5.1 Change control procedures . NO NO 
12.5.2 Technical review of applications after operating 
system changes 
NO NO 
12.5.3 Restrictions on changes to software packages. NO NO 
12.5.4 Information leakage. YES NO 
12.5.5 Outsourced software development. NO NO 
12.6 TECHNICAL VULNERABILITY MANAGEMENT . - - 
12.6.1 Control of technical vulnerabilities  NO NO 
13 INFORMATION SECURITY INCIDENT MANAGEMENT   
13.1 REPORTING INFORMATION SECURITY EVENTS 
AND WEAKNESSES 
- - 
13.1.1 Reporting information security events. YES NO 
13.1.2 Reporting security weaknesses  YES NO 
13.2 MANAGEMENT OF INFORMATION SECURITY 
INCIDENTS AND IMPROVEMENTS  
- - 
13.2.1 Responsibilities and procedures  YES NO 
13.2.2 Learning from information security incidents  YES NO 
13.2.3 Collection of evidence YES YES 
14 BUSINESS CONTINUITY MANAGEMENT    
14.1 INFORMATION SECURITY ASPECTS OF 
BUSINESS CONTINUITY MANAGEMENT . 
- - 
14.1.1 Including information security in the business 
continuity management process. 
NO NO 
14.1.2 Business continuity and risk assessment YES(indirectly) YES 
14.1.3 Developing and implementing continuity plans 
including information security  
NO NO 
14.1.4 Business continuity planning framework. NO NO 
14.1.5 Testing, maintaining and re-assessing business 
continuity plans 
NO NO 
15 COMPLIANCE   
15.1 COMPLIANCE WITH LEGAL REQUIREMENTS . - - 
15.1.1 Identification of applicable legislation NO NO 
15.1.2 Intellectual property rights (IPR) . NO NO 
15.1.3 Protection of organizational records. NO NO 
15.1.4 Data protection and privacy of personal information  NO NO 
15.1.5 Prevention of misuse of information processing 
facilities  
NO NO 
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15.1.6 Regulation of cryptographic controls . NO NO 
15.2 COMPLIANCE WITH SECURITY POLICIES AND 
STANDARDS, AND TECHNICAL COMPLIANCE  
- - 
15.2.1 Compliance with security policies and standards YES NO 
15.2.2 Technical compliance checking.  NO NO 
15.3 INFORMATION SYSTEMS AUDIT 
CONSIDERATIONS . 
- - 
15.3.1 Information systems audit controls NO NO 
15.3.2 Protection of information systems audit tools . YES NO 
 
From the examination of the ISO 17799 standard with respect to SE and 
based on the background provided by the research that led to this 
examination, several areas were identified where additions must be made to 
the standard. These are presented in the following section. 
 
7.4 Proposed additions to the standard 
Through the examination of the ISO 17799 standard from a Social 
Engineering point of view, it is made evident that although solid guidelines 
exist that, by design, promote security in general, there is not much direct 
reference to Social Engineering.  
 
The standard would thus benefit from the inclusion in each security clause of 
paragraphs presenting a discussion of the individual controls from a SE point 
of view. Furthermore the standard could include a separate section on Social 
Engineering that would attempt to address SE issues. This would not 
necessarily mean that new controls would be defined, although this is quite 
possible, but even if existing controls are placed within the SE perspective, 
the standard would benefit.  
 
The section on Social Engineering should address the main SE methods of 
attack by classifying them in such a way that the SE concept, which is 
inherently chaotic, may become structured to the extent necessary that the 
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security personnel as well as all employees of the organisation are able to 
understand, follow and implement the proposed guidance. Furthermore, 
issues pertaining to education, training and awareness-building with respect 
to SE should be laid out.  
 
One way to categorise controls and guidelines might be with respect to the 
means that the attacker would use to approach a target. Drawing from the 
classification of attacks as this was presented earlier in this work, three major 
areas can be defined: a) SE attacks at the physical level, b) SE attacks over 
the phone and c) SE attacks over email and the Internet.  
 
At the physical level, new controls can be created or existing ones put into 
the correct context for controlling information leakage in physical form, 
unauthorised entry to the premises and unauthorised access to sensitive 
areas. Controls for SE attacks over the phone should address the different 
types of targets. One type of target is the organisation's phone operator / 
information centre. A second one is the IT help desk and a third type is 
practically any employee with a phone on his/her desk. SE attacks over email 
and the Internet, must be catered for, both at the user and mail server level. 
 
7.4.1 Physical Level attacks 
At this level, and in order to eradicate leakage of information in physical form 
(documents, magnetic media etc) controls must be geared towards the 
sanitisation and/or safe disposal of material, garbage inspection and garbage 
removal area monitoring. This should lead to the minimisation of the effects of 
a "dumpster diving" attack. Furthermore, creation of significant new controls 
will not be required as controlled disposal of sensitive material and area 
monitoring are indeed discussed, primarily in sections 9 and 10.7 of the ISO 
17799 standard. However, a useful addition to these controls would be the 
inclusion of procedures catering for garbage inspections for sensitive material 
that has been improperly disposed of. The controls of section 9 of ISO 17799 
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regarding security at a physical level can be boosted according to the 
discussion found in section 5 of Appendix C and in the previous chapter of 
this dissertation on protection against SE attacks. This should provide for 
better physical control against SE attacks and allow only properly authorised 
personnel to enter the secure perimeter of the organisation. Furthermore, if all 
areas are continuously monitored for possible intrusions and suspect persons 
are de facto challenged by all employees and not just security personnel, 
even if a Social Engineer does manage to penetrate the secure perimeter, 
there should be little chance of successfully carrying out his/her mission. Such 
a measure, however, requires the existence of a particular mentality and 
culture that is not possible to instill through directives and policies. To achieve 
this goal, special education is necessary and this comes in support of the idea 
that SE-related education should also be discussed in the proposed SE 
section of ISO 17799. Security education apart, all other controls of the 
proposed SE section that have to do with physical security will in most cases 
constitute re-phrased, more detailed and augmented versions of controls 
already existing in the standard. The content of the "new" controls should 
follow the discussions of the existing controls already presented and 
appropriate references to the original structure of the standard will be 
essential for reasons of clarity.  
 
7.4.2 SE attacks over the phone. 
Having identified the three main types of targets, namely, a) the organisation's 
phone operator / information centre, b) the IT help desk and c) any employee 
with a phone on his/her desk, the following controls could be considered as 
effective countermeasures for SE attacks. 
1) All employees must be made aware of the danger of SE attacks over the 
phone through security education and awareness plans (refer to " IS 
education, training and awareness" subsection). 
2) The organisation's phone operators at all levels and the operators at the 
organisation's information centre must not give out any kind of personal 
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information of employees to anyone that requests it, neither must they 
divulge personal phone numbers to people making such requests. The 
requester can simply be forwarded to the person he/she requested or be 
given the operator's phone number for the requested individual's 
department.  
3) IT department staff and especially those members of the staff that man the 
IT help center should explicitly be forbidden to honour requests that are 
received over the phone for the creation of new accounts or the alteration 
of access rights, even if the requestor is positively identified. All such 
requests should be placed in writing and follow proper procedure and 
authorisation. 
4) IT department general staff may be approached with technical support 
requests. All requestors should be immediately re-directed to the IT help 
desk that handles support requests. Such an approach may be an attempt 
on the part of the Social Engineer to bypass security procedures by 
directly contacting IT members of staff who are not as familiar with the 
security procedures governing a particular request as their help desk 
colleagues are.  
5) IT help desk staff should positively identify a caller before opening a 
conversation on any matter. This may require a challenge/response 
system to be in place and callers be requested to give particular digits of a 
personal code along with some bits of personal information in order to be 
positively identified by help desk staff. Alternatively, an infrastructure may 
be designed for the requests to be received by an application running on a 
dedicated server. Hence, full user authentication will be necessary for any 
request to be logged. Such an implementation would relieve help desk 
staff from the responsibility of carrying out caller authentication and 
furthermore, the requestor would be called back by the help desk staff on 
his/her designated number as this would appear on the organisation's 
official phone list. Caller authentication by IT help desk staff will only be 
necessary when the local caller is not able to use his/her computer or one 
nearby to log the request or when a remote caller asks for help. Callback 
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procedures to the designated phone number should be activated in those 
cases also.  
6) IT help desk employees must not disclose the names of users who have 
logged a technical support request to IT department outsiders. If a Social 
Engineer somehow obtains this information, he/she may call the employee 
who logged the request, pretending that he/she is handling the problem 
and subsequently launch an attack (Mitnick & Simon, 2002, p. 291).  
7) All employees should be warned not to follow orders related to their work 
that are given over the phone, without first positively identifying the person 
on the other end of the line and also ascertaining that he/she has the 
authority and sufficient reason to issue that order.  
8) Organisation-wide procedures for positively identifying phone callers 
should be in place and all organisational units handling incoming phone 
calls should employ them undeviatingly. As this may involve appropriate 
infrastructure to be made available to employees, only employees having 
access to this infrastructure will effectively be able to positively identify 
callers. All other employees should refer callers to those who have the 
means to positively identify them.  
9) All employees should refuse to enter unknown commands on their 
workstations, divulge any information that could lead to the compromise of 
their computer account or the accounts of others, or relay sensitive 
information over the phone, even when their interlocutor has been 
positively identified.   
10) The contents of the company internal telephone directory must be treated 
as sensitive material and not be made available to the general public in 
any form (see section 9.1.3 of ISO 17799). Only numbers for general use 
(central or departmental operator phone numbers) must be made public 
for contact purposes and the employees covering those positions must 
have received proper security education and always be alert to the 
possibility of a SE attack. Dial-in modem numbers for remote-access users 
must also be treated as secret and not be divulged over the phone under 
any circumstances. All reference to these numbers must be strictly made 
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on a substantiated need-to-know basis and formal procedures for the 
communication of these numbers be followed.  
11) All calls to the organisation's telephone operators (central or departmental) 
must be recorded for security purposes. All calls to the IT help desk must 
also be recorded.  
12) All employees must easily and inconspicuously be able to contact the 
appropriate security contact person or security incident management 
group, or otherwise signal that a SE attack is under way so that the 
suspicious call is immediately monitored and recorded (according to 
relevant laws and regulations). Furthermore, suspicious calls must be fully 
documented for reference purposes and further reporting.       
13) All employees should deny to participate in telephone surveys as Social 
Engineers may pose as legitimate researchers and conceal questions 
critical to the security of the organisation among other, indifferent, 
questions. All requests for such surveys should be referred to the 
appropriate public relations department of the organisation and at the 
same time be treated as a security incident and reported to the security 
contact person or security incident management group who should follow 
up on any and every such request. 
14) Even if interlocutors have been positively identified, confidential 
information should not be discussed over unencrypted telephone 
connections, especially if the conversation is routed over public 
telecommunication networks, i.e. if it is taking place between the 
organisation premises and the outside world. Furthermore, the use of 
voice or data encryption devices makes it more difficult, if not impossible, 
for a Social Engineer to mount an attack as, in order to communicate with 
the target, appropriate encryption equipment will be required. 
15) All employees must be alerted to the perils of call-forwarding and the 
vulnerabilities that may be caused by poor call-forwarding policies. Call-
forwarding to numbers external to the organisation must be completely 
disabled. If a Social Engineer at any point has the opportunity to activate 
such a forwarding function at an unattended phone set, for instance in a 
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vacant office, then this internal number can be used for a variety of 
attacks. The attacker can then call an employee and in the course of the 
conversation ask him/her to call back at the compromised number. The 
call will be forwarded to the attacker's own number but at the same time 
the confidence of the victim in the attacker's claims will be boosted as the 
number will actually be an internal one. Furthermore, the attacker may ask 
the target to fax sensitive information to the compromised number. Again, 
as the number is an internal one, the targeted employee will not be alerted 
to the fact that the information will be sent outside the controlled perimeter 
of the organisation and thus classified information may leak. 
16) All employees must be made aware of the vulnerabilities introduced by the 
use of voice-mail. If remote access to the mail-box is allowed by the 
system, one obvious vulnerability will be that of poor choice of voice-
mailbox passwords. As voice-mailbox passwords are usually four-digit 
numbers, they may be guessed. If simple or default passwords such as 
"0000" or "1111" are used, then an attacker may compromise the mailbox 
and obtain useful information that may be used in an attack, by either 
impersonating the owner of the mailbox or the person leaving the 
message. There is also a second vulnerability that voice-mail may 
introduce which is not in the hands of the employees to control but should 
be analysed in the present context. This vulnerability is a purely technical 
one as many PBX systems allow "Direct Inward System Access" (DISA) 
through the voice mailbox menu, either as a feature or as a bug of the 
system. In the National Institute's for Standards and Technology Special 
Publication 800-24 (2000) titled "PBX Vulnerability Analysis", even the 
case of DISA as a feature of voice mail is considered a vulnerability and 
needs to be mitigated. The concept behind the DISA functionality is to 
allow a remote user to dial in to the PBX system from an outside line and 
gain access to the usual features of the PBX as if he/she is accessing the 
PBX from an internal extension. Obviously, an attacker who manages to 
gain DISA through the voice-mail system, may then be able to gain access 
to many of the PBX's features and set them up to serve his/her purposes. 
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These purposes can include (but not be limited to) support for a SE attack, 
information theft that is not restricted to that contained in the compromised 
mailbox, use of the PBX as a gateway for long distance calls etc. Hence, 
one approach would be to not allow remote access to the users' mailboxes 
altogether. Users should be able to retrieve their messages either only 
from their own telephone set or any other set within the secure perimeter 
of the organisation. (It goes without saying that the stand-alone DISA 
feature should also be entirely disabled). A more relaxed alternative would 
be to allow access to a user's voice mailbox from particular, pre-defined 
location(s) that are unique to each user. Such locations could be the user's 
home telephone or the user's mobile telephone set. Even that policy 
though may be vulnerable to fake caller-ID attacks. The responsibility for 
making policy decisions on the use or not of voice-mail and DISA lies with 
the organisation's administration.  In any case, as far as the organisation's 
employees are concerned, voice mail passwords are more important than 
the average user assumes and should be treated in the same way and 
protected to the same extent as any other personal password granting its 
owner access to a system.  
17) Employees must not present information on their daily schedule (routine or 
otherwise) on the greeting message of their voice mailbox. An attacker 
may use this information to create a believable scenario in order to 
deceive other employees (Mitnick & Simon, 2002, p. 317).   
18) Employees must alert the appropriate security contact person or security 
incident management group if previously unheard voice-mail messages 
are not marked as "new" (Mitnick & Simon, 2002, p. 317). This would 
obviously indicate that another person who has gained access to the 
mailbox has already listened to the messages. Employees must also 
proceed to immediately change their voice-mail password unless 
otherwise instructed by the security personnel if an attempt to identify the 
attacker is initiated.  
19) Employees should not leave personal or sensitive data in other people's 
voice mailboxes, even within the same PBX, as those mailboxes can be 
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compromised and the information obtained from them may subsequently 
be used in a SE attack.  
 
7.4.3 SE attacks over email and the Internet 
Email and the Internet offer the attacking Social Engineer an alternative route 
to approaching the organisation's employees. Sending emails may be used as 
a standalone method of approach or in conjunction to any other method 
already described, in an effort to gain credibility in the eyes of the targeted 
employee. The following controls may help in mitigating the risk associated 
with Internet and email-related SE attacks. 
1) Employees should not send or request sensitive information over the 
Internet. Internet is an insecure medium and should be treated as such. If 
privacy measures are taken such as the establishment of a VPN over the 
Internet, a formal security assessment must be carried out and the 
network be appropriately classified prior to any sensitive information being 
transmitted over it.  
2) Passwords for access to any part of the organisation's computer system 
must not be sent over the Internet.  
3) Personal Internet mail addresses of employees must be treated as highly 
confidential and as such must not be made available to the general public 
on the organisation's web site or otherwise. For contact purposes, generic 
departmental email addresses must be posted on the organisation's web 
site or distributed official documentation.  
4) Under no circumstances users may install new software packages on their 
computers or update already existing ones, especially if the package or 
update has arrived over email. If such an email message is indeed 
received, it should be considered as fraudulent and/or malicious and be 
immediately reported to the appropriate security contact person or security 
incident management group. 
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5) All incoming mail messages must be centrally scanned for malicious 
software threats. If such software is detected, the message carrying it 
should be deleted and the recipient be notified of this action.  
6) If the circumstances demand it, the organisation's security policy may 
dictate that all attachments of incoming email messages are immediately 
and automatically deleted by the mail server software and the bodies of 
messages be scanned for http links or self-executing code.  
7) The setup of an automatic forwarding rule that relays incoming internal 
email messages to an external email address is forbidden. Sensitive 
internal information may be compromised if this rule is not enforced. 
8) Employees must not use their passwords for access to the organisation's 
computer system in any internet-related activity. Internet passwords can 
be compromised, effectively leading to the possible compromise of the 
organisation's computer system. 
9) Employees should be aware that they may be targeted by attackers who 
may offer them over email "free" downloads if only they register at a site. 
Not only should the employees ignore the message according to rules 4 
and 8 above, but they should also report the incident to the appropriate 
security contact person or security incident management group and 
provide a copy of the message.  
10) Employees should not respond to email messages that ask them to re-
confirm their login or personal data by logging in at a particular webpage, 
even if the message appears to come from the organisation's IT 
department or any other legitimate source. Such an email constitutes a 
"phishing" attack and should be immediately reported to the appropriate 
security contact person or security incident management group and a copy 
of the message provided. 
11) Employees should be aware that personal computers with "always on" 
connections to the Internet are more vulnerable to attacks. They should 
thus take all precautions against such attacks by switching off their 
stations or putting them to hibernation when not needed (in either case 
with the "wake-on-LAN" feature disabled). 
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12) If the security requirements demand it, it may be necessary to verify email 
addresses before receiving from or sending mail to them. There exist 
cases where mail servers block all incoming messages unless an 
employee has explicitly requested that messages coming from a particular 
address be allowed to pass through or has sent an outgoing email 
message to that address. This measure could appear as an overkill to the 
problem of receiving spam mail, but many organisations, for example 
those in the US banking sector, have adopted it already.  
 
7.4.4 IS education, training and awareness 
Although IS education, training and awareness are discussed in section 8.2.2 
of the ISO 17799 standard, special care must be taken insofar SE issues are 
concerned. The reason for this is that what is described in section 8.2.2 has to 
do with solid facts that are well documented and is geared towards informing 
all parties involved on their obligations and responsibilities stemming from that 
factual documentation. An approach that will be effective in providing 
education and raising awareness on SE-related issues must be quite different. 
The notion of SE can not readily be covered in full by mere reference to 
relevant documentation nor can it be exhausted in any document. Instead, the 
personnel receiving the training must be exposed to as many facets of the SE 
problem as possible, in order to form an esoteric understanding of the issues 
involved and be able to extrapolate and synthesise in situations of attack. It is 
this author's opinion that employees should not be given access to the 
organisation's information system if they have not completed a security 
education course in addition to the required "basic skills" course needed to 
operate within the bounds of the organisation's information system. Although 
this may sound as excessively cautious to the administration's ears given that 
for the sake of efficiency all new employees must become productive from 
their first day of employment, it is unarguably impossible for an employee to 
uphold the security of an information system if that employee is unfamiliar with 
the operation of the system and/or lacks security education. On the other 
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hand it should not be considered that by exposing an employee to any single 
security course the problem of upholding security is resolved. Security 
education must be continuous and the latest updates must be methodically 
presented to the employees. This is the only way to achieve the raised level of 
awareness necessary to effectively withstand and deflect SE attacks. Applied 
psychology could also be used to raise awareness on SE issues along the 
lines described previously in this work. This can be accomplished by 
employing direct and indirect means to psychologically "nudge" the 
employees in the right direction in the fight against SE. Such an approach 
may include messages at workstation boot-up, circulars, notices etc. 
Obviously this is one control that should involve a multi-disciplinary approach 
to bear fruit.   
 
What should not be overlooked in the context of building security awareness 
and training for security, is the promotion of ethical standards in the 
workplace. This should be carried out according to the discussion presented 
in earlier chapters and follows from the reasoning that in a work environment 
where the ethical level is high, the circumstances are such that the job of the 
Social Engineer becomes more difficult. Again, for the promotion of ethical 
standards to be successful, a multi-disciplinary approach is needed.  
 
7.5 Concluding Remarks 
It should be clear by the analysis presented here that the issues pertaining to 
Social Engineering are not directly covered by the guidelines of the ISO/IEC 
17799:2005 information security standard. Furthermore, from the study of the 
standard it can be deduced -in a qualitative way- that no part of it was written 
with Social Engineering in mind. Hence, the whole standard is not geared 
towards dealing with Social Engineering in particular. However, the controls 
and guidelines presented in the standard, deal with a large part of the types of 
vulnerabilities stemming from Social Engineering in an effective, albeit 
indirect, way. By providing subsections in the existing clauses where the SE 
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aspects of individual controls or control groups are discussed along with 
adding new sections or clauses containing controls that are specific to the SE 
methods of attack, the standard will surely benefit.  Apart from the introduction 
of new controls, new sections may even include and/or re-phrase existing 
controls as it is necessary to place new and existing ideas in the context of 
SE. If the same attention were placed on the most important issue of security 
training, education and awareness with respect to SE, then the effectiveness 
of the standard in building defenses against SE will definitely multiply in 
strength. 
 
It must be noted that not all of the results of the research presented so far can 
be coded in the form of new or rephrased controls of the ISO/IEC 17799:2005 
standard. The reason for this is that the scope of this standard can, obviously, 
not include the restructure of organisations or the instillation of the correct 
attitude towards IS. In the same sense, a policy can not suffice in inculcating 
the proper IS mentality in people. Hence, the enhancements to ISO 17799 
that have been proposed must not be viewed as exhaustive and all-
encompassing with respect to SE, although they do help towards acquiring a 
better level of defense against it. 
 
Having identified the shortcomings of the ISO 17799 standard and having 
proposed enhancements and additions to it to better cater for risks related to 
SE methods, the next obvious question is how to assess the level of defenses 
against SE. The next chapter deals with this issue. 
 
 
8. Proposals on SE-related Measurement Techniques 
 
8.1 Introduction 
In previous chapters, the principles of Social Engineering were examined, as 
were the social aspects of IS. This two-fold study led to the detailed 
examination of the IEC/ISO 17799:2005 standard from a Social Engineering 
point of view. One of the initial questions, however, has not yet been 
addressed: that of devising SE-related measurement techniques. The current 
chapter deals with this issue. Figure 8.1 depicts the role of this chapter within 
the overall structure of this dissertation.  
Chapter 1: The problem of
Social Engineering in
Information Security
Chapter 2: Social engineering
and Information Security:
The status quo.
Chapter 3: Social
Engineering as a
backdoor to ITSec and
IS infrastructures
Chapter 5: Social
aspects of Information
Security
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of ISO 17799 with
respect to Social
Engineering
Chapter 8: Proposals
on SE-related
Measurement
Techniques
Chapter 9: Conclusions
Chapter 4:
Psychological
considerations in Social
Engineering
Chapter 6: Protection
against SE attacks and
the introduction of
"Ψ-wall"
 
 
Figure 8.1: Chapter 8 within the context of the overall dissertation structure 
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The need for metrics related to the Security of Information Systems in general 
and to the specific aspect of security against SE attacks has already been 
discussed in earlier chapters of this work. 
 
Given the inherent difficulty of measuring a concept such as Information 
Security, it becomes much more difficult to produce quantifiable results for an 
even more obscure aspect of it, namely that which deals with SE.     
Despite the degree of difficulty involved, the quantification of the SE aspect of 
Information Security is essential for the continual re-assessment of any 
implemented security policy and a most valuable guide in pinpointing problem 
issues in the defense against SE and in addressing them.  
 
The reason this chapter deals solely with measurement techniques that are 
related to SE is because in all the IS literature investigated, the SE aspect of 
IS is inadequately dealt with and material on SE-related measurement is 
virtually existent, although Information Technology security metrics 
discussions are becoming more frequent. 
  
Following the analysis that has been presented in the previous chapters 
regarding SE, this work would be incomplete if an attempt were not made to 
bring forward the basic principles for SE-specific metrics. This chapter is not 
meant to exhaustively address the issues pertaining to devising metrics for 
the performance of security controls against SE threats but hopefully provides 
a well-laid foundation to build upon in future research.  
 
8.2 Principles of metrics 
Prior to examining how SE-specific metrics can be obtained, a brief 
discussion of the defining qualities of the term "Metrics" is included: 
• Metrics must be viewed as tools and yardsticks in the effort to improve an 
organisation's posture with respect to the examined concept, in our case 
the efficiency of the organisation's defenses against SE.  
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• SE-related metrics should address the qualities for the attainment of the 
set goals and objectives, namely efficient defenses against SE threats. 
• Metrics must provide quantified data for the effectiveness of the 
implementation of controls by assessing the degree to which the goals and 
objectives for efficient defense against SE threats have been attained.  
 
The very nature of SE threats is a source of major complications when it 
comes to obtaining the desired metrics. As such, it does not appear possible 
to obtain a straight-forward and exact metric of security against SE threats. It 
would thus be more appropriate to try to obtain a measure of the "Assurance" 
present in a system. "Assurance" is thoroughly discussed by Vaughn et al 
(2003) who define it as "an expression of confidence that one has in the 
strength of mechanisms or Countermeasures". Assurance is also examined 
by Jelen and Williams (1998) according to whom assurance is defined as "the 
degree of confidence that security needs are satisfied". Although the two 
definitions appear to be quite close, there is a subtle difference between them 
as one is directed towards assessing the quality of the implementation of 
controls, while the other is directed towards the expected effect of those 
controls against threats. The two definitions thus have a "cause and effect" 
relation among them. This relation highlights the fact that although it seems as 
a small logical step to move from the implementation of controls to the 
effective mitigation of risk, this may not necessarily be that simple. Thus this 
gap has to be closely analysed.  
 
Hence, in order to obtain an assurance estimate, the definition of assurance 
should encompass both of the above notions. Assurance is thus defined in the 
context of this dissertation as "an expression of confidence that one has in the 
strength of implemented controls and that security needs are indeed 
satisfied". In order to obtain the level of assurance with respect to SE, data 
must be gathered and quantified from a variety of sources that call for 
different measurement / assessment methods. Furthermore, the results 
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obtained from various sources must be combined in such a way that an 
overall result on the level of assurance is extracted. 
 
8.3 Directly measurable aspects of the defense against SE 
Some aspects of the defense against SE can be readily measured and, in the 
worst case, a rough assessment can be provided. (The reader must not forget 
that it is only the SE aspect of security that is being dealt with here, under the 
assumption that the original controls of ISO/IEC 17799:2005 are in place as is 
an ISMS according to the directives of ISO/IEC 27001:2005). An example of a 
directly measurable aspect of the defense against SE is the level of 
compliance with the security requirements as these are set forth in the IS 
policy document. For other aspects of the defense against SE, indirect 
methods must be employed in order to obtain meaningful results. 
The directly "measurable" elements of the defense against SE can be 
obtained from the assessment of the controls of ISO/IEC 17799:2005 
standard presented in the previous chapter, as these were enhanced with 
respect to SE. By quantifying the level of implementation of the proposed 
security controls in an organisation, a raw metric can be obtained for single 
controls or groups of controls. By combining all of the obtained metrics, an 
aggregate figure can be obtained -perhaps in the form of a percentage- that 
will give an indication of the status of the security infrastructure of the 
organisation regarding SE. The reason that this will provide only an indication 
of the status of the security infrastructure and not an assessment of the 
degree of satisfaction of the security need against SE threats is due to the 
vague nature of the concept that is being dealt with. This statement may 
become clearer with an example. Consider the vulnerability related to hard 
disk "Mean Time Between Failures" figure (or MTBF): if a control involving 
backups and related procedures is implemented, then the risk stemming from 
the actual fact that hard disks do fail eventually, is effectively mitigated. This is 
a case where an exact metric on a technical control can be obtained and have 
a value on its own accord as it does give an assessment on the degree to 
which the goal of protecting the organisation against hard disk failure is 
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attained. If, on the other hand, the vulnerability of an unauthorised person 
inside the secure perimeter of the organisation is considered, one of the 
proposed controls of the previous chapter was to have specially coloured 
badges worn by visitors so that people not bearing such a badge are 
immediately challenged by the organisation's employees. The fact that the 
control is in place has no conceivable way of forcing the organisation's 
employees to actually challenge individuals who do not carry a badge, thus 
effectively and definitely mitigating the risk. However, the control is in place 
and this does have to account for something. As long as the control is 
implemented, a valid metric can and should be obtained. This metric though 
can not yield conclusive results with respect to the ultimate goal of security 
need satisfaction with respect to SE, as other conditions must co-exist for the 
control to be effective. This highlights the qualitative difference between the 
two examples presented above: in the first case, a technical control (backup 
technology and procedures) is sufficient to mitigate the risk from a technical 
vulnerability (hardware failure) and this is quite straightforward in assessing. 
In the second case, the vulnerability is definitely not technical and has mainly 
to do with the interaction between humans. Hence, the technical control (issue 
of specially-coloured badges) must function alongside a non-technical control 
(the will of an employee to challenge suspicious persons) in order for effective 
mitigation of the risk involved to take place. This reasoning brings forth the 
idea that the quantification and measurement of controls against SE only 
constitute a single component in the formula that will eventually yield the final 
assessment of the organisation's posture with respect to SE.   
 
However, before moving on to the other components it is necessary to 
examine the ways that the level of implementation of the proposed security 
controls against SE can be quantified.  
 
The U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology in NIST Special 
Publication 800-55 (2003, section 4.1) presents a procedure for obtaining 
metrics results using a “Metric Detail Form” for each critical control or group of 
Proposals on SE-related measurement techniques 
 
 
 
Chapter 8  187   
controls in the examined context. Although this measurement method is 
primarily used to address the existing, stable information security processes, 
the authors state that even measurements attempted on non-existent or 
unstable information security processes will help pinpoint information security 
areas that require improvement by returning poor metrics’ results. 
Furthermore, the use of a weighting scale to differentiate the importance of 
selected metrics in the context of the overall security program is also 
discussed. Weighting is considered essential in ascertaining that the obtained 
results accurately reflect the existing security program priorities.  
 
To illustrate the use of Metric Detail Forms, a sample security metric from 
NIST Special Publication 800-55 (2003, app. A) is reproduced below. This 
sample metric detail form refers to the “Incident Response Capability” of an 
organisation and through minimal adaptation could be used in the context of 
ISO/IEC 17799:2005. 
 
Table 8.1: Sample Metric Detail Form for Incident Response Capability  
(from NIST sp800-55, 2003, App. A) 
A.14 Incident Response Capability 
 
Critical Element  14.1 Is there a capability to provide help to users when a 
security incident occurs in the system? 
Subordinate 
Question 
14.1.1 Is a formal incident response capability available ? 
Metric Percentage of agency components with incident handling and 
response capability 
Purpose To ensure that there is an agency wide incident response 
capability 
Implementation 
Evidence 
1. Does your agency component maintain an incident response 
capability? 
? Yes ? No 
 
2. If the answer to Question 1 is no, why not?  
? Did not know of requirement ? Lack of resources? 
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Competing priorities 
 
3. Is there a formal process and/or documented incident 
handling guide that defines “incidents” and describes how to 
report an incident internally? 
? Yes ? No 
 
4. Are incidents monitored and tracked until resolved? 
? Yes ? No 
 
5. Are personnel trained to recognize and handle incidents? 
? Yes ? No 
 
6. Are alerts and advisories received and responded to? 
? Yes ? No 
 
7. Number of incidents reported from your agency component 
during reporting period________ 
Frequency Semi-annually 
Formula Number of agency components that have incident response 
capability (tally answers to Question 1 from all components) / 
Total number of components 
Data Source ISSO; NIST SP 800-26 (particularly Items 14.1 and 14.1.1) 
Indicators The goal for this metric is 100 percent; an upward trend is 
necessary to show progress and the continued strength of the 
IT security program. The ability to report and handle incidents 
is critical to maintaining an adequate security posture. 
Comments: Question 2 is a causation question that indicates why an 
agency component’s incident response capability may be 
inadequate. If the answer to Question 2 is “Did not know of 
requirement,” it may be necessary to investigate whether a 
policy is in place requiring an incident response capability, or if 
guidance is necessary. Other corrective actions will be required 
if the answer to Question 2 was “Lack of resources” or 
“Competing priorities.” 
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Questions 3 through 6 validate that the essential components 
of an incident response capability are in place and to what 
degree. For example, if a guide exists but no training is 
provided to enable personnel to recognize and report incidents, 
the capability would not be considered robust. The lack of an 
element in Questions 3 through 6 indicates weakness in the 
incident response capability that must be addressed to 
increase functionality and effectiveness. 
Question 7 is another validation question. It is unlikely that 
there will be no incidents reported from an agency component. 
This number can be compared with agency wide incident 
reports and correlated with items that would have affected the 
agency component, to determine whether reporting is 
occurring as necessary. 
 
 
Following this example, Metric Detail Forms can be created for any and all of 
the implemented controls. A critical assumption, though, is that a security 
policy is in place and general IS controls (the ones prescribed in ISO 17799) 
have already been implemented. Using that as a starting point, the 
assessment of the controls specific to SE can begin by creating Metric Detail 
Forms for the controls prescribed in a SE-enhanced version of ISO 17799. 
Each of the individual SE-related controls -and even guidelines- discussed in 
the previous chapter can be examined and relevant, accurate metrics 
obtained for their implementation. It must be noted that provisions should be 
made to take into account the interdependencies of controls, as lack of a 
specific control may render the metrics for other, dependent controls nullified. 
An (extreme) example of such a situation would be to have users report 
potential security breaches to appropriate persons serving as a security 
incident reporting contact points for the departments, but not having the 
necessary procedures in place for efficient coordination of the departmental 
contact points and organisation-wide response. Thus, the value of the 
implemented control of "users reporting to security incident contact person" 
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would be nullified as the value for the control of "security incident reporting 
and co-ordination centre" would be very low or zero. 
 
Thus, although results for individual controls can be used to identify the 
strengths and weaknesses of the defense against SE, a final, aggregate result 
showing the level of implementation of the controls and guidelines against SE 
should be based on a weighted average of the results for the individual 
controls that takes into account control interdependencies. This result, 
combined with the ones described further on, will eventually lead to the overall 
assessment of the assurance of the system with respect to SE.       
 
8.4 Operationalisation of the effectiveness of the Ψ-wall. 
It was argued in previous chapters that the most effective defense against SE 
would be decidedly psychological and the notion of building a line of defense 
based on psychology, dubbed the "Ψ-wall", was presented in a previous 
chapter. Hence the effort to obtain metrics' results on the assurance of the 
system with respect to SE is naturally directed to the component qualities of 
the Ψ-wall as the non-technical, indirect controls against SE stem from it. 
  
In order to obtain metrics for a concept such as Social Engineering, one has 
to borrow measurement methods from Social Science research. Abstract 
sociological concepts such as crime can be made measurable in social 
sciences' terms through the process of "operationalisation". According to 
Collins et al. (2000, p.68), "operationalisation" is "the process of transforming 
a theoretical concept into an empirical variable", (i.e. making the concept in 
question, measurable). In principle, crime based on or enhanced by attacks 
based on Social Engineering methods is difficult to operationalise. 
Consequently, measuring the effectiveness of a set of psychological 
countermeasures designed to block SE attacks is even more difficult than 
operationalising the crime based on the attacks itself. This is because apart 
from the complexity inherent to the Social Engineering-aided crime, one has 
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to also take into account the non-descriptive nature of those countermeasures 
or controls against SE that are based on psychological techniques.  
 
In short, how can the effect of security education on the employees of an 
organisation be assessed? Surely, this can not be done by an old-school 
examination process at the end of the training schedule. Furthermore, how 
can the psychological effect of an awareness campaign on individuals be 
measured? How can an external observer be sure that the employees of an 
organisation have internalised the guidance promoting ethical practices in the 
workplace? Most importantly, how can the actual effect of this psychology-
laden process against the potential Social Engineering attack be measured? 
All of the above observations, and possibly many more, ultimately help in 
distinguishing all the different aspects of the concept of effective defense 
against SE. To operationalise a concept, ideally, one must identify all of its 
measurable dimensions. These dimensions are also known as indicators 
where an indicator is defined as "an observable measure" by Collins et al. 
(2000, p.68). 
  
The multi-disciplinary nature of the effort against SE is exhibited once again 
as it would be most appropriate to ask for the help of a psychology expert who 
should identify the indicators for the above, multi-part question. However, the 
author, going out on a limb, believes that some indicators may be readily 
available.  
 
8.4.1 Effectiveness of security education 
As far as the effect of education on security is concerned, the following 
method should yield an "observable measure" in relative terms: 
 
(It should be noted that security education must not be strictly limited to 
Information Security as the controls necessary for SE exceed the scope of 
IS).  Assuming, for illustration purposes, that the security education course 
deals with the subject of "secure practices in the workplace", first of all, a 
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baseline measurement must be taken at a point in time before the actual 
education takes place. This measurement can employ various methods, all of 
which can be carried out internally without the involvement of parties external 
to the organisation, e.g. external auditors. A (non-exhaustive) list of aspects 
examined could be: 
• Through observation, figures should be obtained for:  
− the percentage of employees who do not abide to physical security 
practices.  
− the percentage of employees not following a clean-desk practice 
when they leave their office. 
− the percentage of computer users who keep notes with computer 
account login information, such as passwords, in insecure and even 
obvious locations. 
− the percentage of computer users who have login information 
permanently stored on workstations that allow this. 
• Through the use of password strength assessment software the 
percentage of users who use weak passwords should be identified. 
• Through an email message simulating a phishing attack, users should be 
asked for their user names and passwords, using an excuse such as "re-
confirmation of user accounts".  A figure should be obtained for the 
percentage of employees who would unreservedly relinquish their login 
information. 
Obviously, the list can be very long, but these examples suffice in showing 
the general principle behind obtaining a baseline measurement. 
 
The education and training on security in general and information security in 
particular can then take place, obviously addressing (among other things) 
the issues described above.  
 
After the education and training courses are concluded, results on the same 
aspects as before should be obtained and compared to the original ones. In 
this fashion, a measurement on the effectiveness of the education will be 
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established, thus providing one of the sought-after indicators for effective 
operationalisation.  
 
There are a few points worth noting:  
a) The employees that took part in the security education program can be 
asked (by questionnaire or otherwise) to give their opinion about the 
value of the education they received. This will help in better assessing the 
effective level of internalisation of the points made in the course of the 
education. 
b) The results obtained from the measurements before and after the 
education took place, both have intrinsic values and can definitely be 
used on their own. Their comparison gives a further measure for the 
effectiveness of the education. 
c) A type of measurement such as the one described above should be 
considered as an integral part of the education process. There is little 
point in having security education that is neither assessed nor improved 
over time to cater for the changing security needs. 
d) The fact that education took place, combined with the number of the 
organisation employees who attended it, is a directly measurable control 
and should be reflected in the measurement of directly measurable 
aspects of the defense against SE, previously discussed.  
 
8.4.2 Effectiveness of the security awareness program. 
A program designed to increase the security awareness of employees is 
much subtler than straightforward security education. To all intents and 
purposes, security education can form only a part of a security awareness 
program. Security-related messages on notice boards, circulars, welcome 
screens of computer systems etc, all help in building security awareness in 
general and with respect to SE in particular. An awareness program is not as 
Proposals on SE-related measurement techniques 
 
 
 
Chapter 8  194   
time-specific as a security education course. A security education course has 
its beginning and end strictly defined in time. The effect that a security 
education course has on the people that follow it is maximised close to its 
end. Thus, the long-term effect of the security education course will die out if it 
is not regularly refreshed and boosted. This is where security awareness 
programs play a most significant role by constituting the core part of a 
continual process, the sole aim of which is keeping the teachings of the 
security education course alive in peoples' minds. Despite the principal 
differences of security education and security awareness, the results of 
security awareness can be assessed over time in a similar way as those of 
security education previously described: 
 
At any given point in time a baseline measurement can be obtained giving an 
indication of the current level of security awareness in the organisation. The 
number of aspects covered in the measurement can be increased to include 
those especially targeted by the security awareness program. Comparative 
results can yield the measure of success of the awareness program as time 
progresses and thus an effective indicator for the operationalisation of the 
effectiveness of the Ψ-wall with respect to SE. Absolute results can also be 
used as stand-alone metrics on the average level of the security awareness of 
employees. Another observable measure or indicator can be obtained by 
establishing what is perceived in theory as a SE threat by the average user in 
the course of time, assuming that a security awareness program on SE is 
actively pursued. Such data could be extracted by appropriate questionnaires 
and/or carefully orchestrated surveys that would be nothing short of full-
fledged psychology experiments carried out with the users as subjects.   
Yet another indicator could be obtained if the user is presented with multiple 
scenarios that are known to the user to be SE attacks and is subsequently 
asked to assign to each one of those a mark corresponding to the gravity of 
the attack. Interesting deductions can be made if the average user 
underestimates or grossly overestimates the severity of the attack. It might be 
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the case that the awareness program will have to be re-assessed and re-
formulated in order to address security issues on a more realistic basis.      
In parallel to the qualitative deductions regarding the effectiveness of the 
awareness program, the proposed process will yield the indicators initially 
required. These indicators will in turn lead to the quantitative assessment of 
the awareness program's effectiveness with respect to SE, effectively 
converting this defining quality into a measurable quantity. 
 
8.4.3 Measuring the effects of the psychological process 
As far as the question regarding the actual effect of the psychological 
processes employed against Social Engineering attacks is concerned, the 
following could function as indicators: 
 
a) Assuming that a security incident reporting and coordination centre has 
been established and is fully functional according to the provisions of ISO 
17799, the percentage of increase in alarms raised against real (not 
artificially created) Social Engineering attacks after the dispensation of 
security education courses and as the security awareness campaign 
progresses, can form a viable indicator. An issue that must be addressed 
regarding this indicator is that an increase in alarms may result from two 
distinct conditions. Such an increase may either be caused by the raised 
awareness of employees who actually perceive SE attacks for what they 
really are in a way that was not possible before, or by an increased 
number of attacks that is irrelevant to the education and awareness 
programs. Additionally, nothing prevents both conditions to occur 
simultaneously. In order to normalise the results reported by the security 
incident reporting and coordination centre over time, further observations 
are necessary.  
b) By carrying out penetration testing centred on SE attacks, three immediate 
benefits may be gained. First, from the number of reports arriving at the 
security incident reporting and coordination centre in direct relation to the 
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controlled SE attack, the values obtained in (a) above can be normalised. 
Second, in absolute terms, the percentage of successful attacks that go 
unreported in the context of penetration testing will yield another indicator 
of the effectiveness of the defenses against SE. Third, if the results of the 
penetration testing are classified according to different types of attacks 
with different types of goals and targets (some serious, some superficial 
and many variations in between) the weaker areas of the defense line will 
be pinpointed.  
c) A "post mortem" indicator of successful SE attacks can be obtained from 
the percentile change of breaches identified after a successful attack has 
been carried out. For the validity of the result to be ensured, the attack 
itself should be a straightforward Social Engineering one, or be fairly 
surely linked to a preceding true Social Engineering attack. (Such a case 
would be, for example, the penetration into a system using a valid 
password that had been previously extracted from an authorised user who 
failed to identify the Social Engineering attack against him/her and thus did 
not raise an alarm). The obtained result only has to do with those attacks 
that were successful and were discovered at a later time. As far as the 
successful attacks that were not discovered are concerned, there is 
nothing to be said or done as is usually the case with "perfect crimes". 
  
The above indicators effectively lead to the operationalisation of the concepts 
related to the Ψ-wall. It is by no means claimed that the list of indicators is 
exhaustive. The interested reader is welcome to suggest additional indicators 
and methods for obtaining them that will make the operationalisation in 
question more accurate.  
 
8.5 Presentation of the results 
Combining the indicators relevant to the Ψ-wall with the results obtained for 
the directly measurable aspects of the defense against SE should lead to the 
establishment of the level of assurance in the system with respect to SE. It is 
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interesting to note the disparate nature of the results. As a first observation, 
the results can not be combined in the form of a weighted average. Such an 
average can not be used in any productive manner and can even be 
misleading if attempted. There is no useable information in the statement "our 
system has a 57% assurance with respect to SE". Furthermore, the weight 
coefficients that have to be used in order to obtain the final result will have to 
be arbitrary as neither an objective relation between the indicators nor 
between an indicator and the final assurance value expressed as a 
percentage, can be established. As a second observation, no indicator may 
yield useable information on the level of assurance in the system with respect 
to SE on its own.  
 
To illustrate this point, consider being given just the result (as a percentage) 
of the level of implementation of controls against SE. This would be 
inadequate on its own to give an idea about the assurance level with respect 
to SE. The figure would yield a measure of the theoretical compliance to the 
security requirements and directives but would lose its meaning in the context 
of assurance if, for example, the level of security awareness among the 
organisation's employees is so low that security breaches can not be avoided. 
On the other hand, results related to incident reporting would be out of place if 
the level of implementation of ISO/IEC 17799:2005 controls (general and/or 
SE-specific) were not furnished. For example, an absolute value for the 
number of incidents being reported to a co-ordination centre would not mean 
much if not accompanied by information on the level of implementation of 
incident-reporting procedures throughout the organisation's structure.  
Furthermore, absolute numbers on security education (such as number of 
participants or education man-hours) would mean very little if not supported 
by penetration-testing results or actual attack results that help in the 
assessment of the actual effects of security education. 
 
A way will thus have to be devised to present the results in a form that both 
retains the values of the individual indicators as well as provides an overview 
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of their combined values, ultimately offering an indication of the level of 
assurance in the system with respect to SE.  
 
Ideal to this type of data is the spider chart representation. A spider chart is a 
specialized type of chart that represents data on a series of radians starting at 
a single point at the centre of the graph. Each radian forms an axis for each 
attribute (or quantitative variable) measured. An attribute can be an indicator 
or a value resulting from a grouping of indicators (if the particular indicators 
can be grouped). The actual value marked on the radian is the distance from 
the center of the graph. Spider charts are typically employed to show, in a 
graphical way, the values of various -and frequently unrelated- organizational 
performance areas. In our case, the performance areas are related to the 
assurance of the system with respect to SE. The strong point of the spider 
chart is that important categories of performance are graphically displayed on 
the same chart, thus providing a useful overview of performance. A measure 
of the assurance of the system with respect to SE can thus be obtained by 
looking at the area covered by the spider web. Furthermore, the examiner can 
easily visualise concentrations of strengths and weaknesses and 
subsequently dictate corrective action. 
 
To illustrate the use of a spider chart in this context, let us assume that three 
subsequent measurements with respect to SE have been taken, separated by 
six-month periods. The resulting data is then plotted on the spider chart of 
figure 8.2: 
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Assurance w.r.t SE
0
50
100
Implementation of SE controls %
Effect of security education %
Effect of awareness program %Incident reporting increase(normalised) %
Blocked SE attacks %
t0
t0+6months
t0+12months
 
Figure 8.2: Example of organisation assurance over the course of a year 
 
If assurance is represented by the area defined by each line, then the first 
obvious result is that as time progresses, the assurance rises. Secondary 
deductions may be that:  
a) the security education did not pay off during the first six months,  
b) the awareness program did have a uniformly increasing effect over the first 
year, 
c) as more controls get implemented and the effects of security education 
and awareness increase, so does the incident reporting and the 
percentage of blocked SE attacks.  
d) as the percentile change of incident reporting increases but at the same 
time the increase in blocked SE attacks does not follow the same rate, this 
indicates that the number of successful SE attacks in absolute terms was 
on the rise during the second half of the year.  
Proposals on SE-related measurement techniques 
 
 
 
Chapter 8  200   
 
By comparing charts of the assurance in, e.g. different departments, at the 
same point in time, weaknesses and strong points can be obtained. Such a 
spider chart appears on figure 8.3: 
 
Assurance at t0
0
50
100
Implementation of SE controls %
Effect of security education %
Effect of aw areness program %Incident reporting increase(normalised) %
Blocked SE attacks %
Dept A
Dept B
Organisation average
 
Figure 8.3: Example of departmental assurance at a given time. 
 
In this case, although both departments are assumed to be following the 
same security policy and the level of implementation of controls is indeed the 
same, Department B exhibits a clearly lower level of assurance with respect to 
SE. Furthermore, the employees of Department B seem less capable of 
identifying SE attacks and thus the overall defense capability is less than what 
it is for Department A. The deviation from the organisation average is not 
much for Department A while Department B is definitely lagging behind the 
rest of the organisation. Such a deviation must be investigated and rectified. 
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Perhaps this hysteresis is due to a common trait shared among the 
employees of Department B. Otherwise it may be attributed to poor response 
on the part of the departmental contact person for security incident reporting. 
Poor management of the department may also lead to such a situation with 
the levels of self-esteem and motivation for work of the employees running 
low at the particular department.       
 
Through the presentation of the above examples, it is hoped that the need for 
and the advantages of such a measurement approach have been clearly 
demonstrated. Apart from the assessment of the level of assurance in the 
organisation with respect to SE, this measurement technique can help in an 
efficient implementation of the Plan-Do-Check-Act (PDCA) cycle that lies at 
the foundation of every ISMS implementation. Furthermore, the measurement 
system itself must have a feedback loop in place if it is to be controlled and 
adapted to the ever-growing security needs of the organisation. The proposed 
measurement system does not have to be limited to the SE aspect of security. 
It can be expanded to encompass all aspects of information security and thus 
provide an assessment for the assurance of the system with respect to 
security in general.       
 
8.6 Concluding Remarks 
The need for obtaining metrics related to the aspect of security against SE 
attacks can be satisfied by examining the level of the Assurance of the system 
with respect to SE. A measure of the assurance with respect to SE can be 
obtained in the form of a Spider chart where the values of assurance-related 
performance variables are plotted. By providing a graphic display of these 
variables that can not be otherwise combined to yield a single numeric result, 
a useful overview of performance regarding the security against SE is 
provided. A measure of the assurance of the system with respect to SE can 
be obtained by examining the area covered by the spider web. 
9. Conclusions 
 
In this final chapter, an overview of the achievements and shortcomings of 
this research are presented and possible directions for future research are 
highlighted. Figure 9.1 shows the relative position of the current chapter in the 
context of this dissertation. 
 
Chapter 1: The problem of
Social Engineering in
Information Security
Chapter 2: Social engineering
and Information Security:
The status quo.
Chapter 3: Social
Engineering as a
backdoor to ITSec and
IS infrastructures
Chapter 5: Social
aspects of Information
Security
Chapter 7: Examination
of ISO 17799 with
respect to Social
Engineering
Chapter 8: Proposals on
SE-related Measurement
Techniques
Chapter 9: Conclusions
Chapter 4:
Psychological
considerations in Social
Engineering
Chapter 6: Protection
against SE attacks and
the introduction of
"Ψ-wall"
 
Figure 9.1: Chapter 9 within the context of the overall dissertation structure 
 
The term "Social Engineering" is made out of two words: "Social" and 
"Engineering". Although this deduction will not win any linguistic prises, by 
separating its two elements the real value of the term is brought to light. 
Social Engineering methods can not be successful without the social 
interaction of humans. As humans are social beings, social interaction 
between them is unavoidable. For a human being to be 100% insusceptible to 
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the ways of the Social Engineer that individual should be locked in a dungeon 
and the key be thrown away. This is comparable to the ultimately secure 
computer that must be without power and buried under a few metric tons of 
cement. The "Engineering" element is used in a way that it rather means 
"manipulation" but at a higher level than usual. This means that the way the 
Social Engineer approaches a victim resembles an engineering problem. 
"Engineering" is also used to denote that no problem can remain unsolved if 
attacked systematically and through the use of a well-founded methodology. 
By combining all of the above, Social Engineering is nothing more than a 
discipline that systematically approaches the question of how to manipulate 
humans and use that manipulation as the means to a goal.  
 
The obvious next question thus becomes: "How can we make sure that our 
Information Security defenses can withstand the bombardment of Social 
Engineering?   
 
When the subject of this research was conceived, the obvious first objective 
was to bring a generally accepted Information Security (IS) standard and the 
nebulous concept of Social Engineering (SE) together and assess the 
effectiveness of the former against the latter.  
 
The two-fold research objective thus immediately became:  
 
a) to investigate the effect that attacks of the SE type could have on the 
existing provisions of IS standards and practices and  
b) to devise extra controls for inclusion into standards and practices in order 
to guard efficiently against SE attacks. 
 
Due to the multitude of available IS standards and practices, a decision was 
made to chose one representative standard of general acceptance in order to 
delimit the area of research. A justified decision was thus made to examine 
the ISO/IEC 17799:2005 standard (ISO/IEC, 2000a) in this context.  
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In order to address the research questions, it was obviously essential to 
gather as much information on SE as possible. The first step was to identify 
the very nature of SE. Almost by definition, SE is difficult to identify as it 
functions as an "umbrella" concept for any methodology conceivable that 
takes advantage of one's psychological profile, behaviour or character by 
exploiting those imperceptible flaws that are inherent to the nature of the 
human psyche. Thus, from the very early stages of this research, it became 
evident that in order to obtain valid results, the research would have to 
systematically address a variety of parameters some of which expanded 
beyond the strict scope of the Computer Science and Information Systems 
disciplines. The problem was thus identified as being philosophical in nature 
to a large extent. If an effective solution to this problem were to be presented, 
it had to be the outcome of a multi-disciplinary process.  
 
This gave rise to a number of "companion" research subjects the results of 
which had to precede the main, two-fold research question.  
 
The first such subject was the methodology of SE attacks. This was 
studied, analysed and categorised. The four main categories of SE attacks 
were found to be: physical attacks at the workplace, attacks over the 
telephone and Internet attacks (all of which require some kind of direct or 
indirect contact with the targeted employee) and dumpster diving (which does 
not require contact with employees). During this study, there were also other 
aspects of SE methodology that were identified and play significant albeit 
lesser roles in the context of the research.     
 
As research on the methodology of SE progressed, it was made evident that 
Social Engineers target the human element of Information Systems by using 
psychological manipulation methodology. Hence, that subject had to be 
studied also -always in context- if effective assessment of the ISO/IEC 
17799:2005 standard with respect to SE were to be made possible.  
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Hence, the Psychological Considerations in SE became the second 
companion subject for research.  Through this research the psychology of SE 
attacks was analysed and the tactics and techniques of Persuasion, Influence 
and Exploitation of attitudes and beliefs were identified. This provides the 
basis for IS awareness, education and training plans that will raise the 
effectiveness of the IS policy against SE attacks.    
 
In the course of the study of psychological considerations for SE, another 
major issue that heavily affects IS became apparent. That issue had to do 
with social aspects in the context of IS in general and Information Security 
Management Systems (ISMS) in particular. It was then realised that an ISMS 
is a textbook example of a social construct, with all the complications that this 
involves and -luckily- with all the standard tools that Sociology provides, 
available for analysis.   
 
The third area of prerequisite research was thus focused on the Social 
Aspects of IS. A sociological analysis of IS and the ISMS was carried out. 
This study on the one hand gave answers to many of the problematic issues 
that reduce the effectiveness of IS policies and implementations, while on the 
other it highlighted issues that could be the source of serious but covert 
problems in upholding IS.  
 
What the study of the Social Aspects of IS also accomplishes is that it lays the 
foundation for analysing the social character of IS. It provides the means to 
identify "socially-induced" vulnerabilities and may even help in establishing 
controls for them. It was demonstrated that the social construct lying at the 
foundation of any ISMS (in terms of IS hierarchy, individual perceptions and 
interpersonal relations) severely affects the design, functionality and efficiency 
of the security policy. As soon as the security policy is in place though, it, too, 
affects and transforms the dynamic relationships within the social construct of 
the ISMS. This bi-directional relation between two concepts that function 
reciprocally as cause and effect can be explosive if left unchecked. Care 
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should thus be taken for feedback mechanisms to exist in order to ultimately 
reach an equilibrium point of maximised security efficiency. 
 
Armed with this knowledge, an attempt was made to devise a protection 
scheme against SE that is based heavily on psychological techniques to 
strengthen the resistance of IS Standards and policies to SE attacks. This 
became the fourth companion research subject. It quickly became evident 
that to successfully defend an organisation against such attacks, a significant 
investment must be made on the organisation's human resources through IS 
awareness and psychological training programs. By exposing employees to 
SE methodology in a controlled fashion, the most effective defenses -those of 
a psychological type- can be built against the real danger of SE.   
 
Having laid the necessary foundation by providing a broad overview of Social 
Engineering, the main two-fold research question was addressed. First, 
an assessment of the degree in which the security clauses and individual 
controls specified in the ISO/IEC 17799:2005 standard may be affected by SE 
threats was undertaken. The following three outcomes were obtained upon its 
completion:  
 
a) It was found that although the set of controls presented in ISO/IEC 
17799:2005 is very comprehensive and effective, it was not written with 
SE in mind.  
b) It was deduced that although the controls presented in ISO/IEC 
17799:2005 do have the indirect effect of raising the level of security with 
respect to SE threats, there is still room for improvement and "tuning" of 
the standard with respect to SE.  
c) Through the discussion of the ISO/IEC 17799:2005 controls with respect 
to their susceptibility to SE threats, the weaker areas of the standard, in 
this context, were identified.  
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The third outcome provides the necessary information for the second part of 
the main research question that has to do with the re-design of the 
standard's controls and/or the introduction of new ones for better protection 
against SE.  
 
The identified weaker areas of the standard with respect to SE were:  
 
a) physical security where more technical controls need to be introduced to 
counterbalance the psychological hysteresis of individuals that Social 
Engineers prey upon,  
b) security against SE attacks over the telephone which remains largely 
untouched in the current version of the standard,  
c) security against SE attacks over the Internet and email that needs to be 
strengthened under the light of emerging SE attacks and most importantly 
d) the need for IS training and education related to SE, the promotion of 
ethical standards in the workplace and IS awareness building (especially 
where SE is concerned).  
 
With the above points in mind, through a detailed examination of the ISO/IEC 
17799:2005 standard, either new controls were devised or the "tuning" of 
existing controls was proposed so that SE issues are better addressed. 
 
It was also understood beyond doubt that there are many issues of 
sociological nature that by definition impede the efficiency of any ISMS, such 
as the vertical nature of hierarchical structures and the struggle for power and 
status within them. These issues lay clearly outside the scope or context of 
any IS policy and can not be addressed by any IS standard.  
 
Thus, the "formal analysis of impediments of a sociological nature to IS" 
may form a prime area for further, interdisciplinary research.  
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Having identified the core components of the transformation necessary for the 
ISO/IEC 17799:2005 standard to become better equipped to deal with Social 
Engineering as well as the limitations of that transformation, it was further 
considered essential to tackle the issue of measurement of IS with respect to 
SE. The need for metrics related to the Security of Information Systems in 
general and to the specific aspect of IS against SE attacks in particular, had 
been evident since the early stages of this research and is quite important for 
the fruition of the Plan-Do-Check-Act (PDCA) cycle promoted by the ISO/IEC 
27001:2005 standard (ISO/IEC, 2005b). However, given the inherent difficulty 
of measuring a concept such as Information Security, the task of producing 
quantifiable results for the Social Engineering aspect of it, seemed daunting at 
best. It was thus decided to address the level of the Assurance of the system 
with respect to Social Engineering. This eventually led to the formation of the 
fifth companion subject of the main research, that of SE-related 
measurement techniques. Spider charts were employed in an attempt to 
provide a measure of the assurance with respect to SE. According to this 
scheme, the values of assurance-related performance variables that can not 
be otherwise combined to yield a single numeric result are plotted on a spider 
chart. By providing a graphic display of these variables, a useful overview of 
performance regarding the security against SE is indeed provided. A measure 
of the assurance of the system with respect to Social Engineering can thus be 
obtained by examining the area covered by the spider web. Although the 
chapter on SE-related metrics is still far from being truly self-sufficient, it does 
provide firm ground upon which to further build.  
 
Hence, more accurate quantification of SE issues could constitute yet 
another area of future research. 
 
The provided analysis of the ISO/IEC 17799:2005 standard can also function 
as a starting point for further work on the assessment with respect to SE of 
ISMSs that are based on the ISO/IEC 27001:2005 standard.  
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This work could be of assistance to all involved in designing for IS based on 
the ISO/IEC 17799:2005 standard, by providing enough insight on how 
vulnerable systems may be from SE threats. The residual risk due to SE even 
after the application of the ISO 17799 controls may be quite higher than 
expected if Social Engineering vulnerabilities are not accounted for and 
effectively mitigated. Hopefully, this work will result in raising the level of 
alertness and diminishing the false sense of security that the application of the 
particular standard may have instilled.  
 
Moreover, this work could provide the basis of a future revision of ISO/IEC 
17799:2005 (and even of ISO/IEC 27001:2005) that would cater more 
effectively for those aspects of Information Security that are related to Social 
Engineering.  
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Appendix A - IS Terminology 
 
The terminology used to describe the various aspects of the Information 
Security (IS) concept can in many ways be confusing. It is also not uncommon 
for similar terms to have different meanings in the context of various IS 
documents. It was thus deemed necessary to at least clarify how particular 
terms are used in the context of this work.  
 
This appendix is divided in two sections: The first section provides the 
definitions necessary for laying the foundation of this work. As such, the 
definitions are presented in logical rather than alphabetical order. These 
definitions closely follow the terminology used in the ISO/IEC17799:2005 and 
ISO/IEC 27001:2005 standards as this work ultimately revolves around them.  
The second section provides the rest of the general terminology that was 
used in this work and does not necessarily relay back to the two standards 
mentioned above. This is sorted alphabetically.   
 
A.1 Foundation terminology 
Information Security: ISO/IEC 17799:2005 defines Information security as 
the "preservation of confidentiality, integrity and availability of information" and 
goes on to include that "other properties such as authenticity, accountability, 
non-repudiation and reliability can also be involved". 
 
Information System: ISO/IEC 17799:2005 deals with the notion of an 
Information  System in terms of the complete environment of an organisation 
within which information is handled. This includes every form of information 
handling as information can exist on many forms. Thus, an information system 
includes information handling in any form, building and location issues and all 
types of assets within the organisation, in addition to its traditionally defined IT 
systems. An information system can be viewed as encompassing all of the 
hardware, software, physical, administrative, and organizational issues that 
are involved in the handling off information within an organisation.  
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Information Security Management System (ISMS): The ISMS is defined in 
ISO/IEC 27001:2005 as "that part of the overall management system, based 
on a business risk approach, to establish, implement, operate, monitor, 
review, maintain and improve information security". It is further noted that 
"The management system includes organizational structure, policies, planning 
activities, responsibilities, practices, procedures, processes and resources". 
 
Risk: In ISO/IEC 17799:2005 risk is defined as the "combination of the 
probability of an event and its consequence". The risk involved in a highly 
probable but inconsequential event or in an event of severe consequences 
but of miniscule probability of ever taking place is thus low.  In the context of 
ISO/IEC 17799:2005 and ISO/IEC 27001:2005, risk has a dynamic quality. It 
is never assumed constant. It is, by default, assumed to be changing with time 
(hence the need for the existence of an ISMS).  
 
Risk assessment: In ISO/IEC 17799:2005 risk assessment is defined as the 
"overall process of risk analysis and risk evaluation".  It is considered as one 
of the foundation elements for the creation of an Information Security system 
that will provide the correct level of security to every functional aspect of the 
organisation. Erroneous risk assessment can either lead to an inadequately 
low level of security, hence making the security system ineffective, while an 
exceedingly high level of security makes the security system inefficient. 
 
Threat: A threat in the context of any system is the possibility of inflicting 
damage to the system. In ISO/IEC 17799:2005 it is defined as "a potential 
cause of an unwanted incident, which may result in harm to a system or 
organization". 
 
Vulnerability: A vulnerability is defined as a weakness of a system that can 
be exploited by a threat, with negative effects for the system. 
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Control: ISO/IEC 17799:2005 defines "control" as the "means of managing 
risk, including policies, procedures, guidelines, practices or organizational 
structures, which can be of administrative, technical, management, or legal 
nature". It is further considered as a synonym of "safeguard" or 
"countermeasure". ISO/IEC 17799:2005 comprises 11 security control 
clauses. In total, these 11 clauses contain 39 main security categories. Each 
security category contains: a) a control objective stating what needs to be 
achieved, and b) description(s) of one or more controls that can be applied to 
achieve the control objective. 
 
Guideline: In the context of this work the term "guideline" is used to describe 
how to implement a particular control in order to achieve the desired control 
objective. In ISO/IEC 17799:2005 a typical control description comprises: a) a 
definition of the specific control statement to satisfy the control objective, b) 
guidance and information in support of the implementation of the control and 
how to achieve the control objective, c) further information, pertinent to the 
control under examination, such as legal aspects of its implementation and 
references to related standards. It is the guidance presented in (b) above that 
the term "guideline" refers to.    
   
Plan-Do-Check-Act (PDCA) model: The PDCA model is defined in ISO/IEC 
27001:2005. According to this model, a virtuous circle of continual 
improvement of the ISMS is established. It is assumed that changes in the 
organisation’s environment occur continually and as a consequence, a 
monitoring system must be established. The core function of the ISMS is to 
make new risk assessment, identification of new vulnerabilities and 
implementation of new controls, as automated a process as possible. Hence, 
one of the main characteristics of the ISMS which is based on the PDCA 
model, is that it is “free running” and does not rely on a triggering event of 
some sort to begin the re-evaluation procedure.  
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A.2 General terminology 
Assurance: an expression of confidence that one has in the strength of 
implemented controls and that security needs are indeed satisfied. 
 
Phishing: the act of tricking someone into surrendering personal or 
confidential information or subterfuging that someone into doing something 
that (s)he normally wouldn’t do. Phishing is primarily used as a means to 
identity theft. 
 
Sanitisation: the general process of removing data from storage media, in 
such a way that there is reasonable assurance that the data originally 
contained in the media may not be easily retrieved and reconstructed. 
 
  
Appendix B - List of abbreviations used 
 
 
In an effort not to overburden the text of this dissertation, it was decided to 
use a number of abbreviations for commonly used terms. Although the 
abbreviations used in this work are the ones generally found in relevant 
literature, they are included here for reasons of clarity. 
 
ANT:  Actor-Network Theory.  
 
BPM: Business Process Modeling.  
 
IA: Information Assurance. 
 
IM: Instant Messaging. 
 
IRC: Internet Relay Chat. 
 
IS: Information Security (this abbreviation is not used in the text to denote 
"Information System(s)" ). 
 
ISMS: Information Security Management System. 
 
IT: Information Technology 
 
ITSec: Information Technology Security 
 
MTBF: Mean Time Between Failures. A figure giving an indication of the life 
expectancy of electronic components. 
 
PDCA: Plan-Do-Check-Act virtuous cycle. Procedure implemented for the 
continual re-assessment and improvement of the level of information 
security. 
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PBX: industry standard acronym for "Private Branch eXchange". Signifies  
the portion of the telephone system owned by the telco customer.  
The PBX includes everything at the customer's office up to the point 
where it connects to the telephone company's lines. 
 
SE:  Social Engineering (this abbreviation is not used in the text to denote 
"Social Engineer"). 
 
 
 
Appendix C - Detailed examination of the ISO/IEC 17799:2005 
IS standard with respect to SE  
 
 
This appendix contains a detailed analysis of the examination of the ISO/IEC 
17799:2005 (ISO/IEC, 2005) security controls with respect to Social 
Engineering.  
 
The ISO/IEC 17799:2005 standard is structured around 11 security control 
clauses that in turn contain 39 main security categories in total. An 
introductory clause also exists (section 4), that deals with the very basics of 
risk assessment and treatment). 
  
The eleven security control clauses and main security categories are: 
 
Table C-1: Structure of the ISO17799:2005 security clauses. 
Section 5.  Security Policy  
 
i. Information security policy 
 
Section 6.  Organising Information 
Security  
 
i. Internal organization 
ii. External parties 
 
Section 7.  Asset Management  
 
i. Responsibility for assets 
ii. Information classification 
 
Section 8.  Human Resources 
Security  
 
i. Prior to employment 
ii. During employment  
iii. Termination or change of 
employment  
 
Section 9.  Physical and 
Environmental Security  
 
i. Secure areas  
ii. Equipment security 
 
Section 10.  Communications and 
Operations 
Management  
 
i. Operational procedures and 
responsibilities 
ii. Third party service delivery 
management 
iii. System planning and 
acceptance 
iv. Protection against malicious and 
mobile code 
v. Back-up 
vi. Network security management 
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vii. Media handling 
viii. Exchange of information 
ix. Electronic commerce services 
x. Monitoring 
 
Section 11.  Access Control  
 
i. Business requirement for access 
control 
ii. User access management 
iii. User responsibilities 
iv. Network access control 
v. Operating system access control 
vi. Application and information 
access control 
vii. Mobile computing and 
teleworking 
 
Section 12.  Information Systems 
Acquisition, 
Development and 
Maintenance  
 
i. Security requirements of 
information systems 
ii. Correct processing in applications 
iii. Cryptographic controls 
iv. Security of system files 
v. Security in development and 
support processes 
vi. Technical vulnerability 
management 
 
Section 13.  Information Security 
Incident Management  
 
i. Reporting information security 
events and weaknesses 
ii. Management of information 
security incidents and 
improvements 
 
Section 14.  Business Continuity 
Management  
 
i. Information security aspects of 
business continuity management 
 
Section 15.  Compliance  
 
i. Compliance with legal 
requirements 
ii. Compliance with security policies 
and standards, and technical 
compliance 
iii. Information systems audit 
considerations 
 
 
 
Furthermore, each of the main security categories contains:  
a) a control objective stating what needs to be achieved, and  
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b) description(s) of one or more controls that can be applied to achieve the 
control objective, 
while a typical control description comprises:  
a) a definition of the specific control statement to satisfy the control objective, 
b) guidance and information in support of the implementation of the control 
and how to achieve the control objective,  
c) further information, pertinent to the control under examination, such as 
legal aspects of its implementation and references to related standards.  
  
Following the structure of ISO 17799, each of the eleven security control 
clauses is examined under the light of a possible SE attack. In this context, 
discussions are presented for each of the clauses along with some thoughts 
on how to further fortify the clauses against SE attacks.  
 
C.1. Section 5 - Security Policy 
Relevant security category: 
• Information security policy 
 
Section 5 of ISO 17799 deals with the cornerstone of security in an 
organisation. The security policy document is essential in providing 
management with a set of justified guidelines and support for information 
security bearing in mind the business requirements at hand, as well as the 
governing legislation.  
 
At the foundation of the security effort lays the degree of management 
commitment to the cause. It is stated in ISO 17799, section 5 that: 
" Management should set a clear policy direction in line with business 
objectives and demonstrate support for, and commitment to, information 
security through the issue and maintenance of an information security policy 
across the organization". Also in section 5.1.1 it is stated: "The information 
security policy document should state management commitment and set 
out the organization’s approach to managing information security". In practice, 
there are examples where management simply accepts a security policy 
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provided by an external consultant because the organisation needs one. 
There are cases where members of the management group do not 
understand -let alone espouse- the security policy document. In such cases, 
an official endorsement of the policy has very little value and does not 
promote the policy's acceptance by lower level employees. A typical example 
of such a situation may arise when a security officer is reprimanded as 
"overzealous" when he/she attempts to verify the identity of a member of the 
management group who is not carrying a proper ID token.   
 
Also in section 5.1.1 of ISO 17799, it is stated: "An information security policy 
document should be approved by management, and published and 
communicated to all employees and relevant external parties" and "This 
information security policy should be communicated throughout the 
organization to users in a form that is relevant, accessible and 
understandable to the intended reader". These two statements deal with 
the very sensitive aspect of how the employees at various levels of the 
hierarchy understand the policy (if they understand it at all), given all the 
possible variations in terms of position, job context, knowledge and ability to 
grasp fine ideas about security. In this sense, the security policy document 
must be easy and simple to read and not overwhelm the readers either by its 
volume or by language that is difficult to understand. A complicated security 
policy or one that takes a lot of effort to read from cover to cover, will not have 
the desired effect of strengthening security. On the contrary, employees who 
have been exposed to but have not understood the policy and its directives 
will definitely be the first ones succumbing to a Social Engineering attack. The 
justification of this statement is that these users will be lulled to a state of false 
security by the fact that, for instance, a password system is in place but may 
end up mishandling their passwords and be persuaded to relinquish them to 
the attacking Social Engineer.   
 
The point also made in section 5.1.1 about explaining "security education, 
training, and awareness requirements", is one of the most important ones with 
respect to SE attacks. To define the notion of a "security-aware" employee in 
Detailed examination of the ISO/IEC 17779:2005 IS standard with respect to SE  
 
 
Appendix C   235   
exact terms would be a rather futile exercise. However, security awareness, 
education and training, if actively pursued, will, in the end, result in raising the 
degree of understanding security and its implications for the average 
employee. This will lead to a higher level of resistance against SE attacks and 
accordingly to a higher level of security. The average person -or employee in 
our case- can not be expected to automatically become "security-aware" on 
queue. Similar to the example of WWII England where banners with motos 
like "Loose Lips Sink Ships" where posted everywhere for everyone to see in 
order to raise security awareness in the battle against espionage, in addition 
to proper security training and education, security messages against SE 
should always be present on monitors, login screens, notepads etc. Even 
penetration testing should regularly take place, not only to have a continual 
assessment of the level of security, but to aid in the training of employees 
against SE attacks. When the average employee is brought to such a level 
that a potential SE attack is recognised and reported, the required security 
level, as far as the end-user is concerned, will have been attained.  
 
Remaining in section 5.1.1, the statement "If the information security policy is 
distributed outside the organisation, care should be taken not to disclose 
sensitive information" should perhaps be more generalised and lead to the 
protection of the document as a whole. If the current security policy document 
(or older version thereof) falls into the hands of a Social Engineer, there is a 
wealth of information that the Social Engineer may use in an attack. From 
internal directives to security incident reporting procedures, all will be 
thoroughly studied to yield the best plan of attack that a Social Engineer will 
follow. 
 
While methods relying on the education of and passing information to users 
on security issues should indeed be the main tool of building up resistance to 
SE attacks, the importance of counterincentives against complacency and 
negligence should not be underestimated. Following this mentality, in section 
5.1.1 it is made clear that " The policy document should contain statements 
concerning: … (omitted text) … a brief explanation of the security policies, 
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principles, standards, and compliance requirements of particular importance 
to the organization, including: … (omitted text) …  consequences of 
information security policy violations". This, combined with prior proper 
training, should aid in keeping users alert against possible SE attacks. 
However, in order to be just in dispensing punishment to users who have 
failed to uphold the security directives, users must be able to function within a 
fully operational security infrastructure that protects them. There is little point 
in identifying users as responsible for a security violation when the security 
system itself is incomplete or failing. In that case, one would only be looking 
for scapegoats to take the blame for an inadequate security infrastructure.    
    
Finally, section 5.1.2 "Review of the information security policy" deals with the 
necessity of keeping the security policy updated. In such reviews and updates 
it is essential to include all lessons learned from past experience. Thus, if the 
security policy caters for controls against SE attacks, the review of the policy, 
if performed according to the ISO 17799 standard, will yield improved 
defenses against SE attacks.  
 
C.2. Section 6 - Organising Information Security  
Relevant security categories: 
• Internal organization 
• External parties 
 
Section 6 of ISO 17799 deals with both the internal organisation of IS as well 
as applying IS rules to external, collaborating parties. Management of 
Information Security within the organisation is effected through the 
establishment of an appropriate framework that controls the implementation of 
IS (section 6.1 of ISO 17799). On the other hand, wherever there is a 
business need for collaboration with external parties, the organisation's 
security level must be maintained by appropriate controls that are defined in 
documented agreements with those parties (section 6.2 of ISO 17799). 
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In the introductory part of section 6.1, among other issues, it is stated that "a 
multi-disciplinary approach to information security should be encouraged". 
This statement proves once again that IS is not a technical matter alone. As it 
has already been discussed, defense against SE attacks is more than just 
technical. Technical controls must be devised and implemented in order to 
provide a supporting infrastructure against SE attacks, but a large part of the 
effort -if not the largest part- is definitely non-technical. 
 
In section 6.1.1 "Management commitment to information security" the 
already familiar notions of Management support of IS, IS policy reviews, 
resource provision for IS, promotion of security awareness etc are re-iterated.    
One important notion stated is that "Management should … ensure that the 
implementation of information security controls is co-ordinated across 
the organization". Lack of such co-ordination may have three immediate 
effects on the defense against SE attacks: First, if the application of IS 
controls is not homogeneous throughout the organisational structure, users 
may become confused insofar security practices are concerned. This will both 
lead to the weakening of the security effort as well as to an increased level of 
vulnerability of users to SE attacks.  Second, if there are differences in the 
application of IS controls between the various components of the 
organisational structure, the attacking Social Engineer will stand a better 
chance of successfully gathering the information necessary for mounting an 
attack, by separately approaching the various organisational components. It 
has to be noted that Social Engineers, very rarely mount a full-frontal attack to 
obtain all the necessary information in a single attempt. Their method rather 
resembles obtaining pieces of the puzzle from different sources and putting 
them together in order to formulate the larger picture that they are after. 
Third, lack of co-ordination in security incident reporting and response may 
give the attacking Social Engineer an appropriate window of opportunity to 
successfully carry out an attack. 
 
In section 6.1.2 "Information security co-ordination", apart from statements 
regarding the handling of non-compliance, security training, promotion of 
Detailed examination of the ISO/IEC 17779:2005 IS standard with respect to SE  
 
 
Appendix C   238   
security awareness, IS control assessment and implementation, IS incident 
handling and co-ordination etc, the notion of approved methods for 
information classification is introduced (and further discussed in detail in 
section 7.2 of ISO 17799). Although this is changing, the current practice is for 
the majority of organisations not to have an active information classification 
policy and most if not all of organisation employees have access to the 
information, irrespective of their actual need-to-know. This places the burden 
of securing the handling of information on the shoulders of employees. 
However, the average employee is not equipped or trained to deal with this. 
Hence, employees may inadvertently disclose sensitive information during SE 
attacks as they only have their personal, highly subjective criteria to rely on for 
determining the nature of the information. If there is no objective classification 
of the information's sensitivity, employees can not correctly evaluate the 
seriousness of a possible information leak. 
 
The need-to-know aspect is more important than it first appears, even for 
information that does not appear very critical at first glance. On the two sides 
of the SE attack there are a) the attacking Social Engineer and b) the targeted 
employees. If a "need-to-know" scheme is in place, obviously, the targeted 
employees can not divulge information they do not possess. Thus, the Social 
Engineer will have to go to greater lengths in order to locate and attack an 
employee who actually has the critical information. On the other hand, the 
Social Engineer's task becomes even more difficult as he/she not only has to 
gain the confidence of the targeted employee, but also has to prove that 
his/her need-to-know status is such that the information requested can indeed 
be provided to him/her according to the organisation's security policy.   
 
Section 6.1.3 of ISO 17799 "Allocation of information security responsibilities" 
discusses the steps for defining and assigning appropriate security 
responsibilities to employees according to the directives of the security policy 
that has been approved and endorsed by Management. The directives 
presented there lead to the creation of a security hierarchy parallel to the 
existing hierarchy of the organisation. As some employees will inescapably be 
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assigned to two positions simultaneously, one in the administrative hierarchy 
and one in the security hierarchy, conflicts are bound to exist between their 
two identities. To illustrate this issue, one can imagine the case where a 
member of the information security hierarchy (e.g. a network administrator) 
identifies a security incident involving or even incriminating another individual 
(e.g. a lower member of the management group) who holds a lower position 
than the network administrator in the security hierarchy or lies completely 
outside of it. Administratively though, the member of the management group 
outranks the network administrator and can directly or indirectly affect the 
network administrator's status in the organisation. The network administrator 
will certainly be faced with the dilemma of further pursuing the matter or not, 
as personal loss can result from such action. This conflict reflects the social 
issues at work in the context of a functioning ISMS and certainly allows a 
Social Engineer to take advantage of the situation and mount a successful 
attack by impersonating an individual who holds a high-level position in the 
administrative hierarchy. It may thus prove imperative to assign the overall 
control of the IS aspect to a group of people who perform their task of 
upholding IS, outside the administrative hierarchy. This, however, does not 
negate the need for employees that lie within the administrative hierarchy to 
be assigned IS responsibilities in order to protect assets and small-scale 
security processes within their work space. Whether Management would 
accept such an "untouchable" IS group, is another issue though!     
 
Section 6.1.4 "Authorization process for information processing facilities" 
provides implementation directives for new information processing facilities. 
This includes privately-owned laptops, home-computers etc. From a SE point 
of view, the introduction of new facilities may provide a window of opportunity 
during the phase when the capabilities of the newly introduced technologies 
are not fully understood. A full risk assessment regarding these new 
technologies can thus not be carried out. Following this, vulnerabilities can not 
be effectively identified and are thus not efficiently mitigated. Hence, the true 
extent of the residual risk after vulnerability mitigation can not be safely 
fathomed. To illustrate this example, one may consider the situation that 
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arose from the first introduction of wireless networking components in the 
work environment only a few years ago. In those days that this technology 
was not fully mature and users and administrators alike had not yet developed 
sufficient know-how and insight on the technology, there were cases where 
Social Engineers exploited this fact. Their method of operation was to use 
mobile wireless-enabled devices outside of or near the organisation premises 
to gain access to corporate networks. In the rather rare cases in those days 
that a password was needed, all it took was a little clever manipulation over 
the phone to have a user or even administrator allow them in. Nowadays that 
wireless technology is considered mainstream, network administrators have 
become more cautious in how to deploy and use it. However, according to the 
executive summary of the "Information security breaches survey 2006" which 
was carried out by the U.K. Department of Trade & Industry (2006), one out of 
five authorised wireless networks was still completely unprotected while 
another one out of five remained unencrypted. This shows that although 
enough time has passed for the wireless network technology to mature and its 
security shortcomings to be identified, implementations of this technology still 
remain vulnerable. Another alarming piece of information is also given in the 
"Information security breaches survey 2006" (U.K. Department of Trade & 
Industry, 2006) regarding another type of technology that should be 
considered mature by now: in 2006 "Only half of the companies that have 
implemented Voice over IP telephony evaluated the security risks before 
doing so". There is little point in attempting to fully justify such an attitude but it 
is important to make a note of it. In a nutshell, technologies such as the ones 
described, are implemented on their merits of convenience, cost-effectiveness 
etc, while the security factor associated with them seems to pale into 
insignificance. If one considers currently emerging technologies such as the 
use of RFIDs, sensor-based smart environment, grid computing, ad hoc 
networks that join mobile devices, bluetooth-based communication of devices 
etc, the predictions for the future from a security point of view are anything but 
auspicious. It should thus also be stressed in the context of section 6.1.4 of 
ISO 17799, that users and administrators alike, must maintain a high-level of 
alertness regarding IS during the introductory phase of new information 
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processing facilities. This high level of alertness should be maintained until all 
vulnerabilities have been identified through the actual use of the facility and 
appropriate controls have been implemented. 
 
Section 6.1.5 "Confidentiality agreements" discusses the implementation of 
controls with a legally binding value, with the objective of securing the 
organisation's information against leaks. Although the composition and 
signing of confidentiality agreements is essential, one has to consider that 
Social Engineers usually manage to extract information from their targets 
through indirect methods that leave the target thinking that nothing wrong was 
done. As such, the target will probably not even think of the signed 
confidentiality agreement while divulging sensitive information during a SE 
attack. 
 
In section 6.1.6 "Contact with authorities" is discussed. The objective is to 
maintain contact with relevant authorities so that these can be contacted in an 
orderly manner when an IS incident demands it. In the context of SE, care 
must be taken in order to avoid "reverse sting" operations. If such a method is 
employed by the attacker, the victim of the SE attack may end up calling the 
Social Engineer for help, while sincerely believing that the call is placed to a 
legitimate authority. For this reason, liaison with the authorities that may need 
to be contacted during a crisis situation must be established and maintained 
long before a crisis arises. It would also be preferable for personal relations to 
be maintained between the organisation's employee(s) assigned with the task 
of contacting authorities and the authorities' officers assigned with receiving 
such calls. Any deviation from the standard procedures such as claims from 
an unknown individual that he/she is replacing the person usually in charge 
should be looked upon suspiciously. Furthermore, calls should always 
originate from the organisation's side. Even when calls are initiated from the 
authorities' side, the called party within the organisation should hang up and 
call back the authority's assigned liaison officer at the authority's known 
telephone number.      
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For the directives of section 6.1.7 "Contact with special interest groups" an 
attitude similar to the one described above must be maintained. As advisories, 
patches and offered executables expected from a special interest group may 
be spoofed and successfully cloak preparatory stages of a SE attack, all such 
material must be scrutinised for suspect content. Mechanisms must be in 
place for confirming the source and validity of all material that is to be 
incorporated in any form in the production or operational phases of the IT 
system or relevant procedures. 
 
Regarding section 6.1.8 "Independent review of information security", the 
reviews must always take into consideration SE methods of operation and 
help control vulnerabilities related to them. Given the indirect nature of SE, 
this is not an easy task but it is an essential one nevertheless and ability to 
identify such problem areas should be included in the list of "appropriate skills 
and experience" of the individuals carrying out the reviews. 
 
In the introductory section 6.2 "External parties", the objective of this security 
category is stated as: "To maintain the security of the organization’s 
information and information processing facilities that are accessed, 
processed, communicated to, or managed by external parties". When a party 
external to the organisation gains for any reason justified access to the 
organisation's information facilities or even the information itself, the IS level 
of the organisation must not be compromised in any way. This category 
proposes controls for external parties and dealing with customers and also 
examines appropriate third party agreements. 
 
Insofar SE is concerned, the main issue in all cases is that the organisation no 
longer has to worry only for SE attacks being mounted against its own 
employees, but to employees of collaborating parties also. Dealing with the 
possibility of SE attacks is quite difficult within the organisation. When the 
security perimeter is expanded to include entities other than the ones 
immediately and directly controlled, the difficulty augments. As there is no 
exact yardstick by which to measure the effectiveness of SE controls, it is 
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practically impossible to ascertain that an external party is at least as effective 
as the main organisation against SE attacks. Furthermore, it is reasonable to 
assume that there will be serious impediments in relaying information 
regarding IS incidents between the external parties and the main organisation. 
To begin with, the IS incident reporting structures of the main organisation 
and that of the external party must interface efficiently. This is something that 
may sound easy in theory and look good on paper but is quite difficult to 
implement in practice, due to many reasons, most of which are non-technical. 
If an IS incident that compromises the main organisation's data takes place 
within the security perimeter controlled by the external party, the external 
party's response would be to attempt a cover-up rather than admit the 
compromise and risk losing the benefits of the collaboration with the main 
organisation. Depending on the gravity and extent of the incident, if the 
incident is promptly contained and does not get out of control, the external 
party will not readily admit to the problem. Even if legal clauses are in place to 
oblige the external party to relay IS incident information, in all but the most 
extreme cases, the external party can always claim that there was no notice 
of the incident. In the author's mind there is no solution other than ensuring 
that external access to information takes place on the strictest need-to-know 
basis for the external party, their access to the information facilities is as 
limited as possible, and most importantly that the main organisation receives 
enough assurances for the level of resistance against SE attacks of the 
external party. Even if the external party is certified to the strictest of security 
standards, resistance against SE attacks is not warranted. Applying the 
controls of sections 6.2.1, 6.2.2 and 6.2.3 is certainly required, but an audit 
geared towards identifying SE-related vulnerabilities of the external party 
structure may be called-for prior to any major undertaking that demands 
access of the external party to the main organisation's sensitive information. 
In this case, it is only the level of criticality of the information that will ultimately 
dictate if such an approach is deemed mandatory.  
 
C.3. Section 7 - Asset Management  
Relevant security categories: 
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• Responsibility for assets 
• Information classification 
 
Section 7 of ISO 17799 covers the identification and protection of 
organisational assets (section 7.1 of ISO 17799) and ensures that the level of 
protection of information is appropriately set (section 7.2 of ISO 17799) 
through the classification of information. 
 
Sections 7.1.1 "Inventory of assets" and 7.1.2 "Ownership of assets" are not 
directly related to the effort against SE attacks but are essential in maintaining 
the overall level of security and indirectly affect the organisation's posture with 
respect to SE.  
 
Section 7.1.1 deals with the cataloguing of all organisation assets including 
information assets, software assets, physical assets, service, people and 
intangible assets. Under the light of SE, some assets readily stand out, 
including information assets such as "system documentation, research 
information, user manuals, training material, operational or support 
procedures", and physical assets such as "computer equipment, 
communications equipment, removable media". Regarding information assets, 
the inventory taken is a very important first step in adequately protecting 
information that may otherwise be inappropriately disposed of and find its way 
into the hands of Social Engineers through "dumpster diving" or otherwise. 
Having accounted for every piece of important information asset, the 
classification of the asset can then be decided upon, the asset tracked 
accordingly throughout its useful life and at the end of it be properly disposed 
of. Even seemingly unimportant information assets such as internal telephone 
lists, organisation charts and even business calendars should be included in 
the inventories as these may provide important information for the Social 
Engineer. As far as physical assets are concerned, cataloguing these 
provides an essential starting point for their protection. Given the value of the 
information that is being handled, physical assets can even include floppy 
disks, recordable or re-writeable optical media etc. In cases where such 
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media have to be used for the transfer of highly-classified information, these 
media must definitely be uniquely identified and clearly marked for "classified 
use only". They must be meticulously tracked, and the information on them 
must be safely deleted before re-use as required. All this must be carried out 
throughout their useful, classified life. At their end-of-life they must be 
"sanitised" whereby sanitisation is defined by the U.S. National Institute of 
Standards and Technology in NIST Special Publication 800-88 (2006, p. ix) as 
"the general process of removing data from storage media, such that there is 
reasonable assurance that the data may not be easily retrieved and 
reconstructed".  Following sanitisation, the media may be disposed of 
according to a specified procedure that leaves no room for a Social Engineer 
(or any other entity) to take advantage of them.  
 
At first glance, section 7.1.1 seems to have been written with disaster 
recovery and business continuity in mind. However, the principles of taking 
inventory of all assets important to the organisation are essential to the day-
to-day operation and protection of the organisation. Furthermore, inventory 
alone does not suffice for adequate protection. Assets must be assigned to 
individuals or entities that are responsible for their management and security. 
Also, assets must themselves be classified according to the classification 
level of the information contained in them. These aspects are covered in 
sections 7.1.2 and 7.2 of ISO 17799. 
 
In section 7.1.2 "Ownership of assets", the nature of "ownership" of assets is 
defined, along with the responsibilities of the individual(s) to whom  
"ownership" is assigned. This does not directly deal with SE, but as assets of 
importance are assigned to "owners" and custodians who are responsible for 
their security, it becomes harder for Social Engineers to extract sensitive 
information from the assets.  
 
Section 7.1.3 "Acceptable use of assets" defines the need for the existence of 
"rules for the acceptable use of information and assets associated with 
information processing facilities" such as, but not limited to, usage of mobile 
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devices, electronic mail and the Internet. Once again, such rules may not 
effectively block a SE attack but may be able to hinder one if guidelines such 
as "report any attempt of email contact regarding the present status of the IT 
system or offers for upgrades thereof" are in place. 
 
Section 7.2.1 "Classification guidelines" supplies the basic directives for 
correctly and consistently classifying information "in terms of its value, legal 
requirements, sensitivity, and criticality to the organization". 
Again, whilst classification is not directly associated with the defense against 
SE, it is an important step in that direction. In association with section 7.2.2 
"Information labeling and handling" the classification of information, should 
clearly appear on physical entities such as documents, CD-ROM disks, hard 
disks etc in the form of labels, as well as unambiguously accompany all 
information in electronic form. The combination of these two controls helps the 
user not to inadvertently mishandle information that ends up in the hands of 
the Social Engineer. For example, a printed list containing all names, phone 
numbers and the positions of the Organisation's employees, will find its way 
with greater difficulty to the dumpster outside the organisation's premises if it 
is clearly labeled as "confidential" on its cover. Furthermore, if the label 
"confidential" appears on the top right and bottom left corners of all pages of 
the list, an employee under attack by a Social Engineer may think twice 
before relinquishing the telephone numbers of fellow employees to the 
attacker. A catchphrase warning against SE attacks like "Do you REALLY 
know who you're giving this information to?" that is printed under the 
classification label will also help against SE attacks. Hence, although the 
directives concerning the labeling of classified information, as described in 
section 7.2.2 of ISO 17799, are technically complete, it might be a good idea 
to add secondary labeling with phrases against SE or ones that remind users 
of the proper way to dispose material of that classification, or even that the 
material has been signed-for and must be returned to its owner. 
 
There are two more issues that need to be discussed while on the subject of 
classification:  
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First, in critical environments all information-carrying material should bear 
appropriate labeling, even if that is "Public". This will do away with the risk of a 
user forgetting to add appropriate classification to a document that he/she 
composes and, subsequently, its recipient assuming that the document is not 
sensitive as it does not bear a classification label. The proper procedure 
would thus call for the administrative personnel handling the unlabeled 
document or its recipient, to assume that the document is by default sensitive, 
to not process it any further and contact the originator for a corrected version 
bearing a classification label.  
 
Second, care must be taken not to overclassify information. Although 
classifying information seemingly provides an easy road to security, this is all 
but true. Every time a document is overclassified, it puts serious strain on the 
information-handling system, on both its human and technical components. 
When wrongly classifying a document that should be Public, automatically, 
resource-draining procedures for its handling and disposal switch into gear. 
When a low-classification sensitive document is given a higher-than-should-
be classification, the above procedures become by default more stringent and 
thus require even more resources. This mirrors the continual tug-o-war 
between security and availability and great care should be taken to have an 
overall balanced system that serves its purpose without bleeding the 
resources of the organisation. Furthermore, if classification is unduly used, it 
looses its meaning and the whole classification scheme becomes transparent 
in the eyes of the employees, its purpose ultimately forfeited. Such conditions 
create confusion and lead to a higher probability of successful SE attacks. As 
it is very difficult to provide an objective yardstick by which to measure the 
importance of the information and thus provide an accurate and consistent 
classification assignment, perhaps the most efficient way to control 
overclassification abuse would be to centrally monitor the classification of 
documents (through random sampling or otherwise) and issue warnings to 
documents' originators when such an abuse takes place consistently. Based 
on the organisation's particular security needs, even quotas and counter-
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incentives could be devised to control overclassification abuse.  
 
C.4. Section 8 - Human Resources Security  
Relevant security categories: 
• Prior to employment 
• During employment  
• Termination or change of employment 
 
Section 8 of ISO 17799 a) deals with the necessary pre-employment checks 
of new employees, contractors and third-party users who need to be properly 
screened, sign appropriate agreements and be assigned security 
responsibilities (section 8.1 of ISO 17799), b) provides controls to ensure that 
all of the above entities follow the security directives relevant to their positions 
(section 8.2 of ISO 17799) and c) provides directives so that the termination 
or change of employment of the above entities is security-wise managed in an 
orderly and controlled manner (section 8.3 of ISO 17799). It is also important 
to note that the term employment, in the context of section 8, is meant to: 
"cover all of the following different situations: employment of people 
(temporary or longer lasting), appointment of job roles, changing of job roles, 
assignment of contracts, and the termination of any of these arrangements".  
  
The control in section 8.1.1 "Roles and responsibilities" is described as 
"Security roles and responsibilities of employees, contractors and third party 
users should be defined and documented in accordance with the 
organization’s information security policy". Furthermore it is stated that these 
roles and responsibilities should be clearly presented to prospective 
employees during the pre-employment processes. This in fact "jumpstarts" the 
candidate's security training and allows the candidate to either accept the 
responsibilities assigned to him by taking the job or refuse to be part of the 
rest of the selection process. Although this is not strictly SE-related, it helps 
by allowing entry only to individuals who have a descent understanding of 
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security and are thus closer to the goal which is none other than to resist SE 
attacks.  
 
This control is extended to the employee's of collaborating third-parties. This 
immediately brings to the surface the inherent difficulty of applying the 
organisation's security policy and directives to entities foreign to the 
organisation. This can certainly constitute a problem as it is difficult to have 
pre-employment processes that are security-wise equivalent among the 
collaborating parties. The pre-employment process and its security 
requirements has a lot to do with the job description itself. To illustrate this 
issue one must consider the real-life situation of an organisation, say a 
software house, that uses a contractor for cleaning and housekeeping 
services. There are significant differences between the personnel directly 
employed by the organisation and the employees of the contractor. The 
academic level of the people directly employed by the organisation is much 
higher than that of contractor's employees. Hence, directly-employed 
personnel are much better adapted to recognise the need for security and 
thus follow security directives. Additionally, chances are that people who are 
directly-employed are career-oriented and will take their security 
responsibilities much more seriously, as their job and future depends on 
upholding them, than the predominantly unskilled people who work for the 
contractor. The contractor's employees may be used to moving between jobs 
often and might even accept the trade-off between being on a continual state 
of alertness on one hand and risking their employment on the other.   
Another issue relevant to SE is that due to the significant differences between 
the employment processes of organisations and their contractors, an attacker 
may choose to infiltrate his/her target organisation by getting employed by 
one of the organisation's contractors. 
 
A possible defense against contractor-related intrusion might be to require the 
contractor to provide a steady group of employees that handle the 
organisation's subcontracted affairs. This should be applied in addition to all 
other directives appearing in 8.1.1 and must not function in the direction of 
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allowing any other measure to lax. Any changes in the group must be 
communicated to the organisation and agreed upon in advance and the new 
member(s) of the group be fully informed on their responsibilities regarding 
the organisation's security. Furthermore, the organisation should be in a 
position to demand a person's replacement on security grounds if just cause 
is presented. 
 
The control presented in section 8.1.2 "Screening" calls for "Background 
verification checks on all candidates for employment, contractors, and third 
party users should be carried out in accordance with relevant laws, 
regulations and ethics, and proportional to the business requirements, the 
classification of the information to be accessed, and the perceived risks". It is 
furthermore clarified that the implementation guidance supplied must be 
extended to include subcontractors and third-party employees. From a SE 
point of view, and continuing on the discussion of control 8.1.1 above, the 
screening of contractors and third-party employees, must be ensured to be 
equivalent to that practiced for direct employees, or else a lateral route to 
mount an attack against the organisation may indeed be exploited. 
 
Control 8.1.3 " Terms and conditions of employment" asks for signed 
agreements regarding IS and in particular states: "As part of their contractual 
obligation, employees, contractors and third party users should agree and 
sign the terms and conditions of their employment contract, which should 
state their and the organization’s responsibilities for information security". 
Although very important and indubitably legally binding, controls based on 
signed agreements offer little protection against the guile of a Social Engineer. 
Even though necessary, such a control may only become effective if the 
signing parties and/or their employees have a solid understanding of the 
notion of IS and are in a position to identify an attack, not yield to it and, 
furthermore, raise an alarm. The first condition may be met only through 
security education and the second through the achievement of a seamless 
security mentality throughout the collaborating parties. To this effect, efficient 
Detailed examination of the ISO/IEC 17779:2005 IS standard with respect to SE  
 
 
Appendix C   251   
communication paths regarding security must be in place and functioning 
between the parties. Section 8.2 attempts to address these issues. 
 
The control described in 8.2.1 "Management responsibilities" states that 
"Management should require employees, contractors and third party users to 
apply security in accordance with established policies and procedures of the 
organization". This calls for security education, definition of security 
expectations, proper motivation towards applying security, security awareness 
and application of the defined IS policy. Perhaps the most important aspect of 
this control regarding SE is offered in the "other information" section of the 
control where it states that: "If employees, contractors and third party users 
are not made aware of their security responsibilities, they can cause 
considerable damage to an organization. Motivated personnel are likely to be 
more reliable and cause less information security incidents". This is indeed 
the most important statement of the control as it deals with the fact that 
uninformed or unmotivated personnel with respect to security are more 
susceptible to SE attacks. Also important is the next paragraph which 
underlines the role of Management in building the self-esteem of employees 
as "Poor management may cause personnel to feel undervalued resulting in a 
negative security impact to the organisation". Such negative feelings may well 
lead to security being neglected and thus making the organisation more 
vulnerable to SE attacks.  
 
Control 8.2.2 "Information Security awareness, education and training" 
constitutes, in the mind of the author, the cornerstone of building effective 
defenses against SE. In this control all the prerequisites for allowing the 
organisation's employees to stand up against the Social Engineer, exist. It is 
in the hands of Management to provide training appropriate to the roles and 
responsibilities of individual employees. Through awareness programs, IS 
education and training, the self-esteem of employees regarding IS will also 
rise and combined with hands-on experience and knowledge may make them 
key contributors to the PDCA cycle.  
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Working in the same direction as the motivation of employees towards 
upholding security, counter-incentives such as disciplinary procedures when 
security breaches occur must be in place. This is dealt with in control 8.2.3 
"Disciplinary process". That control states that "there should be a formal 
disciplinary process for employees who have committed a security breach" 
and goes on to add that "the disciplinary process should also be used as a 
deterrent to prevent employees, contractors and third party users in violating 
organizational security policies and procedures, and any other security 
breaches". However, it is the opinion of this author that as far as "defending 
the perimeter" against SE attacks is concerned, this may work in the opposite 
direction, such as discouraging employees from coming forth and reporting 
such an attack. Given the modus operandi of Social Engineers, and assuming 
that an employee has indeed been lulled into a false sense of security and 
has released sensitive information to the attacker, if the victim later realises 
what has transpired, he/she may decide not to admit to the inadvertent breach 
of security out of fear of repercussions. This hesitation, however, may allow 
the attacker enough space to move on with the next phase of the attack. 
Hence, as an improvement to this control, provisions must be made so that 
the victims of SE attacks are not disciplined for reporting the incident, but 
instead be commended.  
 
The controls of section 8.3 all deal with the orderly management of the 
termination or change of employment of direct employees and those of 
subcontractors and third-parties. All three controls described, "Termination 
responsibilities", "Return of assets" and "Removal of access rights" all have 
the dual goal of ensuring that departing employees and/or subcontractors a) 
do not possess information belonging to the organisation or access rights to 
that information and b) that all specialised know-how held by departing 
personnel, that is essential for the organisation's business continuation, is 
properly transferred to the organisation. From a SE point of view, these 
controls are crucial as Social Engineers may decide to attack the organisation 
indirectly by targeting personnel members that are known to possess 
information vital to their goal. As an added measure, the signed confidentiality 
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agreements between the organisation and its employees, subcontractors or 
third parties should continue to hold even after the termination of employment. 
In the case of change of employment, assuming that the sets of terms of the 
confidentiality agreements are differentiated for the previous and current 
assignments, it should be obvious that the employee / subcontractor / third-
party must continue to be bound by the union of the sets of applicable terms 
of the previous and current agreements.  
 
One case that must be approached with extreme care is that of terminating 
disgruntled employees or unilaterally interrupting contracts with 
subcontractors and third-parties. In that case, extreme measures may have to 
be taken to ensure that the departing entity may not inflict any damage to the 
organisation by compromising the confidentiality, integrity and availability of 
the organisation's information. In order to accomplish such a task, appropriate 
managerial and technical controls must be in place. These controls must be 
centrally managed, in order to enable Administration to swiftly sever all 
contact with the terminated party and deny the party all access to the 
organisation's information and resources. Physical and remote access to the 
organisation's installations and information resources must be terminated 
immediately upon or even prior to the party's notification of termination. All 
organisation assets (from ID badges to company cars and equipment) must 
immediately be repossessed by company personnel, even if the terminated 
party must be accompanied to another location in order to return the asset(s). 
To this effect, a list of all assets in use of personnel must be kept and 
continually updated to reflect the current situation. From a SE perspective, 
any assets or access capability that remain with the disgruntled party may be 
used by the party to mount an attack that employs SE methods. Such an 
attack will have a high probability of success as the attacker possesses not 
only the supporting means to mount it, but also the insider knowledge to 
successfully carry it out.  
 
C.5. Section 9 - Physical and Environmental Security  
Relevant security categories: 
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• Secure areas  
• Equipment security 
 
Section 9 of ISO 17799 deals with the prevention of a) "unauthorized physical 
access, damage, and interference to the organization’s premises and 
information" (section 9.1 of ISO 17799) and b) "loss, damage, theft or 
compromise of assets and interruption to the organization’s activities" (section 
9.2 of ISO 17799). 
 
Control 9.1.1 "Physical security perimeter" states that "Security perimeters 
(barriers such as walls, card controlled entry gates or manned reception 
desks) should be used to protect areas that contain information and 
information processing facilities". The implementation guidance includes the 
definition of the security perimeter(s), the use of locks, alarms and other 
technical measures such as intruder detection systems, as well as 
considerations regarding the physical location of information processing 
installations.     
 
In conjunction to control 9.1.1, control 9.1.2 "Physical entry controls" proposes 
guidelines to ensure that only properly authorised personnel gain access to 
secure areas, through appropriate entry controls. These guidelines include 
visitors' entry and departure logging, card readers to allow access to sensitive 
areas, access logs for auditing purposes, visible identification badges for 
visitors, restricted access for support personnel etc.  
 
There is certainly no doubt that the guidelines presented in controls 9.1.1 and 
9.1.2 will lead to the implementation of a secure perimeter where only 
authorised individuals will gain access if all the security requirements are 
always met. However, a Social Engineer does not attempt to forcibly break 
into the secure perimeter. The Social Engineer will always try to "slide" in by 
convincing those people controlling the perimeter that entry should rightfully 
be allowed to him/her. The rich bibliography on the methods employed by 
Social Engineers to penetrate perimeter security stands as proof that Social 
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Engineers can indeed bypass security systems by exploiting the human 
factor. There should thus be two methods to warn-off the danger of a SE 
attack: a) strengthen the human factor to the point that it is not exploitable or, 
at least, that it is more difficult to exploit and b) implement such technical 
measures and practices that even when the human factor is assumed to be 
exploitable, the intrusion of an individual employing SE methods becomes 
more difficult or is detected as early as possible, at the very least.  
 
"Strengthening of the human factor" with respect to upholding the physical 
perimeter can only take place through education and controlled exposure to 
SE threats (via appropriate penetration testing or otherwise) as well as 
through the implementation of psychological techniques to build defenses 
against the psychological methods employed by Social Engineers.  
 
Technical measures function better against SE attacks as the human factor is 
progressively removed from being a pre-requisite for their operation. 
(Hopefully this will become clearer in the discussion that follows). It is 
assumed that a system requiring a card/PIN combination for entry and/or 
access to sensitive areas is already in place, and that security officers are 
physically present at the main gates. Ways of intrusion that are used to 
circumvent the existing system (for example, employee in distress, heavily-
laden delivery person, following another employee in and others) must thus 
be efficiently catered-for.  
 
The "manned reception area" proposed in guideline 9.1.1(c), will have little 
effect if the actual entry point is not within a few meters of the reception post. 
If the distance is not great, the security officer manning the post may 
efficiently check the identity of the people entering after presenting their 
badges to a reader. This can only be possible if at the time that a person uses 
his/her card, a clear facial picture of the authorised card holder appears on 
the monitor in front of the security officer for comparison. 
Furthermore, if in doubt regarding the employee's identity, the security officer 
must have a means of blocking the entry to the individual before he/she 
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enters the building. To this end, a two-door scheme may be implemented. In 
this implementation, the employee should present his/her card to the reader of 
the first door, enter and then have to pass through a second door a few steps 
away that would normally simply yield to a push, unless remotely locked by 
the security officer.     
 
This system may also provide an effective means of preventing "tailgating" or 
"piggy-backing" (terms used to describe a situation where an unauthorised 
person follows an authorised employee into the secure perimeter). If tailgating 
is the only concern, a simpler method of entry control may be implemented 
through the use of three-bar turnstiles that strictly allow only one person per 
card presentation to pass.  
 
The security officers manning the reception area must have strict orders to not 
allow entry to any individual by bypassing the security measures. It could be 
argued that a solution to this problem might be to have the system not allow a 
security bypass of the authentication procedure for granting entry. However, 
in real-world terms, an emergency bypass must be a security officer's 
prerogative in order to deal with a variety of situations. An attempt should thus 
be made to diminish the chance of a Social Engineer conning the security 
officer into initiating a bypass. First of all, emergency bypasses should be 
identified by the system and logged, preferably with video information also. 
Such logs should regularly be reviewed and potential threats identified. In 
order to initiate an emergency bypass, the security officer should have to use 
his/her own authentication token and PIN code. Furthermore, the procedure 
could involve a second officer -a supervisor for example- to concur by 
presenting his ID token to the system.  
 
Guideline 9.1.2(c) demands that "all employees, contractors and third party 
users and all visitors should be required to wear some form of visible 
identification and should immediately notify security personnel if they 
encounter unescorted visitors and anyone not wearing visible identification". 
While this may sound very nice in theory, in practice one is dealing with the 
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deepest folds of the human psyche. People, in their majority, do not like 
"blowing the whistle" on other people or, worse, challenging them themselves. 
On the contrary, they want to be liked by and be helpful to others. While 
special ID cards should indeed be issued to and be worn by visitors, they do 
not provide much protection in the sense that the ISO 17799 author means 
them to. The reason for this is that for the scheme to work, the human factor 
must again be dialed in. Visual confirmation that a visitor is indeed wearing a 
visitor badge offers to the person making the confirmation nothing more than 
the assurance that the visitor has been registered at the front desk. 
Furthermore, low-tech ID badges can easily be counterfeited to at least fool a 
casual observer. If the average employee finds it difficult to challenge a visitor 
who is not wearing an ID badge, it will be close to impossible to challenge a 
visitor on the grounds of the authenticity of the ID badge that the visitor is 
wearing! 
 
In order to remove the human factor from this procedure, technical measures 
must be employed to confirm that a visitor is where he/she is supposed to be 
and not elsewhere. This is especially true in those cases where access to the 
public is essential to the organisation's operation and accompanying visitors is 
impractical. Such an application of technical measures can be achieved fairly 
easily by installing a centrally managed access-control system of networked 
card reader-controlled doors and elevators. Assuming that the building is 
served by a number of elevators that let people out on a foyer area for each 
floor, different departments on the floor may have different card reader-
controlled entrances. When a visitor presents a valid ID card and states 
his/her destination at the reception desk, he/she is issued a temporary 
badge/ID card. With the data presented, the installed access-control system is 
programmed by the security officer manning the desk, to allow the visitor 
access to a designated path only that leads to the visitor's destination and 
back. In that sense, only pre-designated doorways will open following the 
presentation of the visitor's badge/ID card. Those not designated to open will 
not do so but, instead, record the attempt and relay it to the central control 
system. Such events may be used to trigger a warning or alarm at the central 
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security desk. Accordingly, a token-reader in the elevator will either allow the 
visitor to press only the floor button relevant to his/her visit, or even 
automatically make that press for him/her. Furthermore, assuming that the 
badge/ID card is based around or contains an RFID device, proximity arches 
along the corridors or at designated (manned or unmanned) checkpoints, may 
log the route that the visitor is following. This could even provide a 
countermeasure in case the visitor takes advantage of another elevator 
passenger's key press to exit the elevator at a non-designated floor. Thus, 
any deviation from the visitor's pre-designated path or unjustifiable delay 
during his/her visit may be programmed to trigger an alarm.  This alarm 
combined with the presence of security officers in the building that warrants a 
prompt response, will give a very small window of opportunity to a potential 
attacker.  
 
Regarding escorting visitors (a point also made in 9.1.2(c) ), this is something 
that even though constitutes a pre-requisite for any security policy, gets very 
easily overlooked. This is especially true when the visitor is someone who -
without being a contractor and thus not being bound by any relevant 
agreements- often has a legitimate reason to visit the organisation's premises. 
After a while employees usually become accustomed to seeing that individual 
move unescorted. It is exactly that gray area between a one-time visitor that 
no one recognises and an authorised (and thus screened) collaborating third-
party member that may be taken advantage of by a Social Engineer. Again, a 
logged-access system that covers the whole building such as the one 
described above, may prove to be a useful tool in the security effort.   
 
Delivery personnel fall under the same general category of unescorted visitors 
moving inside a secure perimeter. For many reasons, items need to be 
delivered to the recipient in person and not be left with the security desk. 
Although stricter delivery procedures may require a security officer to sign for  
a larger percentage of the incoming items irrespective of who the final 
recipient is, the problem of a courier insisting on immediate delivery to the 
recipient will always surface. Tracking the courier using the principles 
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described above throughout his/her visit to the building may provide a 
solution. Alternatively, it could be defined that all delivery personnel making 
deliveries must be escorted, without exceptions, by a security officer, or that 
the recipients of the items being delivered must always collect them in person 
from a common area outside the secure perimeter.  
 
Remaining on the issue of "visible identification", usually, most badges/ID 
cards include a picture of their authorised bearer. There is no point of having 
this picture on the badge if the picture is small, dark, out of focus, badly 
printed or has faded with time. If an employee must wear spectacles in order 
to closely examine another employee's badge, then this will simply not 
happen. Such badges may be sufficient for front-desk identification when the 
badge must be presented to the security officer performing the control, but are 
totally insufficient for the casual control that guideline 9.1.2(c) calls for. If the 
badge photographs are to be of any use in that respect, they must be of good 
quality and large enough to be clearly recognisable from a distance of 2 
meters. As visitors' badges can not have a photograph of the bearer included, 
colour-coding of the badge may be used to identify which area of the building 
the visitor is allowed to visit. Furthermore, visitor badges should bear the 
same colour on both sides. Thus, a badge can not "accidentally" be turned on 
its neutrally-coloured side to confuse control. Hence, an out-of-place visitor 
may be swiftly identified and pointed out to security. Such specifications may 
call for badges/ID cards of a larger format and most probably more expensive 
to produce, but are essential if the badge characteristics are not to be used as 
a tool in a SE attack. 
 
Control 9.1.3 "Securing offices, rooms and facilities" provides guidance that is 
very important in the fight against SE as it attempts to remove those elements 
that a Social Engineer may use to secure his/her goal. Guideline 9.1.3(b) calls 
for "key facilities should be sited to avoid access by the public". This is very 
important as the attacker may otherwise pretend to be lost or misdirected if 
caught. Furthermore, by exhibiting a little well-mannered naivete, the attacker 
may get away with the attempted breach without raising any alarms. When an 
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attacker finds him/herself successfully within the secure perimeter he/she 
must be able to swiftly identify the next target. To this end, any information 
regarding the "what and where" of the surroundings is essential. By depriving 
the attacker from such information, more obstacles are placed in the way of a 
successful SE attack. To this end, guideline 9.1.3(c) can offer significant aid: 
"where applicable, buildings should be unobtrusive and give minimum 
indication of their purpose, with no obvious signs, outside or inside the 
building identifying the presence of information processing activities". 
Indubitably, phone directories can offer a wealth of information to the Social 
Engineer. Hence, these documents would be something of a prize for the 
attacker who has already managed to get inside the security perimeter. This is 
the reason behind guideline 9.1.3(d) that states: "directories and internal 
telephone books identifying locations of sensitive information processing 
facilities should not be readily accessible by the public". To this guideline one 
might add that there should not be any unattended telephone sets in publicly 
accessible places that an attacker might use to extract information from 
unsuspecting employees. The targeted employees would have no indication 
whatsoever that the person calling them from a telephone extension from 
within the organisation is, in reality, an attacker.  Another useful addition 
would be that bulletin and notice boards must not be present in public access 
areas. As these may carry personal or organisational data, they might provide 
a Social Engineer with morsels of information that help him/her substantiate 
his/her claims.  
 
Control 9.1.4 "Protecting against external and environmental threats" deals 
with physical protection against natural and man-made disasters. Although 
not directly related to SE attacks, an attacker might intentionally trigger an 
alarm system in an effort to cause a diversion. This would give the attacker an 
opportunity to either proceed with his/her plan in vacant offices, or allow 
him/herself to leave the premises undetected in the general confusion if no 
other way is safely available, or escape imminent discovery as security 
personnel will be diverted to co-ordinate the evacuation following an alarm. 
Hence, in the case of an alarm going off that requires the evacuation of a 
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building, all occupants must be assembled in a controlled secure area (muster 
area) at a safe distance from the building and accounted for. (Data from the 
control access system may help in the accounting of evacuees). Care must be 
taken not to allow individuals remain behind or re-enter the building, both for 
their safety and for security reasons. Security must be aware of any 
individuals leaving the building long after the rest of the people were 
evacuated. In such an event, the late evacuee must be securely identified and 
the reasons for his/her delay be fully justified. This event should be dealt with 
as a potential security breach and logged appropriately at the security 
incident-reporting center. Following evacuation particular attention must be 
paid to evacuated visitors who should have their IDs re-confirmed before 
being allowed to leave the muster area.   
 
Control 9.1.5 "Working in secure areas" calls for physical protection and 
guidelines for working in secure areas. The guidelines presented here apply 
to employees, subcontractors and collaborating third-party employees and 
cover four major areas of security that, although not designed with SE 
exclusively in mind, may play a major role in relation to SE attacks. Guideline 
9.1.5(a) stresses that secure areas and activities related to those areas 
should be covered by the "need-to-know" principle. This minimises the 
possibility of information regarding secure areas being disclosed to attackers 
by unsuspecting employees. Guidelines 9.1.5(b) and 9.1.5(c) respectively 
suggest that work in secure areas should be supervised and that vacant 
secure areas should be locked and monitored. If implemented, these two 
guidelines will definitely place yet more obstacles in the way of the attacker 
who has already penetrated the outer perimeter. Finally, guideline 9.1.5(d) 
proposes that recording devices of every form should not be allowed on the 
premises. Barring such devices from the secure perimeter is quite difficult 
given the current miniaturisation of such equipment. However, it is very 
important to attempt to control their use, as video recording devices may very 
effectively be used in the preparatory phases of a SE attack. Such use could 
include capturing location data useful for analysis before the major offensive 
takes place. Even during the offensive, recording devices in mobile phones or 
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other mobile equipment may be used to store sensitive data and thus 
smuggle it out of the organisation's premises. 
 
All of the guidelines presented in control 9.1.6 "Public access, delivery, and 
loading areas" aim at minimising the general risk involved in allowing 
unauthorised persons to enter the secure perimeter and/or to come in contact 
with authorised personnel. For SE attackers in particular, this takes away their 
opportunity to invade the organisation by taking advantage of an area where 
the security measures are by default relaxed. It is fairly easy to penetrate 
through such a loading area as the organisation employees working there 
may assume that the person unknown to them is a member of the delivery 
company's party and vice-versa. In addition to that, no one will turn down a 
helping hand when the work is physically intense. To this end, a security 
officer may be necessary to supervise the procedures and work with the 
foreman of the delivery party to positively identify all members of the delivery 
crew.  
 
Control 9.2.1 "Equipment siting and protection" states that "Equipment should 
be sited or protected to reduce the risks from environmental threats and 
hazards, and opportunities for unauthorized access". With regards to SE, 
guidelines 9.2.1(a) "equipment should be sited to minimize unnecessary 
access into work areas" and 9.2.1(b) "information processing facilities 
handling sensitive data should be positioned and the viewing angle restricted 
to reduce the risk of information being viewed by unauthorized persons during 
their use, and storage facilities secured to avoid unauthorized access" should 
be able on their own to ward off the SE technique of "shoulder surfing". 
Through careful placement of equipment and by being aware of their 
surroundings, employees at work may thus effectively prevent an attacker 
from casually observing their monitors and keyboards. Technical measures 
can also be employed such as special filters that limit the viewing angle of 
computer monitors. The rest of the guidance in this section mostly deals with 
the physical protection of equipment and there is also one last guideline to 
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avoid interception of sensitive information due to equipment emanations 
(electromagnetic or other).  
      
Control 9.2.2 "Supporting utilities" deals with the necessity of protecting 
equipment against failures in supporting utilities. To the guidance presented in 
this section it should be added that the supporting utilities should themselves 
be well protected against intrusion to the maximum extent. If the installations 
of the supporting utilities are not within the secure perimeter, they may be 
targeted by a Social Engineer, in an attempt either to cause a diversion by 
means of the ensuing disorder or to mount a "sting" operation in which the 
attacked will turn to the attacker for help and support. 
 
Control 9.2.3 "Cabling security" continues in the same mentality as 9.2.1 and 
9.2.2 by offering adequate protection for cables of all sorts and types. 
Regarding SE attacks, unprotected cabling can be interfered with to mount a 
"sting" operation or attach devices in critical points to eavesdrop or inject 
modified signals to serve the attacker's purpose.  
 
Control 9.2.4 "Equipment maintenance" ensures the equipment's 
uninterrupted availability and integrity. It is of paramount importance to 
ascertain that only previously screened and authorised personnel, either 
internal or external to the organisation, holding appropriate security clearance 
is allowed to carry out maintenance tasks. By implementing such controls, it 
will be virtually impossible for a Social Engineer to present all proper 
credentials and impersonate an authorised maintenance person.  
 
Control 9.2.5 "Security of equipment off-premises" deals with maintaining 
information security when equipment is taken outside the secure and 
controlled perimeter of the organisation.  
 
It goes without saying that when the object dealt with in the organisation calls 
for extremely sensitive information to be handled, the risk of taking and/or 
using equipment off-site can not be fully mitigated. For this purpose, classified 
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equipment must not be taken off-site for any reason except appropriately 
authorised official transportation and even in that case all necessary 
precautions must be taken to avoid loss of or damage to the equipment. 
Additionally, remotely working with highly classified data should be considered 
unacceptable unless through risk assessment and vulnerability mitigation has 
been carried out.  
 
For the majority of the cases though, where working outside the organisation's 
premises is allowed, official equipment may well be targeted by individuals 
seeking to gain access to the organisation's information. Equipment may be 
stolen and "shoulder surfing" in an unprotected, open to the public, 
environment is quite easy. When equipment is stolen, the material loss can be 
significant but even more important is the compromise of the information 
contained within the stolen equipment. Even that is relative though. If the theft 
is a random incident, then there is a chance that the information per se will not 
appear as valuable to the thief who will swiftly try to get rid of the hot property 
in his/her possession. In that case, the hard disk containing information will be 
re-formatted at some point and the original information cleared. In most 
cases, the person on the receiving end of the stolen equipment will neither 
have knowledge of the nature of information previously contained, nor attempt 
to reclaim it by using specialised software. There are cases though when the 
thief will try to extract personal sensitive information, such as credit card data 
etc, from the equipment. The worst case scenario though would be for the 
theft to not have occurred randomly but after careful planning, with the 
ultimate goal of gathering enough information from the stolen equipment to 
mount an attack against the organisation. In order to protect information from 
unauthorised access in cases where equipment is stolen -or even lost- there 
is only one way to do so and that is through the application of password 
protection and encryption techniques on critical data. Fortunately, there are 
many applications supporting such solutions available on the market today 
and even custom ones could be created if there is a justified need. Encryption 
techniques should thus be added to the guidelines of control 9.2.5 as an extra 
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measure capable of protecting information if the equipment falls into the 
wrong hands.  
 
When working in public areas, the user must be on the lookout for 
vulnerabilities that may compromise the security of the organisations' 
information. The user's choice of a location to work on a portable computer or 
even his/her posture while working may have a definite and significant effect 
on a potential attack attempt. Furthermore, resources that are available on 
that location, such as WiFi hotspots etc, should not be trusted. It is only 
recently that a new method of operation, which is now officially classified as a 
Social Engineering modus operandi, was identified (Thomson, 2006). The 
"Evil Twin" method as it was dubbed, uses fake wireless access points to 
steal personal information from unsuspecting users. The fake wireless access 
point is placed near a commercial hotspot and is given the same name as the 
original hotspot. Thinking that the original hotspot is serving him/her, the 
unsuspecting user logs-on to the fake hotspot. Subsequently, the generated 
traffic is monitored and recorded to extract personal information. Such 
installations were found in international airport lounges and there have even 
been reports of the victims' computers being remotely hacked. This is 
obviously a threat that would be rather difficult to implement within a secure 
perimeter but quite feasible to realise in a more security-wise relaxed 
environment. This proves that users can not be complacent regarding the 
secure use of their equipment. What can be a secure practice in one 
environment may prove to be quite the opposite in another.  
 
Control 9.2.6 "Secure disposal or re-use of equipment" enforces removal or 
safe-deletion of sensitive data and software contained in equipment that is to 
be disposed of or re-used. It is imperative to sanitise equipment for disposal 
or use a secure deletion method for re-use as the data contained in the 
equipment may easily end up in the hands of a Social Engineer via the 
organisation's dumpster or through a recycling facility. To take things one step 
further, perhaps garbage or material for recycling should even be checked for 
security issues before being dumped. This should not apply to disposed 
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equipment only but to documents and anything else that might carry sensitive 
information. Re-use holds its own dangers as, after sanitisation, once 
classified equipment may be de-classified and put to good use in another part 
of the organisation where the classification of information and the level of 
security are lower. If sanitisation has not been carried out properly, sensitive 
data may eventually leak through unclassified channels.  
 
Control 9.2.7 "Removal of property" should logically precede control 9.2.5, as 
it defines under what circumstances, equipment, information or software 
should be taken off-site. By following precise procedures for removal of the 
above assets by positively identified and authorised personnel, a Social 
Engineer has fewer chances of getting away with removing such assets or 
convincing an employee to do this for him/her. Hence, this control is another 
step in the right direction in the fight against SE.  
 
C.6. Section 10 - Communications and Operations 
Management  
Relevant security categories: 
• Operational procedures and responsibilities 
• Third party service delivery management 
• System planning and acceptance 
• Protection against malicious and mobile code 
• Back-up 
• Network security management 
• Media handling 
• Exchange of information 
• Electronic commerce services 
• Monitoring 
 
Section 10 of ISO 17799 deals with a) the "correct and secure operation of 
information processing facilities" (section 10.1 of ISO 17799), b) the 
implementation and maintainance of the "appropriate level of information 
Detailed examination of the ISO/IEC 17779:2005 IS standard with respect to SE  
 
 
Appendix C   267   
security and service delivery in line with third party service delivery 
agreements" (section 10.2 of ISO 17799), c) minimising the risk of system 
failures (section 10.3 of ISO 17799), d) protecting the integrity of software and 
information (section 10.4 of ISO 17799), e) maintaining  "the integrity and 
availability of information and information processing facilities" (section 10.5 of 
ISO 17799), e) ensuring the "protection of information in networks and the 
protection of the supporting infrastructure" (section 10.6 of ISO 17799), f) 
preventing "unauthorized disclosure, modification, removal or destruction of 
assets, and interruption to business activities" (section 10.7 of ISO 17799), g) 
maintaining the "security of information and software exchanged within an 
organization and with any external entity" (section 10.8 of ISO 17799), h) 
ensuring the "security of electronic commerce services, and their secure use" 
(section 10.9 of ISO 17799) and i) detecting  "unauthorized information 
processing activities" (section 10.10 of ISO 17799). 
 
Control 10.1.1 "Documented operating procedures" calls for common 
procedures that are comprehended and followed by the employees involved 
in them. Obviously, documented procedures offer an elevated degree of 
protection from internal as well as external dangers and are thus indirectly 
related to SE attacks, but there are a few finer aspects described in the 
guidance offered in 10.1.1 that bear direct relation to SE. First, "mail handling 
management" is mentioned as being one of the procedures that need to be 
documented. This is important as a Social Engineer may target the mail room 
to remove mail items, insert new mail items or intercept and alter mail items. 
Organisation stationery can be stolen for later use, messages may be inserted 
to prepare the ground for the main attack etc. In guideline 10.1.1(e) it is stated 
that operating procedures should include "special output and media handling 
instructions, such as the use of special stationery or the management of 
confidential output including procedures for secure disposal of output from 
failed jobs". Failed job outputs that are not disposed of properly according to 
security regulations and the level of confidentiality of the information that they 
contain, may end up in the hands of the Social Engineer during "dumpster 
diving" missions. Even fragments of jobs that only contain partial information 
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can be of value in the context of a SE attack. Again, the matter of security-
wise control of disposed materials, would add to the level of protection of 
information. 10.1.1(e) asks for the documentation of the procedure for 
contacting support in case of unexpected operational or technical difficulties. 
This is very important in order to prevent "reverse sting" operations.  
 
Control 10.1.2 "Change management" speaks of the need for controlling any 
changes to information processing facilities and systems. If there is lack of 
such strict control, malicious software created by a hacker may find itself 
installed in an operational system. This can be accomplished in the context of 
a SE attack whereby the administrator/supervisor -or even a simple user in 
some cases- is convinced to install the software as a necessary patch, 
problem-solving solution etc.  
 
Through the "Segregation of duties" described in control 10.1.3, the risk of 
deliberate or accidental system misuse and/or compromise of information is 
reduced by ensuring that no single person can actually affect information 
assets. As such, the Social Engineer's work instantly becomes more difficult 
as there are more than one employees that need to be targeted and 
convinced to act in a way that will eventually lead to a successful attack.   
 
By the "Separation of development, test, and operational facilities" described 
in control 10.1.4, the chances of the operational facility being compromised as 
a result of a SE attack, are reduced during the development of a new system. 
As many individuals, external to the organisation, unavoidably find themselves 
involved with various aspects of a system in development, it is by definition 
more difficult to uphold the required level of security in relation to the system 
being developed. Hence, a Social Engineer may target the system under 
development in order to gain access to the operational system. This becomes 
more difficult through the separation of the two systems.  
 
Section 10.2 "Third party service delivery management" ensures that third 
parties continue to uphold the terms of their agreements in terms of service 
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and information security. It could be argued that the controls presented in this 
section do not have a direct relation to SE attacks in particular. However, 
these controls help in seamlessly interfacing the organisation's security policy 
to those of the collaborating third-parties. Effectively, having an as common 
as possible security policy, will help in countering SE attacks. Most 
importantly, guideline 10.2.2(c) "provide information about information security 
incidents and review of this information by the third party and the organization 
as required by the agreements and any supporting guidelines and 
procedures" effectively ascertains that a security incident caused by a SE 
attack that targeted the third party in an attempt to compromise the security of 
the organisation's information, will raise all necessary alarms, both within the 
organisation and the third-party structures, in an attempt to block any further 
phases of the attack. 
   
Section 10.3 "System planning and acceptance" offers guidance in order to 
minimise the risk of system failures through sound capacity management and 
system acceptance practices. Though not directly related to SE, it helps avoid 
emergency situations that well-informed Social Engineers may benefit from.  
 
The controls of section 10.4 "Protection against malicious and mobile code" 
serve the obvious cause of protecting the integrity of system, software and 
information against malware. Through a repertoire of attack types, Social 
Engineers may convince a targeted employee into installing a piece of 
software on the system, thus compromising system security. Hence, the 
directives of controls 10.4.1 "Controls against malicious code" and 10.4.2 
"Controls against mobile code" do indeed create a line of defense against 
such threats. There are however issues with the guidelines as, for instance, 
guideline 10.4.1(c): "conducting regular reviews of the software and data 
content of systems supporting critical business processes; the presence of 
any unapproved files or unauthorized amendments should be formally 
investigated". Taking into consideration the thousands of files installed on a 
single system, that are necessary to support a large number of applications 
from different developers and vendors, it is probably futile to attempt to 
Detailed examination of the ISO/IEC 17779:2005 IS standard with respect to SE  
 
 
Appendix C   270   
identify every single file and verify its function. In theory, it might be helpful to 
try and locate suspicious files but in practice even this is becoming 
increasingly difficult. Further on, it is stated that "The use of two or more 
software products protecting against malicious code across the information 
processing environment from different vendors can improve the effectiveness 
of malicious code protection". It is well known that antivirus and "internet 
security" software products from different vendors are rather intolerable of one 
another and most even ask the person performing the installation to remove 
other software of the same type before proceeding. Even false alarms and 
lockups can take place if more than one such products co-exist on the same 
system. Hence, this guideline should be taken with a grain of salt. Two (or 
more) pieces of protection software could co-exist on the same network 
provided that they do not execute on the same processor. This arrangement 
could possibly result in the benefits described in control 10.4.1 but the effort in 
keeping two or more such products updated may not be worth it. This is 
especially true if the products execute within the confines of a network that 
has no Internet connections for security reasons.  
 
There is a further complication regarding the use of commercial software to 
control malicious and mobile code and that stems from its limitations. The 
very nature of common computer virii, worms, malicious Java scripts etc is 
such that they all constitute malware which propagates indiscriminately, 
infesting any unprotected system. Hence, when a new virus is located, the 
antivirus software houses identify its characteristics and add it to the list of 
mitigated threats. This list then is passed on to the antivirus software users 
through a mechanism of updates. However, when a particular organisation (or 
even individual) is targeted by a Social Engineer, chances are that the 
malware implanted in the system through SE techniques will be a new and 
unknown piece of software that will never become "mainstream" enough to 
cause the attention of the antivirus software houses. Even though antivirus 
and related software do use heuristic methods to identify misbehaving pieces 
of software that are unknown to them, this offers little protection as there exist 
programming tricks that can be employed by the malware author to avoid 
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detection of the malicious code. Furthermore, a clever attacker would implant 
a low-profile piece of software that silently works in the background without 
being detected. This is quite different from the "show-offish" behaviour of 
mainstream malware. Hence, although the use of antivirus and anti-malware 
software is essential, it does not solve the full extent of the problem. Thus, it is 
once more proven that steps must be taken in the direction of building up 
psychological user defenses against SE attacks, rather than trying to identify 
and rectify the problems caused by a successful one. This, however, does not 
devaluate in the least the need for protection against malware. 
 
Control 10.5.1 "Information back-up" provides guidelines for effective and 
secure back-up procedures. Especially guideline 10.5.1(h) that calls for 
encryption of back-ups when the backed-up data is classified, helps secure 
the data carried on a back-up set if the set is stolen. As backup sets are 
always high on the list of infiltrators since they contain the most important data 
in a space-efficient way, rendering them useless is very important.  
 
Section 10.6 "Network security management" provides guidance for ensuring 
the protection of information in networks as well as that of the supporting 
infrastructure. As is true for most security controls, the ones presented here 
do not have a direct relation to the issues involved in SE. Control 10.6.1 
"Network controls" could benefit from the addition of guidelines stating: 
"Networks must be classified according to the classification of information 
passing over them" and: "Networks providing Internet access to users should 
be classified at the lowest level".  
 
Regarding connections between networks there must be at least two 
guidelines: "Routing equipment must only be used to connect networks of the 
same classification" and: "Connections between networks of different 
classifications must be established only if business processes demand it and 
only through appropriate Firewall equipment". An exclusion from the above 
guideline would be: "When the level of classification of a network demands it, 
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the network should be physically isolated from other networks of lower 
classification (even connection through Firewall equipment is not allowed)".  
 
Furthermore: "Only equipment of classification equivalent to that of a network 
can be connected to that network" and: "Computer equipment in general and 
workstations in particular, must not be physically connected to more than one 
networks at any time. Moving the physical network connection of equipment 
from one network to another is forbidden. Firewall and routing equipment is 
excluded from the above directives". A connection established in defiance of 
the above directives would function as an unauthorised bridge between the 
two networks and must not be allowed. If there is a general need that has 
been properly justified for users' workstations to be simultaneously connected 
to two different networks and the classifications of the two networks allow it, 
then the bridging must take place at a central level using proper router and 
firewall equipment. Such an implementation must first undergo a full security 
examination to identify and mitigate relevant risks.  
 
Finally, a guideline concerning network outlets should be added: "Measures 
must be taken to ensure that network outlets are protected against 
unauthorised use by centrally deactivating unused outlets and by locking 
active outlets to the authorised equipment that uses them.  
 
Perhaps the reason that networks have not received much attention regarding 
their classification is that until recently, it was not financially sound or even 
feasible for an organisation to install and maintain a number of different 
network backbones, each classified at a different level. By realising the 
severity of the threats to the network that could materialise through a single 
networked user's connection to the Internet, an increasing number of 
organisations opt for physical separation between backbones. This 
requirement becomes more prominent as the classification level of information 
transmitted on the network, rises. In this case, it is not just the Internet that 
constitutes a potential threat but rather the potential of unauthorised access 
form within the organisation becomes a calculable risk. The concern is such 
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that in some cases (Government services, for example) even VPN 
realisations may seem inadequate. Hence, physical separation may prove to 
be the only solution. This physical separation should not be compromised by 
PCs or other equipment connected to more than one networks 
(simultaneously or not) that could act as an uncontrollable bridge between 
them. Apart from the danger of creating a transfer path for common malware 
between the two networks, if the PC is simultaneously connected to the two 
networks, using two network interfaces, real-time bridging may occur. If there 
is only one network interface on the PC and the PC is connected to the two 
networks at different times, delayed-action information leaks may take place 
by first obtaining data from one network and then passing it on to the other 
network when the physical connection is switched. Through the use of DHCP, 
such a scenario would not require much effort on the part of the attacker. It is 
conceivable that a legitimate user could be persuaded to do such things by a 
manipulative Social Engineer posing, for instance, as a help desk member. 
 
Section 10.6.2 "Security of network services" is necessary to ascertain the 
level of security offered by network service providers. As network service 
security is tightened, the Social Engineer has fewer opportunities to strike.  
 
Section 10.7 "Media handling" provides precise guidance for ensuring that 
information-bearing assets should not be disclosed, modified, removed, or 
destroyed in an unauthorised way and that business activities should not be 
interrupted. If the proposed controls are in place, a SE attack targeting media 
or system documentation will most probably not succeed.  
 
Section 10.8 "Exchange of information" provides controls for maintaining the 
security of information exchanged within an organisation as well as with any 
external entity. By specifying policies and procedures to protect the exchange 
of information through any and all communication channels available, 
including physical transfer, and by applying the need-to-know principle to the 
bulk of the information being exchanged, the possibility of information leakage 
in general or -more specifically- as a result of a SE attack, is minimised.  
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Regarding the use of fax machines in particular, one should always bear in 
mind that a fax-id may be faked and that there is no automatic 
acknowledgement system in place. The "OK" indication received at the end of 
the transmission does not automatically mean that the designated recipient 
has already read and properly processed the faxed message. In addition to all 
the precautions outlined throughout the controls of section 10.8, vocal 
communication and confirmation at pre-designated telephone numbers should 
follow either the transmission or the reception of significant documents. Even 
in that case a faxed copy is not considered a legally-binding document in most 
parts of the world. At least, though, a Social Engineer's attempt to 
impersonate the other party in communication by fax will have failed. A partial 
solution to the problems associated with faxed documents may be achieved 
through the use of dedicated encrypting equipment. Such encryptors are 
connected between a standard fax machine and the PSTN telephone line and 
are pre-set to communicate in a secure manner, only with equivalent setups in 
other locations. Through the use of shared keys, no outsiders may intercept 
transmitted documents or inject fabricated ones into this secure ring. Despite 
the obvious drawbacks that have to do with key creation and distribution, 
increased cost of equipment acquisition and maintenance and the fact that 
secure communication is limited to a specific number of destinations, such a 
system can be considered quite secure from a SE point of view. The aspect of 
availability does suffer and makes the system impossible to view as a 
universal solution, but otherwise, this encryptor-based system does uphold 
the confidentiality, integrity and non-repudiation aspects of security.  
 
Sections 10.9 "Electronic commerce services" views the problem of security 
from the side of the organisation implementing the electronic commerce 
(section 10.9.1) and On-line services (section 10.9.2). However, the risk here 
is no longer associated only with the organisation side. Through SE methods 
over email or otherwise, key-loggers may be installed on the client's side to 
record and transmit keystrokes that reveal passwords, personal information 
etc. Furthermore, another very popular SE technique, "phishing" can be very 
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successful in extracting personal information, passwords etc and may 
potentially lead to full-fledged identity theft. The organisation involved with 
providing electronic commerce and on-line services may not be held directly 
or legally responsible as there is no way of controlling what types of malware 
are being executed on the client's PC or to which SE attacks the client may 
have succumbed. However, it is imperative that all organisations dealing on-
line with their business partners or the general public, take all precautions to 
help uphold the security of both ends of the communication line. Such 
precautions may include splash screens with warnings about spyware and 
instructions on how to uphold the security of the transaction through SSL, the 
use of on-screen  "soft" keyboards for sensitive data entry that can not be 
logged by the key-logging routines of spyware, the issue of One-Time 
Password (OTP) devices to be used by registered clients (for web banking 
services, for instance), directed emails about fraud on the Web and phishing 
attempts, the use of asymmetric cryptographic keys for encrypted point-to-
point communications etc.  
 
Section 10.9.3 deals with the integrity of publicly available information. If a 
Social Engineer manages to modify such information, he/she may then use it 
as a confidence-building tool in an attack targeted towards another Mark. For 
example a victim could easily be fooled by being told by the Social Engineer 
to address a reply containing sensitive information to " mr. So-and-So whose 
name and telephone number appear on the organisation's official web page". 
If the page has already been compromised to reflect the Social Engineer's 
preferred phone number or email address, the attack is more than likely to be 
successful.   
 
Section 10.10 "Monitoring" is only indirectly related to SE. Even in that case 
its value is limited to a "post mortem" analysis of what has transpired in the 
course of SE attack. This section stresses the need for logging user activities, 
system use, system administrator and system operator activities, faults and 
information security events with as much detail as possible. Furthermore, all 
systems should be synchronised so that their logs are synchronised too and 
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log files should be adequately protected against tampering. Clearly, if the logs 
are to be of any value, their integrity must be ascertained. If log entries are 
deleted, modified or added, it may be feasible that the real guilty party gets 
away with the crime and an innocent individual takes the blame. Hence, log 
integrity is of paramount importance. By regularly examining log files with the 
use of specialised software, secure system operation may be warranted to an 
acceptable degree and perhaps attacks in progress may be identified and 
interrupted. Even if this is not the case, the sooner the problem is identified, 
the better the chances of containing the damage are.   
 
C.7. Section 11 - Access Control  
Relevant security categories: 
• Business requirement for access control 
• User access management 
• User responsibilities 
• Network access control 
• Operating system access control 
• Application and information access control 
• Mobile computing and teleworking 
 
Section 11 deals with a) the creation of an access control policy which is 
based on business and security requirements for access (section 11.1 of ISO 
17799), b) ensuring authorised user access to information systems and 
preventing unauthorized access to them (section 11.2 of ISO 17799), c) the 
prevention of unauthorized user access to the information system and the 
upholding of information security by assigning responsibilities to users 
(section 11.3 of ISO 17799), d) the prevention of unauthorized access to 
networked services (section 11.4 of ISO 17799), e) the prevention of 
unauthorized access to operating systems (section 11.5 of ISO 17799), f) the 
prevention of unauthorized access to information held in application systems 
(section 11.6 of ISO 17799), g) the upholding of the level of information 
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security dictated by the security policy when mobile computing and 
teleworking facilities are used (section 11.7 of ISO 17799). 
 
Before proceeding with the discussion of the individual controls presented in 
this section, the reader needs to be reminded that Social Engineering 
methods aim to provide the attacker with authorised access to a system 
through a manipulated legitimate user rather than bypassing the enforced 
access control measures.  
 
The control discussed in 11.1.1 "Access control policy" aims at creating an 
access control policy that serves as a rule-book for dispensing access rights 
to users, depending on business and security requirements. The policy must 
be kept current with frequent reviews in order to reflect the true needs of the 
organisation. 
 
Especially guidelines 11.1.1(h) and 11.1.1(i) may help to fend-off a Social 
Engineer seeking authorised access to the system. In particular, by 
segregating the roles of access request, authorisation and administration, it 
becomes difficult for the SE to successfully carry out attacks against all of the 
role bearers in order to gain authorised access to the system. In conjunction 
with the segregation of roles, if the requirements for "formal authorisation of 
access requests" are defined and upheld under all circumstances, a Social 
Engineer's attempt to exercise pressure or otherwise convince an 
administrator to grant him/her access will be doomed to failure as such action 
on the part of the administrator will simply not be prescribed in the formal 
procedures. Although an approach based on the attacker's impersonation of a 
legitimate user who needs access to a system is thus effectively mitigated, 
other, rather indirect attacks that aim in making the person responsible for 
controlling access to the system yield to the attacker's demands, are still quite 
possible. The exercise of authority, for example, and possibly intimidation, 
may bend the resistance of an employee fearing for his/her future in the 
organisation. If such is the case, the whole system of controls will, in fact, 
collapse. Thus, as it has already been mentioned, the main line of defense 
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against such SE approaches rests solely on the existence of a sound security 
mentality within the organisation, one, though, that does not turn into an 
obsession with security as this will, in itself, ultimately lead to extreme 
situations. 
 
Section 11.2 deals with "User access management", i.e. ensuring that 
authorised users are granted access to the information system and preventing 
unauthorised users from gaining access to it.   
 
In particular, control 11.2.1 governs the procedures of registration and de-
registration of users. Most importantly, guideline 11.2.1(a) provides for the 
assignment of responsibility to the users for their actions. This is 
accomplished through the creation of personal, unique and non-re-useable 
accounts. Hence, solid, auditing trails can be obtained and non-repudiation 
issues can be automatically resolved. One issue of the same guideline that 
generates some reason for concern, is the creation of group IDs and 
passwords. This potentially constitutes a major vulnerability as by sharing a 
common account and password, the responsibility for malevolent actions 
through that account is diffused to more than one individuals. If a security 
breach does take place under such conditions, it is always a major source of 
anxiety for all members of the group. Also, the larger the group, the more 
difficult it is to pinpoint the guilty member(s).  In guideline 11.2.3(a) users are 
prompted to "… keep group passwords solely within the members of the 
group; …". In the mind of the author, it is futile to have such a statement, as a 
group member who, for any reason, has compromised the group password, 
can easily deny the fact, given that the account details are common 
knowledge among a number of people. The age-old truth about shared 
secrets not being secrets, definitely holds strong in this case. Allowing for 
some rather specialised forms of support and maintenance structures, as far 
as ordinary users are concerned, there is no need whatsoever for shared, 
group passwords. Given the abilities of modern authentication systems, each 
group member can have a personal (truly secret) password and be assigned 
individual and group rights and responsibilities upon login. The complications 
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of having group passwords do not end here, as such passwords have to be 
reset when a group member leaves the group for any reason. Such a reset 
will involve the formal notification of all group members and will also call for 
acknowledgements to be returned that must also be administratively 
processed, i.e. logged, securely archived etc. It can thus be seen that from a 
purely administrative point of view, such action may become very quickly, very 
complicated. Administrative difficulties put aside, a Social Engineer can more 
easily persuade a target to disclose a group password than a personal one as 
the sense of ownership of a group password is weaker than that of a personal 
one. Furthermore, the password of a group of which the target is no longer a 
member, may seem to the target as of a security-wise lesser value and be 
given out with fewer reservations.  
 
Guidance 11.2.1(b) that calls for separate authorisations from the system 
owner as well as Management in order to be granted access to the system 
may impede an SE attack, as multiple targets create a greater chance of 
failure. 
 
Directives 11.2.1(d) and (e) regarding issuing written statements to the users 
outlining their access rights and requiring them to sign appropriate 
documents, assists in creating and maintaining a security culture. By following 
directives 11.2.1(h-j) and controlling redundant accounts and IDs, "loose 
ends" do not exist for a Social Engineer to take advantage of. Dormant 
accounts are always targeted by Social Engineers and hackers alike, as they 
are not regularly monitored -if monitored at all- and can provide an efficient 
back door to the secure perimeter. Disgruntled employees may use their own 
accounts that were not deactivated upon their departure themselves or 
unreservedly release that information to a Social Engineer that approaches 
them. Even more seriously, if the disgruntled employee used to have high-
level access to the information system, he/she may have succeeded in 
creating supplementary accounts for him/herself that remained unused, just in 
case of such an eventuality. This is another major issue that dictates the 
segregation of system administration duties which has already been 
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discussed. If such segregation exists, then no individual can act uncontrolled 
and single-handedly create accounts. 
 
Section 11.2.2 concerns "Privilege management" and attempts to minimise 
the need for privileged users on the system. In directives 11.2.2(d) and (e) a 
prime example of technical controls that effectively mitigate a non-technical 
vulnerability is given. This is achieved through a) the implementation of 
system routines that help avoid granting privileges to users and b) the use of 
programs that avoid the need to run with privileges. Thus as the need for 
privileged use of the system is minimised, a Social Engineer may not take 
advantage of such privileges to compromise the security of the system.   
 
Control 11.2.3 provides directives for "User password management". Apart 
from the references to group passwords that are made in 11.2.3(a) and which 
have already been discussed, the remainder of the section's directives 
provide a very solid foundation for the protection of passwords. Especially 
important is guidance 11.2.3(c) that calls for established procedures for 
verifying the user's ID in cases of requests for new or temporary passwords. It 
effectively deals with a very common method of SE attack whereby the 
attacker attempts to prove his/her ID through references to other employees 
or by bringing up facts and details internal to the organisation, or even by 
persuading another employee to vouch for him/her. A solid identification 
procedure eliminates such risk. As an addition to the directives presented in 
this section and in the context of building psychological controls against SE 
attacks, apart from the official exchange of signed statements and 
agreements regarding passwords, users should also be given informative 
material on the importance of keeping passwords secret. This should include 
guidance on how to defend themselves against SE attacks, preferably through 
discussed examples of such attacks. This should only be the first step in 
building the necessary security culture.  
 
If the guidance of control 11.2.4 "Review of user access rights" is followed, 
then it should be made reasonably certain that the rights and privileges of 
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users do in fact remain current and are solely dictated by the needs of the 
users' assignments. If obsolete user rights and privileges remain active, they 
may indeed be discovered by attackers by means and in ways that have 
already been discussed.     
 
Section 11.3 "User responsibilities" makes clear that the co-operation of 
authorised users is essential if the security of the information is to be upheld.  
 
In 11.3.1 "Password use" a set of instructions for the secure use of passwords 
is presented. Directives 11.3.1(b): "avoid keeping a record (e.g. paper, 
software file or hand-held device) of passwords, unless this can be stored 
securely and the method of storing has been approved" and 11.3.1(g): "(do) 
not include passwords in any automated log-on process, e.g. stored in a 
macro or function key" in particular, if implemented will impede the work of a 
Social Engineer who has entered the security perimeter. If there is neither a 
written record of the password, nor has the password been saved in the form 
of a macro etc, then the attacker can not make use of e.g. an unattended 
workstation to gain access to the system. Directive 11.3.1(e) calls for the 
"change passwords at regular intervals or based on the number of accesses 
(passwords for privileged accounts should be changed more frequently than 
normal passwords)…". Apart from its obvious value in upholding the security 
of a system by regularly resetting compromised passwords, this guideline 
should be extended to call for the automatic and system-wide disablement of 
passwords of dormant accounts. Although dormant accounts should not really 
exist in a well looked-after system, there is always a chance that such a case 
may occur as people sometimes make use of long-term leaves of absence 
etc. If passwords are disabled after a reasonable time of account inactivity, 
the dormant accounts are effectively locked down and thus made unavailable 
to attackers. The authorised user may at any given time, upon his/her return, 
re-apply for a new password to his/her account and go through any 
authentication processes that are deemed necessary. Although the proposed 
scheme may sound as a "belt-and-braces" solution, it is easy enough to 
implement in any modern information system and the benefits from its 
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application should be evident. Another very important directive is 11.3.1(i) that 
dictates to "not use the same password for business and non-business 
purposes". If the same password is used on multiple systems by a user, then 
the security of that password is only as good as the weakest system the 
password is used on. If one system is compromised and the password falls 
into the hands of an attacker, then access to the other systems may be 
gained, leading to the compromise of their security. Especially passwords 
used on the Internet should never be used on classified networks. As users 
tend to want to remember one simple password for all cases where login is 
essential, an interesting form of attack has been appearing through email 
"spam". Although not exactly "Phishing", whereby the target is fooled into 
entering his/her login information to a replica site pretending to be a valid one 
of which the target is an authorised user, this attack lures unsuspecting users 
by promising free software, screensavers, MP3s etc. The only prerequisite for 
the free download, is that the user first has to create a personal account with 
a user name and password. Although the free downloads do not carry a 
malicious payload, this form of attack can be very dangerous as it is built 
around one purpose: to have the visitor register and provide a username and 
password that might match those used on a business system. Obviously, this 
method would not be effective if the original emails were blindly sent to 
random recipients. However, if the attacker is targeting the Information 
System infrastructure of a particular organisation and finds him/herself in need 
of a user name and password, then the method's virtues become apparent. All 
that the attacker needs to do is to target the employees of the organisation via 
email. Chances then are that in a very short time a valid pair of user name 
and password entries would be produced that would enable the progress of 
the attack.  
 
Control 11.3.2 deals with the issue of "Unattended user equipment". 
Assuming that an attacker has managed to break into the secure perimeter of 
the organisation, his/her next target would be to gain access to the system. 
Unattended equipment, especially equipment in the middle of a process that 
requires privileged access to the system would give the attacker ample 
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opportunity to carry out the goal of creating a secret, privileged account on the 
system and/or install software appropriate to his rather special needs. The 
guidance presented in this control is sound and the control can be further 
enhanced by technical controls as they appear on the market. One solution is 
provided by smart-card controlled Ultra-Thin Client equipment (Sun 
Microsystems, 2003). These work on a principle that requires the user to 
insert a cryptographically-protected smartcard (Schneier, 1996; Frangopoulos 
& Venter, 2004) that is uniquely encoded for him/her and further protected by 
a PIN. When the card is presented to the reader on the Ultra-Thin Client 
equipment, the client first has to check the validity of the card in order to allow 
the user to then go through the authentication process. If all is well, a session 
is created for the user on a special server that serves the Ultra-Thin Clients. 
When the user leaves the Ultra-Thin Client he/she may choose to leave the 
session running. All that needs to be done is to remove the user's smartcard 
from the Ultra-Thin Client reader. As the Ultra-Thin Client equipment is 
virtually stateless, the client is released for the next user while the original 
user's session is kept running on the well-protected server. As soon as the 
original user inserts his/her card on any other Ultra-Thin Client, the original 
session is brought to that client. This "session-mobility" feature makes the 
Ultra-Thin Client especially safe when it comes to SE attacks as, in order for 
the equipment to be used in any way, a valid smartcard must be inserted in 
the Client along with its authorised user's PIN. As the Ultra-Thin Client has no 
local storage space in the form of a hard disk or otherwise, even in the 
improbable event that an attacker does gain access to it or disconnects and 
steals it (!) there is no information on it that can be compromised. Thus, 
clearly, such an implementation provides a very effective control against a 
critical phase of a type of SE attacks. Another technical measure for the rather 
non-technical issue of the absent-mindedness of users can be implemented 
through the use of proximity devices that lock the PC equipment when the 
authorised user is more than a few meters away. This device is made up of a 
cryptographically authenticated pair of transmitter - receiver. The receiver is 
always connected to the PC and controls access to it through secure 
authentication, cryptography, and/or other methods. If the receiver is not 
Detailed examination of the ISO/IEC 17779:2005 IS standard with respect to SE  
 
 
Appendix C   284   
connected to the PC or when the transmitter is not within a specified range of 
the PC/receiver, the PC and its contents are locked down and are rendered 
totally inaccessible. When the authorised user of the PC returns within range, 
he/she can continue working after providing a personal password to the 
system. Such a system provides an extra safeguard in case the user forgets 
to secure his/her PC before leaving for a short period of time. Thus, the 
window of opportunity for an attacker to take advantage of unattended 
equipment is greatly reduced if not nullified.  
 
Control 11.3.3 "Clear desk and clear screen policy" calls for the adoption of a 
clear desk policy for papers and removable storage media and a clear screen 
policy for information processing facilities. If this is upheld, not much -if any- 
information will be compromised in the event of a physical intrusion. The 
directive about not leaving sensitive information unattended on printers is very 
useful as is the proposition of having access control by PIN, installed on all 
network printers. Such a provision makes the physical presence of the job 
owner in the immediate vicinity of the printer essential in order to receive the 
output. The output can not be released to anyone without the PIN of the print 
job owner.     
 
Sections 11.4, 11.5 and 11.6 deal respectively with "Network access control", 
"Operating system access control" and " Application and information access 
control". The controls presented in these sections are quite detailed and cover 
a wide variety of network and OS access-related threats in a quite efficient 
manner. These controls should be adequate to ward-off most if not all 
attempts by a hacker to gain access to the network, the operating systems it 
supports and the applications running on it. However, it must be taken into 
consideration that a Social Engineer would most probably use a lateral 
method of operation. A Social Engineer would choose to pose as a) an 
authorised user to administrators, b) an administrator to users or c) a 
maintenance or support person to either users or administrators. If the 
controls of section 11.4 are in place and no shortcuts are taken in securely 
identifying the caller as being who he/she claims he/she is, then the attack will 
Detailed examination of the ISO/IEC 17779:2005 IS standard with respect to SE  
 
 
Appendix C   285   
almost definitely come to an abrupt end. However, the alternative method that 
the Social Engineer will use in an attack, would most probably be to convince 
an authorised user / administrator / maintenance person to do the job for 
him/her. As organisations are re-enforcing their defenses, the SE attacks no 
longer target the organisations themselves, but rather the users of the 
organisations. Hence, the users must be exposed to SE methodology if they 
are expected to recognise SE attacks and efficiently defend themselves and 
the organisation against them. Users should be trained to avoid any unusual 
requests that involve relinquishing their system access privileges to any other 
person. Thus, users should be trained to think in a lateral way similar to the 
one used by the attacker. In such a context, the question of whether the user 
will outsmart the attacker or vice-versa may arise. If "smartness" were to be 
measured in terms of IQ or otherwise, then it might be argued that a Social 
Engineer who is smarter than the average person, would in practice be 
invincible. This would lead to the question of how to devise a viable defense 
scheme to outsmart such a person. To answer this question it suffices to 
consider that the Social Engineer must go to extreme lengths to produce a 
viable and believable scenario. On the other hand, the person in defense only 
has to identify those telltale signs that accompany a SE attack and simply 
raise the alarm. This can only be accomplished through the existence of solid 
procedures and the education of users on SE methods of operation. 
Organisation employees should systematically be exposed to the persuasion 
techniques used by Social Engineers in an attempt to build defenses. To 
illustrate this, the reader should consider a simple example: A Social Engineer 
could easily show up at a remotely connected location of the organisation, 
pretending to have arrived from the central offices on assignment or 
otherwise, begin chatting with the person at the reception in a confidence-
building attempt and eventually -when it would be considered appropriate to 
do so- ask for access to the organisation's network using the local person's 
account. In such a case, the fact that another person asked for the use of the 
receptionist's account -one of the telltale signs of a SE attack- the person 
manning the reception desk should immediately deny any co-operation and 
log this as an attack with the appropriate co-ordination security response 
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office of the organisation. It is hence made evident that although sound and 
complete, the controls described here do not directly cope with the SE threat.   
 
Section 11.7 approaches the very sensitive issues of "Mobile computing and 
teleworking". As it has already been discussed, working outside the controlled 
perimeter of the organisation poses tremendous security risks for the 
information handled within the organisation's scope. Furthermore, data that 
may be obtained directly or indirectly through the use of mobile or remote 
equipment can be used to compromise the very existence of the organisation. 
The control described in 11.7.1 "Mobile computing and communications" 
attempts to mitigate the obvious risks involved with mobile computing and 
there is no doubt that it would succeed in achieving this end if its directives 
are properly implemented. The real issue though is how to establish for a fact 
that the guidelines are upheld and that the control does indeed function as 
designed. In this author's mind this is impossible to do as the control deals 
with locations outside the secure perimeter of the organisation. Hence, by the 
control's very nature, it is the end user who is ultimately responsible for its 
implementation, in circumstances that can neither be monitored nor centrally 
controlled.  
 
The advent of cutting edge technologies such as wireless networks that are 
swiftly embraced by users and organisations alike, has the potential to create 
many vulnerabilities. The operational incorporation of new technologies by 
organisations, in many cases before a scrupulous assessment of the level of 
security that these technologies provide is even made possible, brings forth 
many new threats, including those stemming from Social Engineering. The 
reader is reminded of the "Evil twin" threat that has already been discussed in 
this context. This is a typical example of the inability of the organisation to 
centrally control all segments of a communication channel. Even though not 
directly implemented by the organisation, the incorporation of any wireless 
network in its operations is indirectly endorsed if access to an internal network 
of operational significance is allowed to the organisation's users over the 
Internet. The average user can not really be held responsible for using a 
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technology that is available to him/her, especially if there is no contra-
indication to its use. Before the "Evil twin" method, no one would have thought 
of the possibility of such a threat. Even before that, the security level of 
wireless access points had been repeatedly thought of as adequate, then 
challenged and subsequently upgraded many times. The result can be seen 
in the number of successive standards concerning the level of security of 
wireless connections. The same holds true for mobile telephony. A long 
distance has been covered in terms of security since the days of analogue 
mobile communications in North America until present day digital mobile 
systems where complicated encryption schemes are employed and are 
continually being challenged and upgraded. Through the use of SSL and VPN 
technologies, it is arguably true that any insecure channel can be used for 
secure communication. However, as these technologies are primarily based 
on asymmetric cryptography, their effectiveness is constantly being 
challenged. Furthermore according to the UK's Department of Trade and 
Industry Information security breaches survey (2006), in 2006 40% of the 
companies that allow staff to connect via pubic wireless hotspots do not 
encrypt the transmissions. Whether this lack of encryption is due to 
unavailability of funds, incomplete security policy or lack of in-house know-
how is irrelevant. The "bottom line" is that information is handled over 
insecure networks that the end-user can not control and, under the 
circumstances, can not be held responsible for.        
 
Control 11.7.2 "Teleworking" deals with the necessary policy, plans and 
procedures that must be in place to allow security to be upheld while 
personnel members are working remotely from a fixed location outside of the 
organisation. All of the guidelines presented in this section deal with physical 
security, access to the equipment, antivirus protection, the restrictions and 
provisions of home equipment, backups, business continuity etc. However 
one issue is not sufficiently addressed, and it has to do with the technological 
infrastructure that has made teleworking as we perceive it today, possible. It is 
the proliferation of high-speed connections at home as well as at the 
workplace that has made teleworking a viable method of working for a 
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continually increasing number of employees. In the past, teleworking was 
indeed possible, but the nature of work being done was dictated by the 
telecommunication equipment and channel limitations. Teleworking used to 
be ideal for business fields where live information was not essential. For 
instance, a translation company teleworking employee could send and receive 
assignments through a direct connection to a company Bulletin Board System 
(BBS) via modem. With the proliferation of the Internet, email replaced the 
BBS. Again though, the exchange of information was more or less time-limited 
to the beginning and the end of the work transaction. Today, broadband 
connections allow users to communicate from home via voice and live video-
conferencing, as well as have an uninterrupted bi-directional high-speed flow 
of data between their location and the organisation's head offices. Technical 
methods can also ensure the security of the exchanged data. Hence the 
security issue is shifted to the employee's remote workplace. This can make 
the employee's home-office the target of the Social Engineer who regards it 
as the "soft underbelly" of the organisation. Interestingly, there is no mention 
of Social Engineering attacks or appropriate countermeasures in section 
11.7.2 and the control would greatly benefit from such an inclusion.  
 
Additionally, broadband Internet connections can both be considered as a 
blessing and a curse. A blessing because of the new horizons that such fast 
connections allow the user to explore and a curse because of the 
vulnerabilities they may carry, many of which can certainly be related to SE. In 
the National Institute's of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-
46 (2002), a 113-page publication solely dedicated to the "Security of 
telecommuting and broadband communications", the increased risk of 
broadband connections is attributed mainly to the increased duration of the 
connection when compared to simple dial-up connections and to the semi-
permanent and static IP addresses that some broadband services provide on 
demand from their users for activities such as on-line gaming and web server 
hosting. A static IP may allow an attacker to target a specific user, aiming at 
gaining access to the organisation the user is teleworking at. A Social 
Engineer can launch a phishing attack that is custom-made to compromise 
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the specific target's personal information by imitating the look of official login 
pages etc. Such a phishing attack will be virtually undetectable by security 
software as such software needs to be alerted to the existence of the attack 
before including its signature to the list of threats it protects against. This is 
impossible for a one-off case. When the IP address is dynamically allocated, 
one might assume that a specific attack is not possible, which is largely true. 
The threat in that case comes from random attacks and simply stems from the 
fact that the computer will stay turned on, using the same IP address, on 
average for longer periods of time than what would be the case for a 
computer with a dial-up connection. Even worse, the computer might be left 
connected and unattended for long periods of time, either in an idle state or 
during download of large files. The random attacker thus has ample 
opportunity to compromise the targeted computer.  
 
During the past decade, emerging technologies in the field have had mainly to 
do with mobile computing and communications techniques and equipment, 
and have enabled communication in all forms to become faster, cheaper, 
richer in content and to an increasing extent released from location 
constraints. This rapid emergence, caused and fueled by the innate need of 
our race to communicate with one another, has changed the way we view the 
concept of work. This change has generated significant societal and economic 
repercussions, the long-term effects of which we are just beginning to fathom. 
Users are free to roam the globe and still be in touch with the organisation's 
headquarters as well as friends and family. This is exactly where the 
contradiction in security terms begins. Users have a tendency to combine 
official and personal information on the same device and use that same 
device for both purposes when they are on the move, simply because it is 
convenient. Strangely enough, all the controls regarding the classification of 
equipment as well as the directives for physical separation of equipment of 
different classification seem to fall apart when a user is on the move. Although 
it is rarely openly admitted, requests for sending sensitive information over 
insecure channels take place all the time. This is one case where technology 
is not able to provide solutions that are simple and secure enough and at the 
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same time warrant the unimpeded upholding of the security policy when users 
become mobile. This is clearly a case where the availability of information is 
challenged if its confidentiality is to be upheld and when this happens, the 
globe-roaming executive will usually prefer availability over security. We have 
not yet reached a state where all of the security measures seamlessly 
integrate with our customary notion of working and communicating. The 
plethora of applied privacy and security standards, acronyms, emerging 
security techniques, new threats to security and the like, are clearly capable of 
perplexing even experts in the field. How will the average, non-expert user be 
able to make sense of all this and decide upon a course of action when the 
need arises? It is exactly this uncertainty that the Social Engineer uses as a 
tool in targeting not the organisation, but its users instead. To help reduce the 
uncertainty, the guidelines of controls 11.7.1 and 11.7.2 should stress the 
duality of a successful defense. On one hand, there are the purely technical 
measures that must be implemented in order to create the infrastructure for 
attaining the desired security level. On the other hand, there are the users' 
actions that ensure the upholding of security. The second part is the most 
difficult to strengthen and this can only be done through the education of 
users and awareness programs. Exact and structured directions can and must 
be given to users so that they can block SE attacks. However, this is definitely 
not going to work 100% of the time. Defending against SE is not an exact 
science. Neither can the ingenious attack of tomorrow be fully anticipated 
today. The Social Engineer has his mind and ingenuity to rely upon and the 
only real weapon against those is also a human mind; the mind of the 
potential target who now finds himself on the first line of defense in a never-
ending battle. Hence, the users' minds must be exercised to recognise any 
uncharted new attack through exposure to data gathered from previous or 
hypothetical attacks.  
 
C.8. Section 12 - Information Systems Acquisition, 
Development and Maintenance  
Relevant security categories: 
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• Security requirements of information systems 
• Correct processing in applications 
• Cryptographic controls 
• Security of system files 
• Security in development and support processes 
• Technical vulnerability management 
 
Section 12 deals with a) the security requirements of information systems 
In order to ensure that security is an integral part of information systems 
(section 12.1 of ISO17799), b) preventing errors, loss, unauthorized 
modification or misuse of information in applications (section 12.2 of 
ISO17799), c) protecting the security of information through cryptographic 
Means (section 12.3 of ISO17799), d) ensuring the security of system files 
(section 12.4 of ISO17799), e) securing the development and support 
processes in order to maintain the security of application system software and 
information (section 12.5 of ISO17799) and f) managing technical 
vulnerabilities in order to mitigate the risk that may result from the exploitation 
of published technical vulnerabilities.  
 
As it stands, section 12 is not directly related to the mitigation of risks 
stemming from possible SE attacks. A small number of issues do arise in 
certain parts of the text but most have already been thoroughly examined in 
the context of previous sections of the ISO 17799 standard. Nevertheless, 
these will be pinpointed and briefly placed in the context of this section.    
One of the guidelines of the control described in 12.4.1 reads "Software 
patches should be applied when they can help to remove or reduce security 
weaknesses".  It probably should be added that "patches should come from 
a verified and authorised source to avoid the risk of introducing fake 
patches to the system that could lead to its compromise". This may come 
as an effective control for a "sting" operation orchestrated by a Social 
Engineer and also applies to section 12.6.1. 
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Another guideline of control 12.4.1 states: "Physical or logical access should 
only be given to suppliers for support purposes when necessary, and with 
management approval. The supplier’s activities should be monitored". 
Although identification of collaborating third-party personnel has been dealt 
with extensively in previous sections, it might be worthwhile to add here: 
"Supplier personnel should be positively identified and if necessary be 
previously classified according to their intended purpose and access".  
Hence a Social Engineer will not be able to walk thorough to the heart of the 
organisation pretending to be a member of a supplier's personnel.  
 
In control 12.4.2 that offers guidelines for the protection of system test data, it 
should be added that "depending on the sensitivity of the information 
normally carried by the system and its classification, test output should 
be treated in the same manner as operational output and be subjected to 
the same sanitisation or controlled destruction procedures". This way 
neither actual information may inadvertently leak, nor information about the 
output format or other detail internal to the system may be compromised.    
 
The guidelines offered in control 12.5.4 regarding information leakage, may 
help in halting the result of a SE attack that was successful in planting of 
covert channel software or other spyware.  
 
C.9. Section 13 - Information Security Incident Management  
Relevant security categories: 
• Reporting information security events and weaknesses 
• Management of information security incidents and improvements 
 
Section 13 of ISO 17799 is probably one of the most important sections of the 
standard insofar SE is concerned. A solid security incident management 
infrastructure is essential in providing effective defense against SE attacks. 
Section 13 deals with a) formal procedures of reporting information security 
events and weaknesses in a manner that allows prompt corrective action to 
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be taken (section 13.1 of ISO17799) and b) ways of providing consistent and 
effective management of IS incidents.  
 
Control 13.1.1 deals with "Reporting information security events" (section 
13.1.1). The guidelines presented there, offer a solid foundation for a 
reporting procedure that is necessary for successful response to IS events. 
The point made about making all people involved in the operation of the 
organisation aware of reporting procedures for security events and points of 
contact is very important. During a SE attack, there is usually very little time to 
either go through the hierarchy in order to file a report or waste precious time 
in trying to locate the person responsible for receiving that report. This 
corroborates the argument for a hierarchy of IS professionals that must be 
independent of and deployed in parallel to the administrative hierarchy of the 
organisation. Furthermore, guideline 13.1.1(c) is definitely along the right track 
with respect to SE attacks as it provides for immediately reporting to the 
Information Systems security contact person without having to fill out any 
paperwork. "Duress alarms" are also mentioned and this too is a measure that 
should be considered in the context of SE attacks. Assuming that user training 
and security awareness schemes have been successful in giving employees 
the necessary edge on SE attacks, a targeted employee may indeed realise 
at some point that he/she is under attack by a Social Engineer. If the attack is 
taking place over the phone, the employee may put the attacker briefly on 
hold in order to notify the appropriate security contact person. If the attack is 
taking place with the attacker "in situ" then a coded phone call for e.g. request 
"for stationery with the organisation's logo in French" to the security contact 
person, should set the defense mechanism in motion in order to locate and 
apprehend the attacker. 
  
Control 13.2.1, "Responsibilities and procedures", outlines the procedures 
that should be in place so that the response to IS security incidents is most 
effective. In guideline 13.2.1(c) the need for audit trails is emphasised. In the 
case of SE attacks these can include video footage or recorded telephone 
conversations. For such evidence to be admissible in court, it must be made 
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certain that it is collected in a proper manner according to legislation and the 
principle of protection of personal rights. Control 13.2.3 deals with the matter 
of evidence collection in general, but not with the recording of either phone 
conversations or video in particular. Provision should perhaps be made for 
this aspect of evidence collection also.  
 
According to control 13.2.2 "Learning from information security incidents" 
there is a need for quantifying and monitoring the types, volumes, and cost of 
IS incidents. If this is also applied to SE attack-related incidents, then a 
measure of success of security-related training and awareness schemes with 
respect to SE can be indirectly obtained. This is very important due to the 
inherent difficulty in obtaining direct measurements regarding SE attacks. 
Hence, if there is a chance of obtaining real-life SE-related metrics, this can 
be made possible through the existence and consistent operation of an IS 
security incident reporting mechanism.  
 
Returning to control 13.2.3, on the issue of evidence trail establishment in the 
case of information on computer media, it is stated that mirror images of 
media should be securely obtained and kept. While this may be fairly easily 
possible for most of PC systems, when it comes to creating a mirror image of 
the hard disk of a server or of any other mission-critical piece of hardware, the 
process may not be that simple.  In order to protect the state of the system as 
it was during or shortly after the incident, the attacked system must be taken 
off-line and mirror images be obtained. This is never an easy or fast process 
and what this means in practice is that the system must stay off-line for a 
significant amount of time or else contamination or even loss of the evidence 
may occur. It can thus be argued that an extreme form of Denial-of-Service 
attack could be initiated simply by creating the false idea that the system is 
under attack and cause it to be taken off-line. All it would take to bring down 
the system could, in theory, be a couple of carefully placed phone calls to 
trigger the IS incident response mechanism.  
 
Detailed examination of the ISO/IEC 17779:2005 IS standard with respect to SE  
 
 
Appendix C   295   
As the uncertainty of whether the system is under attack or not rises, it is 
much more difficult to identify and counter the attack. This is something that 
could be used by the Social Engineer in an attempt to work around the IS 
incident response mechanism. By frequently creating small and insignificant 
IS discrepancies, these would initially be treated as IS incidents and result in 
the mobilisation of the response mechanism, but would, after a while, tend to 
be ignored. When this point is reached, the real attack can take place and 
have a greater possibility of success.          
 
C.10. Section 14 - Business Continuity Management  
Relevant security categories: 
• Information security aspects of business continuity management 
 
The objective of section 14 of ISO 17799 is described as "to counteract 
interruptions to business activities and to protect critical business processes 
from the effects of major failures of information systems or disasters and to 
ensure their timely resumption". Hence, the controls of this section can not be 
directly related to the notion of SE. One issue though that has to do with the 
control of sub-section 14.1.2 "Business continuity and risk assessment" is that 
every effort should be made to consider the SE attacks and their effects in the 
risk assessment procedure. In order to do so, it would be helpful if SE 
vulnerabilities and threats could be reduced to quantifiable entities.  
C.11. Section 15 - Compliance  
Relevant security categories: 
• Compliance with legal requirements 
• Compliance with security policies and standards, and technical compliance 
• Information systems audit considerations 
 
The objective of section 15 of ISO 17799 is "to avoid breaches of any law, 
statutory, regulatory or contractual obligations, and of any security 
requirements". As such, most of the controls of this section are not directly 
related to SE. Control 15.2.1 "Compliance with security policies and 
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standards" is obviously important as is control 15.3.2 "Protection of 
information systems audit tools", given that any self-respecting attacker, 
Social Engineer or otherwise, would attempt to render the audit tools 
unusable if possible, to make any trail that has been left behind, difficult or 
impossible to follow. 
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